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Resumo
Esta tese explora as ligações entre a filosofia tardia de Ludwig Wittgenstein e
método de modelação dos jogos de sinalização (signaling games). Em particular,
foco-me nas Investigações Filosóficas, nomeadamente em quatro tópicos aí desen-
volvidos: as observações de Wittgenstein sobre filosofia e método, a sua imagem
da linguagem como uma prática dinâmica e heterogénea, as suas críticas a algumas
variantes da conceção do significado como uma forma de correspondência, e as suas
discussões sobre o seguimento de regras. Defendo que o método dos jogos de sina-
lização fornece-nos ferramentas que permitem um estudo do significado que está no
geral bem alinhado com esses aspetos da filosofia tardia de Wittgenstein. Adicio-
nalmente, a comparação revela trabalho na área dos jogos de sinalização que pode
ser visto como filosoficamente problemático à luz dos comentários de Wittgenstein,
e aponta para potenciais melhorias e direções para trabalho futuro.
Palavras-chave: filosofia da linguagem, Wittgenstein, jogos de sinalização
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Abstract
This thesis explores the connections between Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philos-
ophy and the modeling framework of signaling games. In particular, I focus on the
Philosophical Investigations and on four topics within it: Wittgenstein’s remarks on
philosophy and method, his picture of language as a dynamic and heterogeneous
practice, his criticism of some variants of conceptions of meaning as correspondence,
and his discussions on rules and rule-following. I argue that the signaling games
framework provides us tools that enable a study of meaning that is generally in
line with these aspects of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Exploring the connec-
tions additionally reveals where some work in the signaling games literature goes
philosophically astray in light of Wittgenstein’s remarks, and points to ideas for
improvements and future work.
Keywords: philosophy of language, Wittgenstein, signaling games
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Introduction
Language is a pervasive presence in the lives of human beings. So much so, that
the ability to use language in the ways that we do is often considered one of the
quintessential characteristics that differentiate us from other animals. Throughout
the ages, many have attempted to develop a better understanding of how language
works, from philosophers, to linguists, psychologists, anthropologists, neuroscien-
tists, and researchers from many other fields. Despite language’s ubiquity in our
practices, and the great deal of attention it has received, there can be a feeling
that progress in developing the theoretical tools to understand it better has been
extremely slow, especially when compared with the study of other phenomena in
natural science. Although we have confidence in our growing knowledge of quarks
and atoms, molecules and chemical reactions, genes and cell structure, planets and
galaxies, and so many other things, we seem to struggle to provide a satisfying
theoretical characterization of a sentence as simple as “Hello!”
This is especially the case when it comes to the aspect of language that is the
focus of this thesis: meaning. Efforts to get a better theoretical grip on meaning go
back to philosophers in Ancient Greece, and have especially become an important
part of philosophical practice since the so-called linguistic turn (Rorty, 1967). De-
spite all the work philosophers put into the topic, consensual progress is lacking (e.g.
Putnam, 1970). Why is that? Perhaps the pervasiveness of language in our lives is
the very thing that makes the study of it difficult; maybe we are too close to see the
forest for the trees. Perhaps our close acquaintance with it creates ingrained pre-
conceptions that get in the way of a deeper understanding. Perhaps it is a problem
of self-reference—the fact that we need language to theorize about language—that
ties us up in knots. Perhaps philosophers have been asking the wrong questions.
Or perhaps it is simply that the phenomenon under study is just more broad and
complex than it seems at first glance.
One philosopher that came to realize most of these issues is Ludwig Wittgenstein.
His early work (e.g. 1922) is seen by most as outlining a systematic theory of meaning
at the forefront of the linguistic turn. His later work (e.g. 1953), however, is mostly
read as fundamentally undermining the picture of language that underlies his earlier
theorizing efforts. Some read his later remarks not only as forming a critique of
how philosophers typically go wrong when thinking about language, but also as
presenting a case against the very possibility of one ever developing a systematic
account of meaning. I believe the latter conclusion is too strong. A great deal
of Wittgenstein’s later criticism is targeted against the mainstream philosophical
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conceptions of language and meaning of his time. Those conceptions are easily tied
to systematic approaches to meaning in general, but this connection is contingent.
A criticism of the former need not necessarily imply, I believe, a full rejection of the
possibility of the latter. But it is important to explore why.
In this thesis, I focus onWittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953; 2009)1.
How I read it, the book attempts to undermine various intuitions that underlie, but
are not exclusive to, a family of philosophical ideas about meaning. These intuitions
include a craving for exactness and objectivity, the idea of meaning as something
possessed and determined by linguistic expressions, a tendency to ignore the multi-
farious and dynamic ways in which we use language and overgeneralize from limited
examples, among others. I see the epitome of the picture of meaning criticized by
Wittgenstein in the analytic approach that uses logic as its main theoretical tool.
This approach can be traced back to the work of Gottlob Frege and is currently
embodied by contemporary formal semantics. Despite the heterogeneity of the field,
I believe that objections to most (if not all) of its variants could be raised along
the lines of at least one of the Wittgenstein’s criticism of the aforementioned intu-
itions. To those that agree with this reading, the predominance of formal semantics
as comprising the most systematic approaches to meaning in philosophy may make
it seem that agreeing with Wittgenstein’s later remarks on language implies giving
up on systematicity. I believe that we can have our cake and eat it too.
The main objective of this thesis is to argue that there is at least one approach for
studying meaning that is both systematic and in line with Wittgenstein’s remarks
in the Philosophical Investigations: signaling games. This framework, introduced
by David Lewis (1969) and brought back to life after almost 30 years by Brian
Skyrms (1996), provides game-theoretical tools to model linguistic interactions be-
tween agents. It fosters the use of mathematical modeling and computer simulations
to study the dynamics of particular scenarios of language use. It can be used in a
way that does not fall prey to the intuitions Wittgenstein warns us about, and is
furthermore aligned with his alternative picture of language and meaning. This
thesis is an exploration of the idea that the framework of signaling games points
to a way that can embrace both the lessons of the Philosophical Investigations and
systematicity in the study of meaning.
1I make a large number of references to the Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 1953).
In order to reduce the dependence on a particular edition of the book, I mostly refrain from using
a publication year and page numbers in citations, and instead cite numbered sections using the
§ symbol. In some occasions, the paragraph within a section is specified by using lowercase letters
in the standard alphabetical order. For example, §64b refers to the Philosophical Investigations,
section 64, second paragraph. Quotes are taken from the revised 4th edition by P. M. S. Hacker
and Joachim Schulte (2009). When these are used, publication year and page numbers to this
edition are provided in the citation.
3To be clear, there are other families of models in the literature that address issues
of communication in a similar way. One that is very closely related and used a lot
in economics sprouted from a seminal paper by Michael Spence (1978). I will briefly
mention some work belonging to this approach in this thesis, but the literature
is much richer that what I can cover here. Connelly et al. (2011) give a more
thorough overview. Another strongly related approach originates from the work of
Luc Steels (1995) and is popular with researchers from the areas of statistical physics
and complexity theory. An idea of the work developed by this lineage of research
can be found, for example, in publications by Beckner et al. (2009) and Loreto,
Baronchelli, and Puglisi (2010). The strong similarities between these approaches
makes this thesis hopefully also relevant for these types of models. But, for the sake
of brevity and clarity, I will mostly focus on the literature that stems from the work
of Lewis (1969) and Skyrms (1996). This family of models comprises what in this
thesis I call the signaling games framework.
I would like to also state what this thesis is not. First, it is not an in-depth
historical exegesis of the Philosophical Investigations. I do not explore the history
and origins of the text or make detailed contextualization of the ideas presented. My
reading is mostly immanent (see Glock, 2007), taking the published text as a finished
product, with only occasional references to The Blue and Brown Books (Wittgen-
stein, 1958, 2002) for additional clarification. Second, it is not an exploration of all
topics presented in the book, but merely of those relevant to the use of the signal-
ing games framework. This mostly includes issues relating to philosophical method,
and both negative and positive remarks on language and meaning. Third, it is not
a defense of the positions expressed in the book. The objective is not to supplement
Wittgenstein’s arguments with my own, but simply to provide an exposition of his
ideas as they strike me. Naturally, this thesis is relevant insofar as one agrees with
most of the remarks discussed here. It is unavoidable that my opinions additionally
seep into the way I present Wittgenstein’s ideas, but this thesis should not be seen
as necessarily supporting those ideas.2 Fourth, it is also not a full defense of the sig-
naling games framework. Only arguments pertaining to Wittgenstein’s remarks will
be considered. This thesis is best thought of as attempting a defense of the following
suggestion: if you like the reading of the Philosophical Investigations presented here,
and are looking for a systematic approach to meaning that does not clash with it,
you might be interested in looking into the signaling games framework.
The thesis is structured as follows. Part I consists of background information
necessary to understand the comparison betweenWittgenstein’s ideas and the frame-
2If that was the case, much more argumentation would be required; the current thesis would
be severely lacking.
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work of signaling games. In Chapter 1, I discuss the issues of interpretation of
Wittgenstein’s work that were briefly mentioned in this introduction. I give an
overview of the approaches in the literature and position my own reading in that
context. An overview of the signaling games framework is provided in Chapter 2.
This includes an introduction and a review of the literature and state of the art.
The actual comparison begins in Part II. In Chapter 3, I consider Wittgenstein’s
remarks on methodology and their implications for the appropriateness of making
use of the tools provided by the signaling games framework in the context of philos-
ophy. In Chapter 4, I explore the picture of language set forth in the Philosophical
Investigations and how well the signaling games approach embraces it. In Chapter 5,
I address one of Wittgenstein’s main target of criticism throughout the book: the
intuition that linguistic expressions have meanings. I outline Wittgenstein’s argu-
ments against some variants of this idea, and explore their significance for certain
conceptions of meaning within the signaling games literature. Finally, another im-
portant theme that is discussed at length in the Philosophical Investigations has to
do with rules and rule-following. In Chapter 6, I explore Wittgenstein’s remarks on
this topic, and their relevance for possible interpretations of signaling game models.
This thesis additionally includes a multi-population signaling game model ap-
plied to vagueness. It was fully worked out during my doctoral program, and can be
seen as an example of a signaling game model that reflects some of the suggestions
stemming from taking Wittgenstein’s remarks into account. The work itself (Correia
and Franke, 2019) does not fit the main argument of this thesis, hence its inclusion
here as an appendix (Appendix A). During the production of this thesis, another
article closely related to it was published (Correia, 2019). In this case, the contents
of the article already reflected the work that was being done for Sections 3.1 and
3.2, and some overlap exists with those sections.3
3Two more articles co-authored by me, based on previous work, were published during the
course of the production of this thesis (Franke and Correia, 2018; Correia and Ocelák, 2019).
These were not included here, since most of their contents were worked on prior to the start of my
doctoral program.
Part I
Background
5

Chapter 1
Reading the Philosophical
Investigations
Various interpretations of Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investiga-
tions abound. In this chapter, I give an overview of some alternative
ways of reading the book, and clarify my own personal approach.
Interpretations of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work vary with respect to a number of
different issues. There are differing opinions regarding whether one should take his
writings as a unified vision or consisting of distinct phases, on how better to interpret
his unusual writing style and rhetorical methods, on whether one can extract sub-
stantial views from his work and, if so, what exactly they are, among other things.
Kahane, Kanterian, and Kuusela (2007, pp. 1-36) and Glock (2007) provide recent
thorough overviews of the alternatives. His Philosophical Investigations (1953) is
considered by many as a pivotal work in twentieth-century philosophy (Glock, 2007,
p. 37), despite important disagreements on why that is so. Part of the reason for
the various interpretations of this book in particular has to do with the writing
style. Between different unidentified voices, rhetorical questions, meta-remarks on
the discussion itself, it is often difficult to both clearly pin down which side of an
issue is being argued for, and what the author’s own opinion actually is (if there is
any). It is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis to delve into this problem.1
Another reason for the heterogeneity of interpretations of the Philosophical In-
vestigations stems from the interplay between how Wittgenstein conceives of phi-
losophy, and the ways he actually goes about doing philosophy. A significant part
of it (§§89-133) is dedicated to issues relating to philosophical method, with other
remarks of the same nature scattered throughout the rest of the book. These are
connected to the remaining remarks in a mutual relation. What Wittgenstein says
1See Stern (2004, pp. 21-28) for a more in-depth discussion.
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about philosophy—what it should do and what it can achieve—should, one expects,
have a direct impact on what he does when discussing certain philosophical topics,
such as meaning, action, or the mind. But what is said about language in particular
is also used to ground the metaphilosophical remarks. This can potentially be seen
as a vicious cycle. Furthermore, there can seem to be, prima facie, an inconsistency
between the two. Wittgenstein can appear at times to bluntly reject any kind of
philosophical theorizing or even just the search for explanation, but he also some-
times seem to dogmatically defend particular views on some philosophical topics. In
order to resolve this apparent tension, most interpreters argue that what he is saying
about philosophy should make us see those apparent views as something different.
Therefore, one can adumbrate a categorization of interpreters of Wittgenstein along
the lines of how they see the relation between Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy and
practice in the Philosophical Investigations.
In Section 1.1, I use this issue as a guide to map out some of the approaches in the
literature. I roughly follow the overview by Kahane, Kanterian, and Kuusela (2007,
pp. 1-36), and restrict myself to three main lines. In Section 1.2, I focus on another
possible interpretation that, although often neglected, appeals strongly to me. In
Section 1.3, based on this approach, I lay out my own choices of interpretation in
order to make clear the type of reading of the Philosophical Investigations that can
be expected in the remainder of this thesis.
1.1 Varieties of interpretation
Perhaps the most well-known reading of the Philosophical Investigations is the
often called orthodox interpretation, epitomized by a series of four volumes by Gor-
don Baker and Peter Hacker (Baker and Hacker, 1980, 1985; Hacker, 1990, 1996),
and subscribed to by many others. According to this reading, Wittgenstein’s later
philosophy presents a conception of meaning in opposition to a picture that underlies
many approaches in philosophy of language: the idea of meaning as a form of corre-
spondence between linguistic expressions (e.g. words, sentences) and other entities
(e.g. objects in the world, ideas in the mind, senses belonging to a third realm2).
The work of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Wittgenstein’s own earlier work,
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922), are especially targeted.
Advocates of this interpretation further suggest that, in alternative to this pic-
ture, the key to a proper investigation of meaning lies, according to Wittgenstein,
in the concepts of explanation and understanding:
2See Dummett (1996).
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The proper strategy is to focus on explanation and understanding and
on the relation between them. In particular, giving a correct explanation
is a criterion of understanding, while the explanation given is a standard
for the correct use of the expression explained. Correspondingly, using
an expression in accordance with correct explanations of it is a criterion
of understanding, while understanding an expression presupposes the
ability to explain it. (Baker and Hacker, 1980, p. 350)
The orthodox interpreter sees Wittgenstein as rejecting a particular idea about
meaning and as grounding his practice on an alternative: language as rule-governed
and grammar as a description of the rules of use. His metaphilosophy is said to derive
from this picture of language and to be consistent with his practice. Wittgenstein is
seen as both dispelling confusions originating from an incorrect picture of language,
and providing clarifications by giving “an Übersicht of parts of the grammar of lan-
guage that give rise to puzzlement” (Baker and Hacker, 1980, p. 368). The second
aspect of Wittgenstein’s practice should, however, not be misinterpreted as defend-
ing theories or theses, but rather as stating grammatical propositions, i.e. “familiar
rules (grammatical rules) for the uses of words” (Hacker, 2012, p. 4). According to
this view, the statement that “for the most part, the meaning of a word is its use”
is no more a theory or a hypothesis than, for example, the statement that “red is
darker than pink” (Hacker, 2012, p. 16).
Gordon Baker, although involved in the production of the first two of the afore-
mentioned four volumes widely considered as the paradigm of the so-called orthodox
interpretation, did not contribute to the latter two volumes because of a change of
opinion regarding Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy (see Hacker, 2007). In his later
work (Baker, 2004), he strongly rejects the idea that Wittgenstein was involved in
any task of grammatical clarification, and defends instead the reading of the Philo-
sophical Investigations as a book with a purely therapeutic aim. Baker specifically
draws a strong link with psychoanalysis and argues that Wittgenstein’s later work
is aimed at releasing individuals from philosophical disquietude. According to this
reading, Wittgenstein would be against presenting theses as philosophical assertions
claiming truth and generality (Pichler, 2007, p. 126) and advancing whatever views
that can appear as theses merely as highly problem- and person-specific alternative
ways of looking at things. The particular analogy with psychoanalysis is present in
other authors as well, one of the earliest proponents being John Wisdom (1953).
In its call for seeing Wittgenstein as making philosophy a purely therapeutic ac-
tivity, dissolving problems with the objective of attaining philosophical quietude, this
kind of reading has much in common with that of other authors who see Wittgen-
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stein’s later philosophy as a form of Pyrrhonian skepticism. One of the earliest
advocates of this interpretation was Robert Fogelin (1976). Bob Plant (2004) gives
a more recent proposal along similar lines. I will interchangeably call these ap-
proaches therapeutic or quietist. It is important to note, as John McDowell (2009)
rightly points out, that Wittgensteinian quietism should not be equated with aban-
doning philosophy or gratuitously rejecting philosophical problems. It is an attempt
at dissolving philosophical problems by actively engaging with them and showing
that they were not interesting problems to begin with. This is not a passive task,
as the label might suggest. The authors that defend these positions also claim con-
sistency between Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy and practice: whatever apparent
arguments or substantial views one finds in the book, should be seen as merely
instrumental for achieving the therapeutic aim of attaining peace of mind.
Between the orthodox and the quietist interpretations, we thus find two differ-
ent pictures of Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy. Morris (2007, pp. 74-76) sees this
as a choice between attributing philosophy either two tasks or just one. In the
orthodox interpretation, philosophy should have a negative task of dispelling confu-
sions and misconceptions originating from a certain understanding of language and
meaning. This would serve an instrumental purpose to make room for a positive
task of providing the correct rules of use of the linguistic expressions involved in
the misunderstandings. The negative task is thus, according to the authors sharing
this reading of Wittgenstein, compatible with a positive task. In the therapeutic or
quietist interpretations, however, there would be only one task for philosophy: un-
dermining dogmatic ways of thinking. No substantial contribution should or could
be made by philosophy since any proposal would reflect a single-minded view. Each
of these readings of Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical remarks has implications for
the reading of the rest of the book. Orthodox interpreters would endorse extracting
substantial views from his work, at least in the sense of proposals about the correct
use of linguistic expressions, while quietists would consider any apparent substantial
views as merely alternative perspectives put forward to draw attention to the fact
that there is never only one way of looking at things. They are pictures of how
things might also be, rather than a defense of how things actually are.
The two readings have in common the assumption that Wittgenstein practiced
what he preached. In order to defend the author’s consistency of thought through-
out the book, orthodox interpreters need to downplay the level of quietism in his
metaphilosophical remarks, whereas quietists need to reduce the intended weight
of Wittgenstein’s apparent substantial views in the rest of the book. David Stern
argues that one should not be too hasty in choosing one interpretation over the
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other:
In order to understand the Investigations, we have to see that the tension
between philosophy as therapy and philosophy as constructive argument
operates there in a number of different ways. (2004, pp. 53-54)
Stern suggests that we see the book as reflecting the author’s own vacillation between
‘ending philosophy’ and ‘doing philosophy’. Although Wittgenstein was at times
skeptic about what philosophy can or should do, he was also tempted to engage in
philosophical argument.
Some evidence of this is circumstantial. Stern (2004, p. 53) quotes a passage
where Rush Rees recounts a conversation with Wittgenstein in which the latter
admitted that, even though he wrote that he could “break off philosophizing” (2009,
§133c, p. 57e) when he wanted to, he actually found this difficult to do. But further
evidence to support this view comes from Wittgenstein’s own words in the preface
to the Philosophical Investigations:
After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such
a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could
write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts
soon grew feeble if I tried to force them along a single track against their
natural inclination. — And this was, of course, connected with the very
nature of the investigation. For it compels us to travel criss-cross in every
direction over a wide field of thought. — The philosophical remarks in
this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were
made in the course of these long and meandering journeys. (2009, p. 3e)
If we take these words at face value, it seems difficult to see the book as putting
forward a unified vision, be it about how language and meaning actually work, or
about the limitations of the whole of philosophy. This might also help explain how
easily proponents of each view are able to present a significant number of passages
that support their interpretation and refute the others. Following Stern’s approach,
one would be unwise to try to take any apparent substantial views as forming a
coherent and complete theory, but equally imprudent to dismiss them as merely
instrumental to a global skepticism against philosophy.
Many authors in the analytic tradition take this realization as an avowal to draw
philosophical theses or theories from passages in the book, despite Wittgenstein’s
metaphilosophical stance. This can be done in a vein that does not claim to be
necessarily representing Wittgenstein’s arguments accurately, but drawing on certain
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interpretation metaphilosophy practice
orthodox
philosophy should
provide an Übersicht of
language
grammatical remarks
therapeutic/quietist
philosophy should
exclusively dissolve
problems
views as instrumental to
therapy
analytic separable from practice skeptical argumentsand/or proto-theories
Table 1.1: Rough categorization of different interpretations of Wittgenstein’s
metaphilosophy and practice in the Philosophical Investigations.
remarks to develop one’s own perspective on the problem. The most well know
example of taking this route is Saul Kripke’s discussion of Wittgenstein’s remarks
on rule-following (1982). Kripke’s approach to the metaphilosophical remarks in
the the book is to simply brush them aside with a disclaimer. Other authors have
taken different attitudes, like acknowledging them but willingly dissenting from them
(e.g. Wright, 2007), downplaying their quietism in order to claim compatibility with
their own analysis (e.g. Travis, 2006; Horwich, 2008). In all cases, though, the
Philosophical Investigations is treated as a repository of either skeptical problems
to be resolved in an analytic fashion or proto-theories to be further developed and
detailed. The metaphilosophy is thus seen as not having a substantial bearing on
the practice, allowing the analytic interpreter to dismiss it as a separate issue or
mere idiosyncrasy.
Table 1.1 contains a rough summary of the distinctions introduced in this sec-
tion regarding the varieties of interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Inves-
tigations. As any categorization, it is necessarily reductive and potentially paves
over interesting nuances between interpreters. The objective is, however, to have
an overview of some of the choices one has to consider when interpreting later
Wittgenstein. The classification is also not exhaustive of all available options when
it comes to the interpretation of the relation between Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy
and practice. I mentioned David Stern’s (2004) position as an introduction to the
approach of the analytic interpreters, but Stern’s reading is more nuanced. He con-
siders the Philosophical Investigations as “a book that has a profoundly dialogical
character” (2004, p. 37). Bob Plant, an advocate of a Pyrrhonian interpretation,
does not think that all of Wittgenstein’s views can be dismissed as merely instrumen-
tal, but that there is a set of ideas that form a core of minimal dogmatism (Plant,
1.2. WITTGENSTEIN, THE PRAGMATIST? 13
2004, p. 242). And these are just examples of how each author’s reading can vary.
In general, I agree with Stern that the book should not be coerced into a fully
consistent whole, as both orthodox and therapist interpreters try to do. Wittgen-
stein says as much in the preface, and I don’t see a reason to ignore his own words
and try to project a unity that he himself did not see there. But, one should not
simply brush aside the metaphilosophical position and draw on the rest of the mate-
rial as a repository of views on traditional philosophical problems, like the analytic
interpreters do. It is important to do “justice to the way in which these apparently
incompatible aspects are intertwined” (Stern, 2004, p. 37) and keep both dimen-
sions of Wittgenstein’s thought in mind. Even though there might not be complete
consistency, there is a certain harmony between the two aspects that some details in
interpretation can bring to light. In the following section, I discuss another reading
that I believe does this quite well: Richard Rorty’s portrayal of later Wittgenstein
as an edifying philosopher of the pragmatist kind.
1.2 Wittgenstein, the pragmatist?
In his defense of a metaphilosophical position commonly known as neopragma-
tism3, Richard Rorty highlights a number of aspects of pragmatism in Wittgen-
stein’s later philosophy. He is not alone in seeing this (e.g. R. Haack, 1982; Putnam,
1994; Blackburn, 2006, pp. 129-136). In this thesis, I will discuss Wittgenstein’s
contextualism, methodological pluralism, and anti-foundationalism. Additionally,
considerations on explanations in the Philosophical Investigations come interwoven
with remarks that emphasize language as a social practice, and with calls for seeing
meaning in the broader context of other practices that involve the use of words and
sentences. This goes in tandem with a rejection of realist and representationalist
conceptions of meaning that see it as a form of correspondence between linguistic
entities and other things. Although Wittgenstein never identified himself as a prag-
matist, it is difficult to ignore these quintessentially pragmatist aspects of his picture
of language and philosophy. Rorty’s reading is, however, typically either ignored or
classified as quietist (e.g. Glock, 2007, pp. 52-60). I believe that Rorty’s reading
is often misunderstood and is actually closer to the analytic interpretations than is
typically acknowledged. There are, however, important nuances that set it apart
from those, but these need to be understood in the context of his general outlook
on philosophy.
3Although Rorty simply calls himself a pragmatist, other authors disagree (e.g. Putnam, 1994;
S. Haack, 1997). Delving into this debate is beyond the scope of this thesis. I will use the term
neopragmatism for Rorty’s particular variety of pragmatism in order to signal the difference.
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One important aspect of Rorty’s neopragmatism is the criticism of a certain
kind of philosophical attitude and practice. He has variously called it philosophy
as pure subject or Fach (1976), systematic philosophy (1979), or simply Philosophy
with capital P (1982). The target is a vision of philosophy as the study of certain
paradigmatic problems that are somewhat exclusive to it. These have historically
spanned over topics such as identity, subject and object, mind and matter, the
nature and origin of knowledge, the relation between language, thought, and the
world, among others. One belief characteristic of the attitude of Philosophy is that
the problems it struggles with have definite solutions. The history of Philosophy
is the story of the search for an Archimedean point of view from where all the
apodictic truths about those issues would be clearly visible. From there, universal
commensuration could be achieved, since the solutions to those problems would
be beyond dispute. Rorty divides Philosophy into Platonists and Positivists, who
both fit this description (1982, pp. xiii-xvii), differing only in whether they believe
this belief is guaranteed by a transcendent realm, or by a correspondence between
our claims and a mind-independent reality. According to Rorty, most ideas in the
Philosophical Investigations can be seen as an attack on the mindset behind this
vision of philosophical practice.
This picture of what Wittgenstein says philosophy should not be, is somewhat in
line with the orthodox interpreters. The latter also argue that Wittgenstein defends
there is nevertheless room for philosophy to positively contribute with grammatical
clarifications on some of the issues Philosophy struggles with. Wittgensteinian qui-
etists, on the other hand, think that there is no such constructive flip side to his
philosophy. There are certainly a number of passages from Rorty’s work that seem
prima facie to support his classification in the latter category of interpreters. The
following is a good example:
In our time, Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger are the great edifying,
peripheral, thinkers. All three make it as difficult as possible to take
their thought as expressing views on traditional philosophical problems,
or as making constructive proposals for philosophy as a cooperative and
progressive discipline. (1979, p. 368)
Taken out of context, this seems like an adamant call for quietism. In my opinion,
statements like this should be taken with a grain of salt, mainly because they were
put forward in a context where Rorty was interested in emphasizing a contrast
between so-called edifying philosophers and the approach of systematic philosophers.
In order to see this, it is crucial to note that Rorty is talking about ‘views’ as
something tied to the latter:
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One has to think of philosophy as a name for the study of certain defi-
nite and permanent problems—deep-lying problems which any attempt
at vision must confront: problems which professors of philosophy have
a moral obligation to continue working on, whatever their current pre-
occupations. The Nature of Being, the Nature of Man, the Relation
of Subject and Object, Language and Thought, Necessary Truth, the
Freedom of the Will—this is the sort of thing which philosophers are
supposed to have views about but which novelists and critics, histori-
ans and scientists, may be excused from discussing. It is such textbook
problems which Wittgensteinians think the Investigations may let us
dismiss. (1982, p. 31)
Rorty’s adamant rejection of the idea that edifying philosophers ‘hold views’ does
not therefore imply that he is saying that they are not putting forward any positive
proposals. In his reading, Wittgenstein is someone that wants to abandon the ideas
of truth as objective, language as in some special relation to reality, and philosophy
as the rational quest for theories detailing those ideas. He is trying to undermine
Philosophy by undermining its vocabulary (truth, language, proposition, etc) and
replacing the way of thinking that is entangled with it, by changing the subject
and talking instead about use, language-games, family resemblances, forms of life,
and so forth. The former, rejecting a certain vocabulary, is a negative task, but
the latter, proposing another, is a positive one. The difference between proposing a
new vocabulary and defending substantial views, and the reason why Rorty rejects
identifying one with the other, is that these positive proposals are of a different kind
than those of Philosophy. Thus, we should “see edifying philosophers as conversa-
tional partners” (1979, p. 372) and, like them, set aside the idea that “when we say
something we must necessarily be expressing a view about a subject” (1979, p. 371).
In order to establish the dichotomy between systematic and edifying philosophy,
Rorty does emphasize Wittgenstein’s negative task. His reading is, however, not a
full quietist interpretation. In fact, the emphasizes of the positive task is more akin
to the orthodox idea of grammatical clarification. But Rorty has something else
in mind. Later, in a different context, and with perhaps a less strict conception of
‘views’, Rorty came to very explicitly endorse the picture of Wittgenstein as more
than a pure quietist. In contrast with interpreters that have the latter picture he
says that “[t]heir understanding of Wittgenstein’s importance differs from that of
philosophers who, as I do, find support in his writings for pragmatist views of truth
and knowledge.” (2007, p. 161) He calls the latter kind of interpreters “pragmatic
Wittgensteinians” and goes on to characterize them as thinking that “their hero’s
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importance consists in having replaced a bad theory about the relation between
language and non-language, such as that offered in the Tractatus, with a better
theory, the one offered in the Philosophical Investigations.” (2007, p. 162)
Rorty’s reading is thus that Wittgenstein’s criticism of Philosophy is accom-
panied by a call for (and an exercise in) a kind of pragmatism. It is a vision of
Wittgenstein as arguing against metaphysical essentialism, epistemological founda-
tionalism, and linguistic representationalism, and proposing new ideas that do not
presume any of the above. This is even more clear if, as argued by Kraugerud
and Ramberg (2010), we see Wittgenstein as an example of Rorty’s figure of the
ironist (1989):
Rorty’s ironist holds that neither truth nor reality constrains human dis-
cursive practice; in other words, everything could be described differently
than it has been. It is not that the ironist believes everything is up to
the whim of human imagination. The ironist is simply not tempted to
regard thought or language as (in any interesting sense) representing the
world. (Kraugerud and Ramberg, 2010, p. 59)
The ironist recognizes that there is no Archimedean vantage point to underwrite our
claims and beliefs, but does not succumb to a full-blown relativism. She recognizes
the role of language as a coping tool and ventures to replace a certain vocabulary by
a more useful one. The recognition that there is no absolute way to determine which
vocabulary is the most useful—one true and final way of describing everything—does
not keep the ironist from committing herself to certain vocabularies for certain tasks,
and defend them against alternatives.
This relates again to the idea that there is a minimal dogmatism (Plant, 2004)
in the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein is indeed committed to certain
ideas, in particular about language and meaning, that are presented in a somewhat
dogmatic fashion. The orthodox interpretation attempts to give them an air of in-
disputability as mere descriptions of grammatical rules, but anyone that can imagine
possible objections to them sees how that is just another form of Philosophical dog-
matism. Reading Wittgenstein as a pragmatist ironist allows one to see these core
views not as unjustified truth claims, but simply as the views Wittgenstein is com-
mitted to.4 They, and the other views built upon them, are positive proposals, but
4Hacker (2012) makes a compelling argument that the orthodox position, with regards to this
particular point, might be closer to Wittgenstein’s original intentions than the interpretation I
am suggesting here. However, to say that there is nothing dogmatic “about the grammatical
proposition that there is no such thing as a private ostensive definition, or that the meaning of
a word is not the object it stands for, or that for the most part, the meaning of a word is its
use” (2012, p. 16) is, I believe, problematic, and at the very least flies in the face of the history
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they are not anchored in some objective notion of truth.
In summary, reading Wittgenstein as a kind of pragmatist means acknowledging
his criticism of a certain kind of doing philosophy, but leaving room for a certain
kind of positive proposals. The distinction with the analytic interpretations is in
the nature of these proposals. Under this interpretation, it is crucial to keep the
following points in mind when considering apparent proposals in the Philosophical
Investigations. First, proposals on a philosophical topic should not be seen as as-
sertions about how things necessarily or objectively are, but rather as suggestions
of alternative ways of thinking or talking about the topic. Second, positive pro-
posals should not be taken as attempts to fully characterize a certain phenomenon
(e.g. meaning and use), neither should negative arguments be seen as attempts to
completely ban a certain vocabulary (e.g. meaning and reference). This point goes
along with the idea that there are no hidden essences to be found. Third, arguments
put forward to defend proposals, positive or negative, are not purported to be the
ultimate unquestionable reasons why one should adopt those proposals. They can
instead be seen as commitments of the author or means of convincing an audience.
1.3 A reading of later Wittgenstein
The interpretation adumbrated in the previous section squares well, I believe,
not only with Wittgenstein’s inclination to address typical philosophical questions
and engage in argumentation, but also with his unorthodox rhetorical methods and
the text’s lack of formal structure. With its multiple voices, topic shifts, more
and less focused parts, the text reads indeed like a conversation that reflects a
pragmatist attitude towards doing philosophy: not forcing thoughts along a single
of philosophy. For each of those “grammatical propositions”, one can find philosophers that have
defended their opposite, even when well aware of those ideas. Even if we grant Wittgenstein that
“not all grammatical propositions are immediately obvious” (Hacker, 2012, p. 14) and some require
elucidation, it is difficult to see what the difference would then be between presenting a thesis and
giving an argument for it, versus presenting a grammatical proposition and an elucidation of it. If
that relies on the steps of the latter being “obvious and natural” (Hacker, 2012, p. 14), it shows
a certain degree of dogmatism to assume that one’s remarks can be supported by observations
beyond dispute: either the Philosophical Investigations provides such elucidations, in which case
it is impossible to explain why various readers of the book still dispute them, or it doesn’t, in
which case those remarks (or the steps of their elucidation) are as dogmatic as any other thesis
in philosophy. One person’s “obvious grammatical proposition” is another person’s example of a
dogmatic statement.
I leave open the possibility that Wittgenstein could have intended the position defended by
Hacker (2012). This would, in my view, reveal a certain inconsistency with other aspects of his
philosophy which, as I argued earlier, is definitely a possibility. The reading I am proposing here
seems to me like a better way to square his metaphilosophy with some other views expressed in the
Philosophical Investigations (namely those comprising his minimal dogmatism), but it is possible
that it does not correspond to Wittgenstein’s original intentions.
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track but letting them “travel criss-cross in every direction” (2009, p. 3e). To try
to coerce the Philosophical Investigations into a unified whole would be against
Stern’s advice, as discussed in section 1.1, of taking the dialogical character of
the book seriously. The book is complex enough to contain elements of all that
was brought forward so far—grammatical clarification, psychoanalytical therapy,
Pyrrhonian skepticism—and potentially more. The reading approach delineated
by Rorty seems consistent with Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical attitudes of anti-
essentialism, anti-foundationalism, anti-representationalism, calls for abandoning
the ideal of precision, and rejection of the metaphysical in favor of the everyday
(more on this in Chapter 3). But is it the correct reading?
Reading the book from an ironist perspective additionally turns in on itself in
an interesting way, as Alan Malachowski rightly points out:
The ‘reading’ is more a case study, so to speak, in ‘anti-essentialist’
reading habits – that is, in pragmatism as applied to texts. For Rorty is
suggesting that we will get more out of (say) Philosophical Investigations
or On Certainty if we take it to be making fun of philosophers’ theoretical
pretensions. And this is an example of Rorty’s view, amplified in his
later work, that a ‘good reading’ of a text is not necessarily one that
accurately extracts its ‘intrinsic reading’, its ‘intended meaning’ or any
such thing, but one that puts the author’s writing to the best extrinsic
practical use. (2002, p. 95)
The approach is thus to go through a certain interpretation and see what one can
get out of it in a given context. The ironist sees the writings of other philosophers
as representative of particular vocabularies which one can explore by a process of
redescription (Rorty, 1989, pp. 78-80). The aim is not to produce a ‘true reading’
(whatever that might be), but to undergo a hermeneutic experience. Interpretation
is never a fully passive process: which aspect of the text will shine brighter depends
on the perspective one takes and what one is interested in drawing from it. Rorty’s
advice is that one should simply acknowledge this and choose the interpretation that
stimulates the most interesting developments, rather than squabble over whether it
is or not correct. This seems to square well with the Wittgenstein’s intention to
“stimulate someone to thoughts of his own” (2009, p. 4e).
These suggestions typically raise fears that they warrant so-called interpreta-
tions that distort, misrepresent, or even completely disregard the original material.
Although such exercises are certainly possible and not unheard of, it is not my
intention to join those ranks. I aim to provide a reading of Wittgenstein’s later
philosophy that is not only coherent (with the aforementioned caveats in mind) but
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also plausible to others. With this in mind, I attempt to stay close to the text as
much as possible in order for the reader to be able to track the source of my claims
and judge their legitimacy themselves.
In the chapters to come, I will further guide my interpretation according to the
following general principles. It will be a mostly immanent reading (see Glock, 2007,
pp. 46-52), i.e. I will focus on the published text and its immediate context, rather
than recurring to Wittgenstein’s Nachlass or other unpublished material. I will
consider Wittgenstein as at times proposing both positive and negative views along
pragmatist lines, as delineated in section 1.2, while also in other moments advancing
views for purely therapeutic purposes. I will reformulate and refer to such views
in a manner close to Wittgenstein’s: as remarks, rather than as theories or theses.
The focus of this thesis being philosophical method, language, and meaning, I will
restrict myself as much as possible to remarks on those topics.

Chapter 2
Signaling games∗
In this chapter, I give a short introduction to the framework of signaling
games, as well as an overview of some of the models in the literature.
Signaling games were created and introduced into philosophy by David Lewis
(1969), later revived by Brian Skyrms (1996), and further explored by several other
authors. The framework has also been used in economics, mainly stemming from the
work of Michael Spence (1978), and theoretical biology, where it was imported by
Alan Grafen (1990) and John Maynard Smith (1991). Because of their diverse origin
and set of influences, terminology and notation is not always consistent throughout
the literature.
David Lewis originally described signaling problems as involving a communi-
cator and an audience. There are a number of alternative states of affairs, and
the communicator knows which state holds. Based on this knowledge, the commu-
nicator can choose one of a number of alternative signals. The audience can tell
which signal was chosen by the communicator and, based on this information, can
choose one of a number of alternative responses. The behavior of the communicator
can be represented as a mapping from states of affairs to signals, and this is called
a communicator’s contingency plan: it represents which signals the communicator
chooses conditional on which state of affairs occurs. Similarly for the audience, one
can represent its behavior (choices of responses conditional on signals chosen by
the communicator) as a mapping from signals to responses, a so-called audience’s
contingency plan.
In most literature stemming from Lewis’ work, however, this terminology is typ-
ically adapted to be more in line with the broader context of game theory. Since
Brian Skyrms’ revival of signaling games (1996) the most common nomenclature
∗Some contents of this chapter (mostly Section 2.1) can also be found in the introduction to
signaling games written for the publication entitled “Towards an Ecology of Vagueness” (Correia
and Franke, 2019), included in this thesis as Appendix A.
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is to call the communicator sender and the audience receiver ; states of affairs are
simply called states, signals are also referred to as messages, and responses are ei-
ther called acts or actions; the set of all possible states (resp. messages, actions) is
referred to as the state (resp. message, action) space; finally, contingency plans are
called strategies, and so there is typically a sender strategy and a receiver strategy.
Other alternatives are to call the sender speaker, the receiver hearer or listener,
states meanings, and signals forms.
In the family of signaling models that stem from Michael Spence’s work on job
market signaling (1978) and are used mostly in economics and theoretical biology,
rather than using the metaphor of the sender being aware of which state of affairs
holds, authors talk about senders being of a certain type, where each type sends
a particular signal. Types in this kind of models are formally equivalent to states
in Lewis-Skyrms signaling games. In this thesis I give preference to Brian Skyrms’
nomenclature, thus I will talk about senders and receivers having strategies of how
to handle states, messages, and actions.
2.1 A short introduction
Lewis’ original objective with the study of signaling games was to provide an
answer to an argument raised by Quine (1936) and others against the possibility
of language having started as a conventional system: if language is a convention, it
had to be originally established by an agreement; in order to establish an agreement,
a convention-governed system of communication would have to already have been
in place; thus, although some languages could have been established by agreement
if another convention was already in place, not all of them could. To this, Lewis
retorts:
I offer this rejoinder: an agreement sufficient to create a convention
need not be a transaction involving language or any other conventional
activity. All it takes is an exchange of manifestations of a propensity to
conform to a regularity. (1969, pp. 87-88)
In order to support this claim, Lewis studies coordination problems formalized in
terms of game theory. These are “situations of interdependent decision by two or
more agents in which coincidence of interest predominates and in which there are
two or more proper coordination equilibria” (1969, p. 24). In game theory terms,
the agents interested in the coordination are the players, the game involves each
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player making an independent choice from his set of available choices, getting a
payoff based on the choices of both.
Adapting one of Lewis’ examples, say Alice and Bob want to get together. They
usually meet at either Café One or Bistro Two. Imagine there is no way for them to
make any explicit agreement about where to meet. They are thus left to indepen-
dently decide to either go to Café One or go to Bistro Two and hope for the other
to show up there. Neither has any preference for either place, but they do want to
meet. Each thus prefers to go to one of the places only if the other also decides to
go to that particular place. The setup of the coordination problem, i.e. the avail-
able choices and the relative interests of the players, can be represented in a payoff
matrix, where rows show one player’s available choices, columns the other player’s
available choices, and each cell gives the payoff for the players based on its row and
column combination.
In the following, I assume Alice and Bob’s interests are fully aligned, so we
only need to specify one payoff value, which will be assigned to both. Consider the
following matrix:
b1 b2
a1 1 0
a2 0 1
We can see this as representing the following game: one player has a set of available
choices A = {a1, a2}, the other B = {b1, b2}; they prefer to coordinate a1 with b1 or
a2 with b2, thus if this is achieved each gets a payoff of 1, otherwise they each get
0. Connecting with the example laid out above, think of a1 as Alice going to Café
One, a2 as Alice going to Bistro Two, b1 as Bob going to Café One, and finally b2 as
Bob going to Bistro Two; their payoff is 1 for both if they coordinate on the place
to meet (independently of which one), and 0 if they fail to do so. Formally, all we
need to define in order to characterize such a kind of situation in general are the
sets of choices A and B, and a utility function U : A × B → R that specifies the
payoff for each player given the choices of both.
The above example is a very simple case, but it serves to illustrate Lewis’ notion
of convention. The two pairs of choices (a1, b1) and (a2, b2) are stable coordination
equilibria, because in such a scenario no player has an incentive to unilaterally change
his choice: if the first player is going to choose a1, the second player would get a
payoff of 0 for switching to b2, instead of 1 from sticking with b1; the same reasoning
applies, mutatis mutandis, to the other player, and to both players in the other
equilibrium. Such a combination of choices is a convention if, besides being a stable
equilibrium, it is common knowledge that everyone conforms to those choices, and
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everyone expects everyone else to continue to conform to them. However, neither
player has a preference between those two pairs. If the same coordination problem
arises repeatedly, Lewis says, we can expect precedence to induce a kind of regularity:
if the players manage to coordinate on one of the two equilibria, they should be
expected (assuming they are rational and want to maximize their payoff) to repeat
the choices that lead to that success, thus remaining in the same equilibrium. Their
preference is to remain in a certain equilibrium given that others do too. This
summarizes Lewis’s general notion of a convention.
In order to extend this notion to linguistic conventions, Lewis considers situations
where the choices available involve sending and receiving messages. Thus, we could
think of two players with different roles. The sender has knowledge about which of
a number of possible states obtains and, depending on this information, chooses a
message to send. The receiver, on the other hand, has no direct knowledge about the
state, but knows the message that the sender chose and, based on this information,
chooses one of several possible actions. A preference relation exists between actions
and states, and a payoff is attributed to each player based on the choices of both.
Note that Lewis assumes that no player has any preference regarding the particular
message that is used, provided that it enables coordination.
Formally, in order to describe the setup we need to specify a set of possible
states T , a set of available messages M , a set of actions A, and the utility function
U : T × A → R. Despite the added dimension of the message exchange, these so-
called signaling problems can be seen as particular cases of coordination problems
if we consider the players’ choices to be of whole strategies. A sender strategy
is a specification of a choice of message for each possible state. It thus describes
the sender’s behavior conditional on the state that obtains. A receiver strategy
analogously specifies a choice of action for each possible message. Thus, formally,
what the sender chooses is a function σ : T → M and the receiver a function
ρ : M → A. Since agents choose strategies, we need a notion of utility that can
be calculated in those terms. The expected utility (EU) of a pair of strategies, or
strategy profile, (σ, ρ) can be calculated, using the utility function U , as a sum of
the payoffs that would be obtained for all possible states, i.e.:
EU(σ, ρ) =
∑
t∈T
U(t, ρ(σ(t)))
As an example, consider a game with T = {t1, t2}, M = {m1,m2}, A = {a1, a2},
and the following utility matrix:
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m1 7→ a1 m1 7→ a1 m1 7→ a2 m1 7→ a2
m2 7→ a1 m2 7→ a2 m2 7→ a1 m2 7→ a2
t1 7→ m1, t2 7→ m1 1 1 1 1
t1 7→ m1, t2 7→ m2 1 2 0 1
t1 7→ m2, t2 7→ m1 1 0 2 1
t1 7→ m2, t2 7→ m2 1 1 1 1
Table 2.1: Expected utility matrix.
a1 a2
t1 1 0
t2 0 1
Since we have two states and two actions, this can be called a binary signaling game2.
Possible sender and receiver strategies are, for example, σ = {t1 7→ m2, t2 7→ m1}
and ρ = {m1 7→ a2,m2 7→ a1}. These would have an expected utility of 2 for both
sender and receiver, since when t1 obtains the sender will use m2 and to this message
the receiver will respond with a1 which achieves a payoff of 1, when t2 obtains the
sender will use m1 and to this message the receiver will respond with a2 which also
achieves a payoff of 1. Calculations of expected utility unfold as follows:
EU(σ, ρ) =
∑
t∈T
U(t, ρ(σ(t)))
= U(t1, ρ(σ(t1))) + U(t2, ρ(σ(t2)))
= U(t1, ρ(m2)) + U(t2, ρ(m1))
= U(t1, t1) + U(t2, t1)
= 1 + 1
= 2
Based on these calculations, one can consider all possible sender and receiver strate-
gies and create a matrix of expected utilities. For this example, we obtain the
matrix represented in Table 2.1. The two strategies just mentioned represent one
of the two stable conventions in this game, the other being the pair of strategies
σ = {t1 7→ m1, t2 7→ m2} and ρ = {m1 7→ a1,m2 7→ a2}. Conventions of this kind in
a signaling problem are what Lewis calls signaling systems. An example of complete
miscoordination would be σ = {t1 7→ m1, t2 7→ m2} and ρ = {m1 7→ a2,m2 7→ a1}.
This is also called an anti-signaling profile. Partial coordination can be achieved, for
example, by σ = {t1 7→ m1, t2 7→ m1} and ρ = {m1 7→ a1,m2 7→ a1}. The latter are
examples of what are called pooling strategies, i.e. strategies where either the sender
2This terminology is introduced by Hofbauer and Huttegger (2008).
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Figure 2.1: Examples of strategy profiles.
(respectively receiver) does not differentiate between states (respectively messages)
by always choosing the same message (respectively action). These example strategy
profiles are illustrated visually in Figure 2.1.
Brian Skyrms (1996, pp. 80-104) identifies some problems with the story so far.
Lewis’ account of the stability of conventions rests on what could be considered
strong demands on the agents. For there to be a certain degree of required common
knowledge between them, which is necessary for a convention to hold, there needs
to be a state of affairs that indicates to everyone involved that a certain regular-
ity will hold, as well as “mutual ascription of some common inductive standards
and background information, rationality, mutual ascription of rationality, and so
on” (Lewis, 1969, pp. 56-57). These requirements can seem excessive, even more
so if we consider how simple signaling systems are when compared to human lan-
guages. The models were introduced in order to help explain how language could
get off the ground as a conventional system without any sort of prior agreement.
However, if we consider the origins of language from a historical perspective, it seems
implausible to assume a high degree of rationality of the agents that started making
use of primordial signaling systems which (hypothetically) evolved into languages.
Furthermore, communication through simple message exchange is something that
almost all animals do: monkeys use calls, birds use singing, bees use dances, ants use
pheromone trails, and so on. A plausible account of the origin of language should
first explain how signaling systems like those could get started, without assuming a
great deal of rationality from the part of the agents involved.
In order to address this problem, Skyrms proposes we study signaling problems
in evolutionary terms. Rather than imagining, as Lewis does, rational agents making
conscious decisions in possession of knowledge of the game and expectations of the
behavior of other agents, we can imagine a simpler scenario inspired by biological
evolution: there is a population of agents with biologically hardwired behaviors
for engaging in interactions characteristic of a signaling problem; utility does not
represent preference, but rather fitness for survival and reproduction; the make-
up of the population evolves based on the relative fitness of the strategies present
in the population. Such a setup attempts to capture the main features of natural
selection: in a diverse population, agents with more successful strategies thrive, while
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m1 7→ a1 m1 7→ a1 m1 7→ a2 m1 7→ a2
m2 7→ a1 m2 7→ a2 m2 7→ a1 m2 7→ a2
t1 7→ m1, t2 7→ m1 s1 s2 s3 s4
t1 7→ m1, t2 7→ m2 s5 s6 s7 s8
t1 7→ m2, t2 7→ m1 s9 s10 s11 s12
t1 7→ m2, t2 7→ m2 s13 s14 s15 s16
Table 2.2: Possible strategy profiles in a binary signaling game.
agents with less fit strategies die off. Although the inspiration for this scenario is
biological evolution, similar things could be said (e.g. Dawkins, 1976; Boyd and
Richerson, 1985) about how ideas spread in a population of agents who can adopt
or abandon them depending on how successful they prove to be. The principles
can be captured in a formal model that abstracts away from the interpretations:
the replicator dynamic. The only thing relevant to this equation are the relative
proportions of strategies in a given population and the utility function. Using it,
one can compute which strategies evolve under which conditions.
Let’s see how this works for our ongoing example. Imagine a population com-
posed of agents that play both as sender and as receiver. Their hardwired behavior
therefore consists of a combination of two strategies, one for each role. We can rep-
resent each strategy profile as si ∈ S : (T →M)× (M → A), referring to its sender
strategy as sσi and its receiver strategy as s
ρ
i . There are 16 possible strategy profiles,
and I will number them as shown in Table 2.2. If we represent the proportion of
strategy profile si at time instant t as xi(t), we can define the step-wise changes in
proportion in terms of the following equation:
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t)
fi(t)
f¯(t)
In this equation, fi represents the fitness of strategy profile si, and f¯ the average
fitness of all strategies in the population. The proportion of a strategy profile at
time t+ 1 is thus dependent on its proportion and relative fitness at time t. Fitness
can be calculated as follows:
fi =
∑
sj∈S
xj
(
EU(sσi , s
ρ
j ) + EU(sσj , s
ρ
i )
)
Thus, the fitness of a strategy profile is given by the sum of the proportional ex-
pected utility of playing as sender and receiver against each strategy profile in the
population.
A simple way of seeing how strategy profiles fare against each other under this
dynamic is to start with a population with random proportions and calculate their
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change over a number of time steps. Figure 2.2a shows the evolution of strategy
profile proportions over time for one simulation run. Notice that the strategy profile
that appears to be taking over the population (almost reaching proportion 1) is the
signaling system s11 (see again Table 2.2). Since proportions add up to 1, we can
represent several simulation runs in a ternary plot, like the one in Figure 2.2b, where
the bottom left corner represents s6 dominating the population, the bottom right
corner represents s11 dominating the population, and the top corner represents any
other strategy profile dominating. The plot shows how every simulation run was
driving towards one of the signaling systems taking over the population.
The characterization of signaling problems in terms of evolutionary game theory
allow us to explain why certain equilibria come to be and how. Not only can we
better understand why signaling systems are stable even without any assumptions
of rationality, but we can also map out which initial conditions drive the system
towards which equilibria and which don’t, as we have seen in the previous example.
Although simulation results can only give an indication of this, it can be shown by
other means that, for a simple binary signaling game like the example just explored,
an evolutionary process of the kind described always drives the population into a
state where one signaling system takes over completely (see Huttegger, 2007a). This
is not always the case, though. More complex signaling problems may have different
evolutionary outcomes, sometimes unexpected ones.
Skyrms (2010) gives an overview of different topics studied using signaling games,
including expansions of the framework itself (for example, considering other dynam-
ics beyond the replicator equation), exploration of other factors that impact the
evolution of signaling (for example, how agents are interconnected), or variations on
the signaling problem and its basic assumptions (for example, loosening the align-
ment of interests in order to provide accounts of deceptive signal use). Applications
of signaling games include discussions of categorization, compositionality, incom-
mensurability, and vagueness, just to name a few. More recent overviews are given
by Huttegger (2014) and Huttegger, Skyrms, Tarrès, et al. (2014). In the following
section, I give my own short overview by exploring the various ways in which the
typical components of a signaling game model have been changed in the literature.
2.2 Anatomy of a signaling game
In this thesis, I talk about the signaling games approach not as a theory of mean-
ing but rather as a framework. This distinction aims to capture a looser conceptual
orientation. What the approach provides is a number of ingredients that can be
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(a) Strategy proportions over time in one simulation run.
(b) Ternary plot of 20 simulation runs.
Figure 2.2: Simulation results of a binary signaling game under the one-population
replicator dynamic. Plots created using the R libraries ggplot2 (Wick-
ham, 2016) and ggtern (N. E. Hamilton and Ferry, 2018).
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combined to create models of communicative interactions. These include agents,
states, messages, actions, and more. Each of these ingredients can come in different
forms and variants are not limited a priori. The signaling games literature also con-
tains various ways of studying the created models, from static analysis to computer
simulations.
The approach does not aim to be complete when it comes to the kinds of interac-
tions that can potentially be modeled. When a researcher is interested in exploring
a particular aspect of a particular type of language use, what the framework pro-
vides is a general way to build an abstract model, and a number of components to
potentially combine. Different problems require different tools, and if the toolbox
does not contain what one needs for a particular use, new tools can be created.
Others can be and have been imported from the development of game theory for
other purposes and other areas like, for example, evolutionary biology or economics.
The application of signaling games to a range of different problems has, since its
inception, given rise to an ever-growing variety of components.
In this section, I want to give an overview of the conceptual tools available, and
in the process give a more detailed survey of the different models in the literature.
As a basis for comparison, I will refer to models of the kind exemplified in the
previous section as simple Lewis signaling games. These are models where states,
messages, and actions all come from discrete finite spaces, there is one and only one
correct action for each state, there is only one sender and one receiver, and there
is full common interest between them, i.e. the utility function rewards the same
state-action combinations for both. Henceforth, a ixjxk Lewis game is a simple
Lewis signaling game with i states, j messages, and k actions. The simplest model
(of any interest) is a 2x2x2 Lewis game and can also be called a binary signaling
game (Hofbauer and Huttegger, 2008).
States
In a Lewis game, states are simple elements of a discrete set. What this means is
that states do not have any properties and are related to other states only by identity:
the most that one can ask of two states is whether or not they are the same. Other
state spaces are possible. First, one can imagine that not all states are equally likely
to hold. This can be modeled by specifying a prior probability function that assigns
to each state a value between 0 and 1 representing the probability of that state
occurring. The default, with all states being equally likely, is equivalent to specifying
a uniform prior probability function. This information can be incorporated and have
an impact on the calculation of the expected utility of strategies and on how these
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strategies change in the context of a dynamic analysis.
Hofbauer and Huttegger (2008) study the impact of non-uniform priors in binary
signaling games under two different dynamics. Their results show that the more
skewed the prior distribution is, the less likely signaling systems will evolve. In
certain conditions, some signaling strategies that constitute situations where no
communication actually occurs (so-called pooling equilibria) even become optimal
solutions to the game. A vivid example of the impact of different priors on the
outcome of evolutionary processes can be found in the work of Jäger, Metzger, and
Riedel (2011, p. 527). Priors can either be interpreted ontologically, i.e. as the real
probabilities of states occurring, or epistemically, i.e. as the probability distribution
that the agents project onto the state space (either implicitly given their behavior,
or explicitly by holding different beliefs). In the latter case, it makes sense to model
situations where priors by sender and receiver diverge. Brochhagen (2017) explores
the consequences of this in the context of linguistic ambiguity and argues that having
a vocabulary with some ambiguity can enable agents to better adapt to misaligned
priors.
Another aspect where one can go beyond the classic Lewisian game is to add
structure to the state space. One example is the family of models called similarity
maximization, or sim-max for short, introduced by Jäger and van Rooij (2007). In
these models, states are related to each other by a distance metric, effectively turning
the state space into a metric space. This means that, besides asking whether or not
two states are identical, one can additionally ask how distant they are from each
other. The usual use is to define a similarity metric based on the distance, and
to set up games where the task of the receiver is to guess the original state; the
utility function is typically proportional to similarity, thus allowing the agents to be
rewarded not only for guessing the exact state correctly, but also, to some extent, for
getting close. These models have been used to study linguistic categorization (e.g.
Jäger and van Rooij, 2007; Jäger, Metzger, and Riedel, 2011; O’Connor, 2014a, 2019;
Correia and Ocelák, 2019), vagueness (e.g. Franke, Jäger, and van Rooij, 2011;
Correia, 2013; O’Connor, 2014b; Franke and Correia, 2018; Correia and Franke,
2019)3, and ambiguity (e.g. O’Connor, 2015).
Davis (2017) develops a sim-max model where each state is itself structured,
being available to both sender and receiver as a vector rather than a simple element.
This enables him to incorporate an additional step in the signaling model that aims
to represent perception as the mapping of multi-dimensional values (e.g. an image
as a vector of pixels) to lower-dimensional internal representations and study the
3The work by Correia and Franke (2019) is reproduced here in Appendix A.
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effects of different perception models (e.g. Bayesian, artificial neural networks) on
the evolution of associations between internal representations and signals. Finally,
although the family of models stemming from Lewis and Skyrms typically uses
discrete state spaces, Crawford and Sobel (1982), and the literature that builds upon
their work, consider states as random variables drawn from a continuous distribution.
In the vast majority of signaling games studied in the literature, state spaces
are additionally static: the set of possible states is defined by the modeler and
remains the same throughout the analysis. Although variants of the same model with
different state spaces are often considered (e.g. changing the number of states), each
variant is studied independently. However, the world is not static and language needs
to be able to adapt to a changing environment. Following this motivation, Alexander
(2014) models two types of dynamic state spaces, one where new state-action pairs
keep getting created, and another where the associations between states and actions
keep getting changed. In this context, the author compares some learning models
and finds that being able to discount the past is an important feature that allows
reinforcement learning to successfully cope with a dynamic environment.
Messages
As with states, messages in signaling game models are typically simple elements
of a discrete set, but other types of message spaces are possible. Nowak and Krakauer
(1999) study state-matching games4 where messages can be mistaken for one an-
other. Much like state spaces in sim-max games, message spaces in their models
consist of elements (the messages) and a similarity metric. This metric is then used
to define the probability of one message being mistaken for another. In this noisy
environment, the authors find that there is a limit to the number of message-state
associations that possibly form under evolutionary dynamics. In the context of a
large state space, this means that agents will evolve to ignore certain states, inde-
pendently of how many messages they have available. This leads the authors to
propose an additional way of making the message space more complex, namely by
allowing different messages to be combined. In such a game, sender and receiver
thus exchange a complex message composed of simpler ones, and this allows them
to overcome the so-called linguistic error limit, i.e. “the number of objects that can
be accurately described” (1999, p. 8029) in a protolanguage.
Complex messages can also be found in work related to the multiple-sender syn-
tactic games of Barrett (2009). The underlying motivation behind the development
of these games is to be able to model situations where messages are sent to a receiver
4See following section on actions.
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from multiple sources. Each sender chooses one message independently from others,
and the receiver makes a choice of act based on all messages. Thus, what the receiver
handles is effectively a complex message composed of simpler ones. Another type of
complex messages appear in the aforementioned work by Davis (2017) where, like
states, they are also represented as multi-dimensional vectors. Hence each message
can be seen as a complex combination of different features.
Both simple and complex messages still belong to discrete spaces, where the
set of elements is predetermined and finite. In the family of models introduced
by Spence (1978), however, messages are typically values of a continuous quantity.
In his model, potential employees (senders) invest in education in order to signal
their productivity type to the potential employer (receiver) who in turn decides the
wage to assign them. Spence considers the signal to be the cost of the investment
in education, which is modeled as a positive real number. This means that the
messages space (set of possible messages to choose from) is both infinite and right-
unbounded. The literature that makes use of this kind of models in economics is
extensive, and an overview of its applications beyond the scope of this thesis. A
thorough review is provided by Connelly et al. (2011).
All the message spaces discussed so far are static: the messages available to the
agents are predetermined by the modeler and assumed not to change during the
adaptive processes that shape the way sender and receiver use them. However, this
need not be so. Alexander, Skyrms, and Zabell (2012) introduce a model5 where
new messages can be invented. For each state, the sender chooses either an existing
message or a new one with a certain probability (which diminishes with the number
of available messages). On getting a new message, the receiver chooses an action
randomly (typically according to a uniform distribution over the action space). If
the action turns out to be successful, both sender and receiver add the new message
into the message space, otherwise they ignore it. Agents adapt their strategies using
reinforcement learning, for both existing signals and successfully introduced new
signals. The authors find that this dynamic prevents the evolution of sub-optimal
strategies (pooling equilibria) that are increasingly likely to occur as the number of
states or the inequality of their prior probabilities increases in models using a static
message space. In order to avoid eventually ending up with a large number of fairly
useless signals, the authors also incorporate a mechanism through which signals
can be forgotten and removed from the message space. Just like the vocabulary of
natural languages, message spaces can thus be modeled to be continuously open to
change.
5Originally explored by Skyrms (2010, pp. 118-135).
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Actions
Like states and messages, action spaces can be discrete or continuous, simple or
structured, static or dynamic. The literature discussed so far covers most of these
variants. States and actions are typically distinct entities, being related only through
the utility function. A number of models, however, have the receiver choosing states
rather than actions. This could be thought of as eliminating the action space from
the model, or simply as equating it with the state space. The latter has the advantage
of maintaining the general structure of a game.
The most simple example of such a model is a state-matching game, where agents
are rewarded if and only if the receiver chooses the same state that the sender
observes. One could imagine other possibilities, the most obvious being a kind of
negation game with two states, where agents would be rewarded if and only if the
receiver chooses the state not observed by the sender. Going a bit beyond this setup
we have, for example, the aforementioned sim-max games of Jäger and van Rooij
(2007), where agents are rewarded proportionally to how similar the receiver’s choice
is in comparison with the state observed by the sender.
These games are especially relevant when the number of states is much higher
than the number of messages and agents cannot therefore develop a perfect state-
action matching, having to make do with getting close enough. This applies to how
we use a limited basic vocabulary to carve up more fine grained domains, such as for
example when talking about people as ‘tall’ and ‘short’ in order to categorize them
in terms of height, or when using basic color terms, such as ‘red’, ‘green’, and so on,
to refer to certain parts of the potentially infinite visible spectrum (see Correia and
Ocelák, 2019 for an example of work addressing the latter situation).
Utility
In general, actions, states, and messages are related to each other via the utility
function. Depending on the interpretation of the model, utility can be seen as
capturing either agents’ preferences or relative evolutionary advantages of strategies.
In simple Lewis signaling games, one typically specifies only one utility function that
represents the payoff obtained by both sender and receiver for each combination of
state and action. This assumes that interests or advantages are both fully aligned
and symmetrical, i.e. that both agents benefit (or fail to benefit) equally in each
possible situation. This is what is called a common interest or pure coordination
game. In general, however, signaling is unlikely to develop or be maintained in
such ideal conditions. In order to break the symmetry and make the model more
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general, independent utility functions for sender and receiver can be specified. Lewis
already allowed for this from the start, and even reflected on specific examples where
there is some degree of conflict between agents (1969, pp. 15, 71, 95, 117). He
did, however, confine his attention to “situations in which coincidence of interest
predominates” (Lewis, 1969, p. 14). But successful communication can also emerge
in situations of partial conflict.
Skyrms (2010, pp. 73-82) investigates what happens to signal use in the context
of partial conflict of interests between the agents involved in a signaling game. In
general, as pointed out by Zollman, Bergstrom, and Huttegger (2013, p. 1), “when
interests are not aligned, signallers might be selected to manipulate signal receivers
with misleading signals, and the signal receivers might evolve to disregard such
communications.” This manipulation from the part of the sender is what Skyrms
calls deception, and occurs whenever a sender systematically uses messages that raise
the probability of the receiver choosing actions that benefit the sender more than the
actions that would have been chosen had the receiver known the state that actually
obtains. It is interesting to note that the deceptive use of some signals by the sender
are not necessarily fully damaging to the receiver, and might even form part of an
equilibrium where partially successful communication can occur. Skyrms discusses
two scenarios where, although messages encode partial information regarding the
states the sender observes, and the receiver’s payoff is lower than it would be if a
full signaling system would be in place, the strategies are nevertheless stable and
the overall payoff is higher than in a scenario of full break down in communication.
Martínez (2019) further argues that there are other possible ways of interpreting
these situations as cooperative rather than deceptive.
According to Wagner (2012), partial communication is even possible in situations
of totally opposed interests. In a zero-sum signaling game, the sender only profits
from the loss of the receiver and vice versa. This makes any honest communication
intuitively undesirable, since if the sender would use messages in a way that would
convey some information about the observed states to the receiver, the latter could
use that information against the sender, and that is exactly what one finds in such a
system in equilibrium. Wagner studies a zero-sum signaling game where the agents’
strategies never actually converge to an equilibrium, but keep adapting to each other
in a non-regular pattern. Because of that, the amount of information conveyed
by each message as the strategies continuously change never actually drops down
to zero, i.e. “partial information transfer can be sustained indefinitely in out-of-
equilibrium play” (2012, p. 25). Godfrey-Smith and Martínez (2013) and Martínez
and Godfrey-Smith (2016) further explore the relation between common interest
36 CHAPTER 2. SIGNALING GAMES
and successful communication by exploring a large number of scenarios between the
two extremes of zero-sum and fully aligned interests. They corroborate Wagner’s
results, and find that the more aligned the interests of sender and receiver are, the
more likely they are to develop some degree of communication.
The payoff structure of a simple Lewis signaling game is influenced only by states
and actions. Since messages do not directly impact utility this type of communi-
cation falls into the category of what in game theory is usually called cheap talk.
Alternatively, in models of costly signaling, sending certain messages can incur a
decrease in utility for the agents involved. A family of models that makes use of
this stems from Michael Spence’s work on job market signaling (1978). In the orig-
inal model, there are two types of senders, and a receiver that, not knowing their
type, has to assign a salary level based on a signal from the sender. Senders are
individuals applying for a job, and the two types represent different productive ca-
pabilities. The receiver (e.g. an employer hiring) wishes to assign a higher salary
to the more productive individuals, and a lower salary to the less productive. As
before, honest signaling (where individuals would send a different signal depending
on their type) is impossible in this base scenario, since less productive individuals
have an incentive to send the same signal as the more productive individuals do, in
order to attempt to receive a higher salary. If, however, signaling as being a more
productive individual has a lower cost for individuals that are actually of that type,
honest signaling becomes an equilibrium under certain parameter values (see Spence
(2002) and Wagner (2013) for more recent perspectives on this).
The same realization has been made in theoretical biology, first informally by
Zahavi (1975, 1977), and subsequently demonstrated in a signaling game model by
Grafen (1990). Maynard Smith (1991) made a model of this type of interaction
popular with his Sir Philip Sidney game. In this game, the sender is imagined as an
individual potentially in need of a resource, and the receiver as another individual
deciding whether or not to donate that resource to the sender. In such a model, it
is observed that signals must be costly for them to be honest in a situation of pure
conflict, but if both agents have a stake on the survival of the other (in particular,
in the case of this model, by being related to each other), honest signaling can still
be evolutionarily stable even without costs (see Maynard Smith, 1994 for more on
this). Some more recent analyses of these games (Huttegger and Zollman, 2010;
Zollman, Bergstrom, and Huttegger, 2013) show that there are also stable hybrid
equilibria where low-quality or not-in-need individuals sometimes signal honestly,
but sometimes also deceive, and receivers act accordingly by not always taking a
signal as honest.
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Pacheco et al. (2015) show another application of costly signaling in theoret-
ical biology. The authors model a collective action problem, where a population
can produce a public good (shared equally by all) if a certain minimum number of
individuals (though not necessarily all) participate in that production (at a cost).
This situation incentivizes free riding, since participation involves a cost, but one
receives the benefits of the public good nevertheless if others pay that cost in suf-
ficient numbers. If individuals additionally have the capacity to produce, and be
sensitive to, a costly signal, quorum signaling systems—that enable individuals to
only pay the cost of participation if enough of them are ready to participate—can
evolve and be stable under a variety of different conditions. This gives an account
of the origins of quorum sensing mechanisms found in populations of organisms as
simple as bacteria.
Another example of introducing costs in a signaling game can be found in the
work of Santana (2014). The proposed model does not assign costs to messages, but
rather to strategies. In particular, the author uses a 4x4x4 Lewis game where if the
sender strategy makes use of all 4 possible messages it pays a small cost, whereas
if it makes use of only 2 messages, it receives the full payoff. The intuition is that
there can be some cognitive or physiological costs to using a larger lexicon (San-
tana, 2014, pp. 408-409). Using 2 messages necessarily involves pooling, which the
author equates to ambiguity. This cost is combined with the presence of contextual
information that can potentially be used by the receiver to disambiguate between
two states lumped by the sender under the same message. Santana uses agent-based
simulations to show that, under a couple of different dynamics (a variant of a birth-
death process and a discrete version of the replicator dynamics), the ambiguous use
of messages is an optimal strategy that can even take over a population of agents
using a precise signaling system.
Agents
David Lewis introduced signaling games as a way to formalize and study coordi-
nation problems between two agents: one sender and one receiver. This perspective
has been modified and expanded in several ways. First of all, it should be noted that,
in simple Lewis signaling games, the agents’ existence is only implicit in the mod-
eler’s interpretation; what is explicitly represented are two strategies and a utility
function. As previously mentioned, other interpretations of these two elements are
possible. An important alternative is to think not in terms of individual agents, but
in terms of abstract populations of agents, where strategies represent an aggregate
of the behavior of all individuals in that population and utility represents fitness
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for survival and reproduction. This forms the base for the evolutionary approach to
game theory, popular in theoretical biology (see Maynard Smith, 1982; Nowak and
Sigmund, 2004) and introduced to the study of signaling games by Skyrms (1996).
When it comes to how agents are imagined, this marks a move from thinking
in terms of two individual agents changing their behavior based on what they con-
sider preferable, to thinking in terms of heterogeneous populations of agents being
changed by dynamics external to their will. This perspective also allows for the
application of signaling games to the study of communication in organisms simpler
than humans, from monkeys, to birds, to even bacteria. When thinking in terms of
populations and evolution, one can choose between modeling only one population
where each individual plays both roles of sender and receiver, or to have two sep-
arate populations, one of senders and one of receivers. While the former is more
natural to account for the evolution of communication among agents of the same
species, the latter allows for studying forms of inter-species signaling, like those used
in cooperative hunting or in prey-predator situations (see Skyrms, 2010, pp. 20-32).
Although the basic setup in a signaling game considers one sender, or one pop-
ulation of senders, and one receiver, or one population of receivers, there are also
variations on that theme. Barrett (2006, 2007) has introduced so-called syntactic
games: signaling models where a receiver handles messages from more than one
sender who observe the same state but whose signaling behavior is independent
from each other. Barrett observes that, given simple learning mechanisms to up-
date behavior based on obtained payoff in iterative interactions, agents can develop
strategies that enable them to communicate perfectly even when the senders can
only use a number of messages that is half the number of possible states. Senders
do this by effectively partitioning the state space in complementary ways that the
receiver can then use to always perform the appropriate action for each state. It is
important to stress that this happens despite the fact that senders learn indepen-
dently from each other.
These games are used by Barrett to argue for hypotheses regarding the evo-
lution of grammar (2006; 2009), conventional kinds (2007), incommensurable lan-
guages (2010), basic arithmetic (2012), and epistemic norms (2013). Signaling games
with multiple senders and one receiver have also been proposed by Lawry and James
(2017) as examples of possible scenarios where sharply delineated partitioning of the
state space is less optimal than communication with a certain degree of vagueness.
In particular, their results indicate that when a receiver handles messages coming
from noisy channels, having multiple vague senders can compensate for transmission
errors that would otherwise hamper communication. Skyrms (2009) discusses addi-
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tional possible setups with multiple receivers, to model situations where one sender
coordinates a team of other agents through signaling, chains of agents where some
agents play the role of intermediaries between the one who observes the state and
the one that carries out the action, and a dialogue setup where both agents signal
back to each other. Signaling systems are found to evolve in all of these scenarios.
Communication does not usually evolve between completely isolated agents, nei-
ther in homogeneous populations where everyone interacts with everybody else, as
abstract population models typically assume. In order to drop these assumptions,
one can introduce constraints in the spatial structure of agents in a population. Grim
et al. (2004) study models with agents fixed on a two-dimensional grid exposed to
wandering predators and food sources (think of a simplified coral colony). These
agents can be hurt if a predator appears on their position and they are not hiding,
or be fed if a food source appears and their mouths are open. They can choose
between not signaling or sending one of two signals at each time step, when either
nothing is happening, they’re being hurt, or they’re successfully feeding. They can
also receive signals and react to them by doing nothing, hiding, or opening their
mouths. Importantly, signals from an agent only reach their direct geographical
neighbors.
We thus have a signaling game with three states (nothing happening, being
hurt, feeding), three messages (no signal or one of two signals), and three actions
(do nothing, hide, open mouth), where agents only interact with a limited number
of other agents within the general population. Additionally, agents do not have any
direct payoff incentive for cooperation, since they only get punished if themselves
are hurt and rewarded if they are fed. The authors find that, either by imitation,
recombination, or reinforcement learning, most agents in such a setup develop perfect
communication with their neighbors. However, and because this can be achieved by
more that one pair of strategies, the whole population does not typically settle on
one signaling system, but is split in regional “dialects” with continuously shifting
borders. This is an important result, since in simple setups with two agents or
abstract populations, the theoretical prediction is that one signaling system always
ends up dominating totally. Zollman (2005) achieves similar results in a related,
but leaner model of common interest, confirming the importance of considering
the spatial structure of a population of agents for understanding the evolution of
communication.
Spatial arrangement of agents is especially interesting because of the constraints
it imposes on communication. Who exchanges messages with whom is, in the afore-
mentioned models, a function of who is a neighbor of whom. However, most living
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beings that we know signal, including humans, are typically mobile and not fully
constrained in this manner, but they still do not interact with every other agent uni-
formly; populations typically have heterogeneous social structures. Wagner (2009)
investigates the impact of different social network topologies on the outcomes of
signaling games driven by different adaptive processes. The author replicates and
expands on the results of Zollman (2005), and additionally studies agents connected
in small-world networks. These are topologies that can be randomly generated to
exhibit characteristics found in real-world biological, technological, and more im-
portantly social networks (Watts and Strogatz, 1998).
The results indicate that social networks of the kind investigated promote the
development and fixation of signaling systems in a population, even in conditions
where this would be less likely to be expected in abstract population models. Small-
world networks are found to be “especially hospitable to the emergence of efficient
signaling” (2009, pp. 392-393). This kind of work is continued by Mühlenbernd and
Franke (2012) who investigate the relation between certain types of agents in terms
of where they are located in the network and the role they play in helping either
fixate or change a certain signaling convention. More recently, Mühlenbernd (2017)
focuses on language change and finds evidence for the so-called weak tie theory, i.e.
the idea that innovation (new messages, new associations, etc.) is introduced in a
system of communication following creative departures from convention by agents
in the periphery of the social structure, which then get propagated and made stable
by more central members.
Strategies
While states, messages, actions, and utility characterize the game being played,
and how one conceptualizes agents introduces additional constraints, strategies char-
acterize how the agents play, should play, or are expected to play the game. As such,
they are the element that usually draws the focus of analysis. When studying a sig-
naling game, one is typically interested in which particular strategies are optimal
given the setup, and how or if agents end up using them or not. But before one
thinks of analysis, it is important to consider the possible kinds of ways strate-
gies can be represented, since different representations enable and motivate different
approaches.
Thinking functionally, there are three main types. The simplest are pure strate-
gies, where each state is univocally associated with only one message for the sender,
and each message is univocally associated with only one action for the receiver. For-
mally, if T is the state space, M the message space, and A the action space, a pure
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sender strategy is a function σ : T → M and a pure receiver strategy a function
ρ : M → A. These types of strategies can be interpreted as representing either
fully deterministic agents or completely homogeneous populations. The advantage
is simplicity, especially when it comes to analysis. Unlike with other types, the
space of all possible pure strategies, for finite T , M , and A, is also finite, despite the
number of possible strategies growing exponentially with the number of states and
messages6. For example, in a 2x2x2 Lewis game there are only 4 possible pure sender
strategies and 4 pure receiver strategies. This makes finding the optimal strategy
profiles a tractable problem, as was seen in Section 2.1. Lewis (1969) considers only
pure strategies in his original work. They are also the preferred types of strategies
in more classic game-theoretical analyses.
A major limitation of pure strategies is that they cannot correctly represent
agents that behave non-deterministically (either by choice or by making mistakes),
neither can they capture the composition of a heterogeneous population (where
different agents in the population may use different strategies). One possible way of
modeling these cases is to use mixed strategies. These are probability distributions
over pure strategies: each possible strategy has an associated probability, a value
between 0 and 1 that can be interpreted either as representing the likelihood of an
agent behaving in accordance with that strategy, or the proportion of a population
that uses that strategy. Formally, σ : ∆ (T →M) and ρ : ∆ (M → A).7 Note that,
unlike with pure strategies, even for finite T ,M , and A, the space of mixed strategies
is infinite since probability values are defined in R. Mixed strategies are mostly used
in dynamical analyses inspired by biological evolution, with each possible strategy
representing a phenotype and natural selection driving changes in the composition
of a population via reducing the relative numbers of less successful strategies and
increasing the numbers of those with higher fitness. This is the kind of approach
introduced into the study of signaling games by Skyrms (1996).
Although mixed strategies are intuitively very suitable for representing hetero-
geneous populations of agents with each their own pure strategy, it is not clear
that the best way to capture the behavior of a stochastic agent is to represent it
as switching probabilistically between whole strategies. Another option is to use
behavioral strategies where probability distributions apply not to pure strategies but
only to the choice options for each choice point. Formally, σ : T → ∆ (M) and
ρ : M → ∆ (A), i.e. for the sender, each state is associated with a probability
distribution over messages, and for the receiver, each message is associated with a
6The number of possible strategies is |M ||T | for the sender and |A||M | for the receiver.
7∆ (X) designates a probability distribution over set X. For a finite X, what we have is, for
each x ∈ X, a probability value P (x) such that ∑x∈X P (x) = 1.
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probability distribution over actions. The space of possible behavioral strategies is
still infinite, even for finite T , M , and A, but it is more restricted than for mixed
strategies and allows for more compact representations when it comes to implement-
ing computer simulations. Their interpretation as anchored in choice points makes
them intuitively suitable for being used in analysis that consider local adaptations of
behavior, like processes of imitation or other learning dynamics (see Skyrms, 2010,
pp. 83-105).
Analysis
Having set up a signaling game model by putting together all the aforementioned
components in a certain configuration, one is left with a theoretical object about
which questions can be asked. There are also various ways in which one can go
about analyzing and drawing conclusions from a model. Though not strictly being
part of the anatomy of a signaling game, certain kinds of models do invite partic-
ular methods of analyses in lieu of others, and preferred types of analyses can also
condition choices in building models.
Basic aspects of simple signaling games, like those explored by Lewis (1969),
can be analyzed using a static approach. One possibility is to use a concept that
is central in classic game-theoretical analyses of this kind: the Nash equilibrium. In
general terms, and assuming agents are individuals, two players are said to be in
a Nash equilibrium when neither of them can unilaterally change their strategy to
achieve a higher payoff. As pointed out by Lewis (1969, pp. 130-141), it is clear that
signaling systems are Nash equilibria, but they are not the only ones. This is the case
even in binary signaling games: pairs of pooling strategies (as the one illustrated in
Figure 2.1c) where the sender does not differentiate between the states (by always
sending the same message), and the receiver does not differentiate between messages
(by always performing the same action) are in a Nash equilibrium, since neither can
do better by unilaterally changing their behavior.
There is, however, an important difference between signaling systems and pooling
equilibria: the former are stable where the latter are not. If there is any, even if
minute, possibility that one of the players does unilaterally change to a strategy
that differentiates, whereas in a signaling system the other player does not have any
incentive to switch strategy, in a pooling equilibrium they do. What this means
is that, in the simple model we are discussing, players that find themselves in a
pooling equilibrium will only remain there in an idealized world where they are
perfectly rational, view the other player as perfectly rational, never make mistakes,
and there are no perturbations in the environment. Otherwise they will be driven
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to a signaling system. Note that this depends on the payoff structure and other
elements of the game.8
The concept of Nash equilibrium is grounded on classic game theory and the view
of strategies as representing choices of rational agents. Strategies can, as mentioned
before, also be interpreted as descriptions of abstract populations subject to the
forces of evolution. In this case, the relevant concept for a static analysis is that of
evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS for short, and was introduced to the study of
signaling games by Skyrms (1996). An ESS is a strategy that, if in use by the whole
population, cannot be invaded by a small number of agents playing any other possible
strategy. Skyrms (1996, p. 90) shows that, for common interest signaling games
with the same number of states as signals and actions, in an abstract unstructured
population, not only are signaling systems evolutionarily stable, they are also the
only ESS’s.
Both these concepts help analyze whether a certain combination of strategies is
optimal and whether it is stable. They still say nothing about the mechanism by
which agents or populations would be driven to play such strategies, and how likely
would it be for that to happen. With regards to the former, Lewis (1969) relies
on standard assumptions of classic game theory and his own notion of common
knowledge: signaling system is stable because agents rationally want to maximize
their payoff, thus having no incentive to change strategy, they assume the other
agents are rational too and thus do not want to change their strategy, and they
believe the other agents ascribe the same beliefs to them. This creates a (potentially
infinite) chain of reasoning that is supposed to go on in the minds of agents and
requires heavy assumptions on their knowledge of the situation, as well as on their
cognitive capacities.
If one relaxes these assumptions, from considering agents with bounded rational-
ity,9 all the way down to imagining populations of the crudest agents being pushed
around by evolutionary forces, a truly dynamic study of the system becomes much
more attractive. In dynamic approaches, which typically work with mixed or behav-
ioral strategies, one provides a concrete model of the mechanism underlying strategy
adaptation and makes calculations of how an initial strategy profile changes under
8For example, in a game of pure conflict, pooling equilibria are not only stable, they are the
only equilibria of the game (e.g. Skyrms, 2010, p. 77).
9One of the first to propose analyzing game-theoretic models with agents of limited cognitive
capacities in mind was Herbert Simon:
Broadly stated, the task is to replace the global rationality of economic man with a
kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the access to information and the
computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in
the kinds of environments in which such organisms exist. (1955, p. 99)
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said mechanism. This allows studying what kind of attractors there might in the sys-
tem (the most simple being a fixed point, i.e. a strategy profile that does not change
under the hypothesized mechanism), and how strategy profiles that do change tend
to evolve. Ultimately, one can map out a sample of the space of possible strategy
profiles to get an idea of what portion of those profiles ends up in which attractor;
this is called calculating its basin of attraction. A dynamic analysis allows for a lot
more insight into the details of the adaptive processes that players or populations of
agents go through. It also can provide information about the optimal strategies (if
there are any), whether these are attainable, and which initial conditions allow for
that to happen. It is, therefore, much more comprehensive than a static analysis.
The downside is added complexity and a lot of models to choose from.
Skyrms (1996) introduced the use of the replicator dynamic (of Taylor and
Jonker, 1978) to the study of signaling games. This model attempts to capture,
in a very abstract way, the general principles of natural selection: strategies change
their relative representation in proportion to their relative success against other
strategies in the population. It is thus very suitable to be used in the analysis of
signaling game models interpreted in terms of biological evolution. It has also been
shown that certain processes of learning by imitation can be represented well by the
replicator equation (Björnerstedt and Weibull, 1995; Schlag, 1998), thus making it
suitable for interpretation in terms of cultural evolution (Dawkins, 1976; Boyd and
Richerson, 1985). The original dynamic comes in two different flavors: a differential
equation that represents continuous change through time, and a difference equation
that assumes change occurs in discrete generations. While the former is a better
representation of how change occurs in nature, the latter facilitates computations
for numerical analysis. Both flavors were originally conceived with symmetric games
in mind, where the options and payoffs available to each player are the same. This is
not the case in signaling games, where sender and receiver have different roles. Two
ways of addressing this are possible. One can symmetrize the game by imagining
each agent plays sometimes as sender, and sometimes as receiver, thus carrying a
combination of strategies, one for each role. Using this approach, one represents the
dynamic in one equation for a single population. The alternative is to imagine two
populations, one of senders, and one of receivers, co-evolving with each other, which
results in a representation of the dynamic in terms of a system of two equations.
The dynamic analysis of binary signaling games is consistent with the static
insights: signaling systems are the only stable attractors in both the one-population
and two-population replicator dynamics (Skyrms, 1996; Huttegger, 2007a; Hofbauer
and Huttegger, 2008). Complications arise, however, as we soon as we deviate from
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this simple game in various ways (see Huttegger, 2007a; Skyrms, 2010, pp. 63-72).
Interestingly, some of these variations on the simple signaling game that make the
evolution of signaling systems be less then a guaranteed certainty perform differently
under a variant of the replicator equation. The replicator-mutator dynamic is an
extension that incorporates an aspect of evolution that is so far missing: mutation.
Signaling systems can be shown to be even more robust under this dynamic than
under the simple replicator (Hofbauer and Huttegger, 2008). Other variants are
possible. For example, Franke and Correia (2018) derive a discrete form of the
replicator dynamic for behavioral strategies where agents learn by imitation but
are subject to imprecision, both when observing the behavior of others as well as
when trying to mimic it. In certain sim-max games, under this imprecise imitation
dynamic, strategies bearing characteristic marks of vagueness are observed to evolve
and be stable.
There are also dynamic models that are based on higher assumptions of rational-
ity. Gilboa and Matsui (1991) propose a best response dynamic where agents have
high awareness of the game and always select the optimal choice of behavior given
the game and state of the population. Franke, Jäger, and van Rooij (2011) study a
variant of this model where limits to the agents rationality can be introduced, and
suggest that bounded rationality can, in a sim-max game, induce equilibria where
agent’s strategies have characteristics of vague signal use. A more detailed overview
of evolutionary dynamics is provided by Huttegger, Skyrms, Smead, et al. (2009).
Population dynamics describe adaptive processes at a very abstract level. Al-
though some of the approaches discussed can capture general principles of learning,
it can be interesting to study more specific mechanisms and their implications for
the development of successful communication. One of the most well studied learning
mechanisms is Roth-Erev reinforcement (Roth and Erev, 1995). The main idea it
tries to capture is that an agent makes a choice with a probability proportional to
the accumulated rewards attained from making it in the past. The usual illustration
of the process portrays each agent as having an urn per choice point (states for
senders, messages for receivers) that contains balls colored by possible choice (one
color per message for the sender, one per action for the receiver). Actual choices are
made per choice point by randomly drawing a ball from its urn and selecting the
choice associated with the color of the drawn ball. Additional balls are then added
back proportionally to the payoff received from making that choice. This reinforces
successful choices by increasing the probability of making them again in the future,
and concomitantly reduces the probability of choosing any of the alternatives.
This type of learning mechanism is highly conducive to the development of suc-
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cessful signaling in simple Lewis signaling games (Barrett, 2006; Argiento et al.,
2009; Catteeuw and Manderick, 2014) and has been generalized and extended in
several ways. Barrett and Zollman (2009) add the ability for agents to forget past
experiences and find that this has a positive effect on learning. Alexander, Skyrms,
and Zabell (2012) add the possibility of new messages being invented during the
learning process, which not only allows for modeling something that happens in
natural language, but is also observed to have benefits for the development of opti-
mal communication. O’Connor (2014b) proposes a generalized reinforcement learn-
ing rule for sim-max games where successful choices reinforce not only the original
choice points but also similar ones; this is found to speed up learning and can be
used to explain the evolution of vagueness. Franke (2014a) combines some of these
variants to propose a mechanism for the development of compositional signaling.
Catteeuw and Manderick (2014) compare Roth-Erev reinforcement to Q-learning
and automata to find that all three mechanisms efficiently learn signaling conven-
tions. Yet another family of models of individual learning that has been successfully
tested in signaling games is artificial neural networks (e.g. Davis, 2017). There is a
large number of general learning models and variations proposed in the literature.
I give here emphasis to those developed specifically for signaling games, but others,
coming from areas like behavioral economics and experimental psychology, might
bring additional relevant insights (see Skyrms, 2010, pp. 83-105).
Raising the level of rationality of the agents even further, one can consider and
attempt to model the use of strategic reasoning. Note that, although Lewis (1969,
pp. 24-32) explores the use of complex reasoning with higher-order expectation as
ways to solve coordination problems, he does not actually formalize them nor does
he study how they play out in a concrete model. This has been done more recently
in work that aims to model mechanisms of pragmatic reasoning in language. An
overview of the approach and the related literature is given by Franke (2017).
These learning mechanisms are typically modeled for the case of two individual
agents interacting repeatedly with each other, and implementations are almost as
abstract as population dynamics. Learning occurs at the agent level, but one might
also be interested in studying the case where an agent learns from various indi-
viduals in a heterogeneous population. One can then choose to model each agent
individually, maintaining and updating independent strategies and internal states.
These agent-based models are typically implemented and run as computer simula-
tions of actual play. Examples of these include the aforementioned research of Grim
et al. (2004), Zollman (2005), Wagner (2009), Mühlenbernd and Franke (2012), and
Mühlenbernd (2017).
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An additional example can be found in the work of Franke, Jäger, and van Rooij
(2011), who explore a variant of learning by fictitious play (G. W. Brown, 1951) in
which agents have a limited memory of past interactions. The outcome of a large
number of agents playing a sim-max game in repeated interaction with each other
show, after a period of convergence, a stable and persistent variation in each agent’s
evolved strategy that, the authors argue, induces characteristic marks of vagueness
at the aggregate population level. Agent-based models are popular in social science
and gaining adoption in many other areas (see Wilensky and Rand, 2015). They are
used to study complex phenomena by establishing a connection between low-level
mechanisms of interaction and the high-level emergent patterns they can induce
in certain environments. As such, they provide a method of analysis that brings
additional insight into the interplay of all the factors that influence the development
of successful signaling.
Given a choice of static or dynamic approaches, one can still further opt between
two ways of drawing out conclusions. If the game model and the dynamics (in
case that is the chosen approach) are specified in mathematical equations, it is
sometimes possible to determine equilibria, basins of attraction, or other properties
of the system using symbolic analysis. This involves calculating exact solutions to
mathematical formulations of the investigated properties in relation to the equations
that define the system. A good example of a fully symbolic analysis can be found in
the aforementioned work of Argiento et al. (2009). Although this type of approach
has the advantage of being precise, it requires a full mathematical specification of
the model. Therefore, it can easily become either too difficult, unfeasible, or even
impossible, as models are complicated beyond the most basic.
In those situations one can resort to numerical analysis and calculate statistical
approximations to the properties one is interested in investigating. This is usually
done with the aid of computer simulations. An example is a standard method for
estimating the attractors of a dynamic by running a kind of Monte Carlo experiment:
taking as domain the space of possible population proportions of all possible strategy
profiles, one can randomly sample a large number of values from that domain, use
the model of the dynamic to calculate the changes in each population proportion
until they stabilize, and determine how many converged into which strategy profile.
This was originally used by Skyrms (1996), who found that all initial population
proportions in a simulation of the simplest signaling game converged, under the
replicator dynamic, into one of the two possible signaling systems, going to each in
approximately equal proportion. This does not prove that no other attractors exist,
but it can raise our confidence that that is the case.
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Although numerical methods are not able to prove universal claims about the
models, they can provide existence proofs. For example, Huttegger, Skyrms, Smead,
et al. (2009) use numerical methods to show that the replicator dynamic can lead
some population proportions in a simple signaling game with three states, messages,
and actions, into partial pooling equilibria. The choice between symbolic and nu-
merical methods is conditioned by how the model is formalized, the researcher’s
ability or inclination towards one or the other approach, available resources (Monte
Carlo simulations were not so easy to perform before the advent of powerful personal
computers), but also to a certain extent tradition: research on signaling games in
economics, stemming from Spence (1978), tends to use the symbolic approach; in
philosophy, work stemming from Skyrms (1996) tends to prefer numerical analysis;
in biology, where researchers focus primarily on costly signaling (Grafen, 1990; May-
nard Smith, 1991), there is more of a balance with a slight skew towards numerical
methods.
Unlike symbolic analysis, numerical methods, especially when applied in dynamic
analysis, typically generate a large number of data points that subsequently need
to be aggregated and summarized to yield meaningful results. In Monte Carlo
and other numerical investigations of the dynamics of a signaling game model, this
involves collecting statistics either (or both) at the end of the simulation and in the
intermediate steps. This can range from simple values, such as the proportion of
simulations that converged to each strategy profile, to more complex metrics. One
example of a metric is the quantity of information. Skyrms (2010, pp. 33-47) defines
the quantity of information carried by a signal about a state as the logarithm of the
ratio between the probability of the state conditional on getting the signal and the
prior probability of that state. If sending the signal does not alter the probability
of a state obtaining, then the signal carries not information, otherwise the metric
quantifies how much information is carried by the signal. This can be aggregated
into an overall quantity of information of a signal by averaging over all states. A
similar metric can be defined with actions, rather than states, in mind.
Wagner (2012) makes use of this metric to show that, even in a signaling game
model that never converges to equilibrium, information is still partially transferred as
sender and receiver strategies continuously change and adapt to each other. Godfrey-
Smith and Martínez (2013) and Martínez and Godfrey-Smith (2016) propose infor-
mation transfer should be measured not for messages but for strategy profiles as
a whole in terms of the amount of information between states and actions. Using
this metric, they corroborate and expand upon Wagner’s results. Other metrics are
possible. For example, Franke and Correia (2018) define entropy, convexity, and
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additionally track expected utility to gain insight into certain properties of strate-
gies and how they change while the system evolves under their imprecise imitation
dynamic. As with other aspects of signaling games, which particular metrics are rel-
evant depends on the game under study and the questions one is trying to answer.

Part II
Later Wittgenstein and
signaling games
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Chapter 3
Room for systematicity∗
Does Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy invite us to abandon systematicity
in philosophy? What does his practice further reveal? In this chapter, I
look into Wittgenstein’s remarks on method and their consequences for
the legitimacy of making use of the signaling games framework.
Before reflecting on whether or not Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy leaves room
for systematicity, it is important to clarify what is meant by the term. A strong
notion of systematicity is related to the idea of system-building. To be systematic
in philosophy, in this sense, is to work towards devising a coherent picture of how
everything hangs together, spanning and connecting all areas of what can be thought.
A systematic philosopher of this kind attempts to establish a firm foundation, a
small number of basic principles from which to derive a unified understanding of,
or approach to, a whole host of philosophical problems in areas from ontology,
to epistemology, language, mind, aesthetics, ethics, politics, and more. We can
recognize this type of ambition in authors like Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz,
Spinoza, Hume, Berkeley, and Kant, to name a few examples. This is not the
kind of systematicity relevant for the thesis defended here. My interest lies in the
connections between Wittgenstein’s later picture of language and the framework of
signaling games. Given that signaling games do not aim to be a philosophical system
in this broad sense, the question of how the approach is in line with Wittgenstein’s
thought does not hinge on this kind of systematicity.
Signaling games are, however, systematic in a different sense. Setting up a sig-
naling game model involves formally defining a number of elements and specifying
how they are interrelated. The framework is not a philosophical system in that
it does not aim to be a description of reality, let alone to explain how everything
∗Some of the content in this chapter (mostly Section 3.1 and Section 3.2) overlaps (with mi-
nor modifications) with the publication entitled “Analysis and Explanation in the Philosophical
Investigations” (Correia, 2019).
53
54 CHAPTER 3. ROOM FOR SYSTEMATICITY
hangs together. However, it fits a weaker notion of systematicity in that it obeys
a certain method: some core elements are always specified (e.g. states, messages,
actions), solution concepts fit within some well-defined principles (e.g. utility maxi-
mization), and results follow from assumptions according to mathematical formulas
and calculations. If one wants to see how this approach fits with Wittgenstein’s later
philosophy, it is important to reflect on whether this kind of systematicity would be
in line with his ideas regarding methodology.
Each of the camps outlined in Section 1.1 has a different understanding of which
methods Wittgenstein supposedly rejected or avowed. In this chapter, I defend that
Wittgenstein’s issues with methodology are not for or against particular methods,
but are instead related to the attitudes we have towards them, i.e. to what we believe
we are doing and can achieve with them. I argue that Wittgenstein’s pragmatist
attitude tolerates a plurality of methods, and a variety of them are in fact used in
the Philosophical Investigations. Some arguments in the book involve setting up
thought experiments with artificial scenarios of language use. I argue that signaling
games can be interpreted as similar to these toy language-games in many respects,
and thus can be seen as methodologically in line with his practice. I make these
arguments by first reflecting on what Wittgenstein had to say about certain aspects
of philosophical practice that are related to its quintessential philosophical method
of analysis (Section 3.1). Next, in Section 3.2, I look into the notion of semantic
explanation and how it can inform a different attitude towards particular methods
in philosophy. In Section 3.3 I explore one method often used in the Philosophical
Investigations: the use of toy language-games as thought experiments. Finally, in
Section 3.4, I explore in detail the connection between toy language-games and
signaling games.
3.1 In pursuit of chimeras
The core of Wittgenstein’s observations on philosophy and method in the Philo-
sophical Investigations can be located in §§89-133. An important part of those
remarks engages in criticism of a certain way of doing philosophy. This is accompa-
nied by what one could call a diagnosis of the motivations underlying the tendency
to follow that path. Wittgenstein sets off this discussion by asking the question “In
what way is logic something sublime?” (§89a). The observations that follow are,
however, not specifically about logic as a formal tool or field of research. They are
more concerned with logical thinking as a method, and more generally about what
can drive us into believing that this kind of thinking has a “peculiar depth”:
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Logic lay, it seemed, at the foundation of all the sciences. – For logical
investigation explores the essence of all things. It seeks to see to the
foundation of things, and shouldn’t concern itself whether things actually
happen in this or that way. (2009, §89b, pp. 46e-47e)
That this conception is to be questioned is already given away by the qualification “it
seemed”. Logic serves here as a representative of an attitude common in philosophy:
the quest for essences, foundations, underlying structures. It is also evocative of the
method of philosophical analysis.
The paragraph is followed by an example from the writings of Augustine about a
typical philosophical question (“What, then, is time?”) and subsequently by remarks
that draw attention to the kind of urges triggered by this type of questions:
We feel as if we had to see right into phenomena: yet our investigation is
directed not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards
the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena. What that means is that we call to
mind the kinds of statement that we make about phenomena. So too,
Augustine calls to mind the different statements that are made about
the duration of events, about their being past, present or future. (These
are, of course, not philosophical statements about time, the past, the
present and the future.)
Our inquiry is therefore a grammatical one. (2009, §90, p. 47e)
These remarks go against the idea that philosophy investigates not surface language,
but something beyond it. Wittgenstein is saying that, when exploring typically
philosophical questions, even though one can believe to be making considerations
directly about phenomena, such as time, one ends up actually reflecting on state-
ments that are made about the phenomena. This is partly what is meant when it
is said that the inquiry is a grammatical one.2
Augustine continues his analysis as follows:
Yet we speak of a “long time” and a “short time,” though only when we
mean the past or the future. For example, we say that a hundred years
is a long time ago or a long time ahead. A short time ago or a short time
ahead we might put at ten days. But how can anything which does not
exist be either long or short? For the past is no more and the future is
2It is important to note here that Wittgenstein’s use of ‘grammar’ and its cognates relates to
meaning, rather than to syntax or other aspects one would typically associate with the term given
its use in contemporary linguistics. For more on Wittgenstein’s use of these terms, and his idea of
grammatical investigations, see McGinn (2011).
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not yet. Surely, then, instead of saying “It is a long time” we ought to
say of the past “It was a long time” and of the future “It will be a long
time.”
My Lord, my Light, does not your truth make us look foolish in this
case too? For if we speak of a long time in the past, do we mean that
it was long when it was already past or before it became the past and
was still the present? It could only be long when it was there to be long:
once it was past it no longer was, and if it no longer was, it could not be
long. (Augustine, 1993, Book XI, §15)
We see here how Augustine goes back and forth from considerations of a linguistic
nature regarding what we say about time and when we call time long or short, to
ontological considerations of how time can be long or short. Underlying this ap-
proach is an implicit understanding of the bearing these statements have on the
characterization of the phenomena. The relevance of exploring the former in or-
der to understand the latter implicitly buys into a picture of language as strongly
connected with other kinds of entities, namely the ones that the philosopher is in-
terested in knowing more about. It seems to presuppose at least two things: first,
that because we have a word ‘time’ there is a Something (§261, §293) to which the
word corresponds; second, that the statements we make about ‘time’ must to some
extent capture the properties of that Something. Driven by this picture, philoso-
phers can be lead to rashly hypostatize linguistic entities, to think that things like
language, propositions, thought, have a hidden essence that “an analysis is supposed
to unearth” (2009, §92, p. 48e).
This implicit understanding of language is strongly tied to an urge that goes
hand in hand with this kind of philosophical method. The statements we make about
phenomena seem to lack exactness. We ask ourselves, like Augustine: ‘What exactly
do we mean when we say time is short?’ Our craving for precision, coupled with the
image of meaning as a Something, can lead us into thinking that these statements
can be further analyzed and expressions completely clarified. Wittgenstein’s allusion
to this problem (§§91-92) is followed by examples of what could be said about
propositions (§§93-94) and thought (§95), and how these statements can be muddled
by the “tendency to assume a pure intermediary” (2009, §94, 9. 48e). This idea can
then lead us back into believing that what we really need to grasp is the essence
of language, i.e. “the order existing between the concepts of proposition, word,
inference, truth, experience, and so forth” (2009, §97, p. 49e). We puzzle about
vagueness in our everyday language (§§98-100) and then project the requirements
of exactness and generality back into reality (§§101-107, §§110-115). Wittgenstein
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seems to be suggesting that this craving for exactness and the picture of language as
anchored in a form of correspondence reinforce each other in sending philosophers
in “pursuit of chimeras” (2009, §94, p. 48e), and lead them astray into philosophical
confusion:
Remark 3.1.1 A picture of language anchored in correspondence, together with a
craving for exactness, lead us into philosophical confusion.
The relevance of this diagnosis for philosophical practice can be better under-
stood if we reflect on a particular method. Analysis can be seen as one of the
most quintessential in philosophy. Michael Beaney (2016) argues that, although
metaphilosophical conceptions and definitions of the method have varied through
the ages, there are aspects of philosophical practice that can be subsumed under a
broad conception of analysis, and these can be characterized by three main perspec-
tives. One is the regressive conception of analysis, which conceives the method as
aiming at “working back to first principles by means of which something could then
be demonstrated” (2016). Another perspective is to think of analysis as decomposi-
tional, i.e. as breaking down concepts (or propositions, or linguistic complexes, or
facts) into their simpler constituents. Yet another conception emphasizes a transfor-
mative (also called interpretative) dimension, in that performing analysis involves
a type of translation from one form into another. These are not to be conceived as
distinct characteristics of analysis, but rather as intertwined aspects of the method.
To what degree each of these aspects or perspectives of analysis comes to the fore is
something that varies with different philosophers, both in their practice, as in their
explicit conceptions of the method.
In order to illustrate these three aspects, let us take as an example the traditional
analysis of knowledge as justified true belief3. We can say that this analysis is
regressive in the sense that it motivates one to orient one’s considerations about
knowledge recursively as considerations about justification, truth, and belief, e.g. if
you want to inquire whether someone knows X you should ask whether she believes
X, is justified in believing it, and whether or not X is true. The analysis is also
decompositional, in the sense that it purports to expose the internal structure of
the concept of knowledge in terms of these other concepts, which are thus seen as
constituting it. The transformative aspect relates to the idea that ‘justified true
belief’ is like a translation of ‘knowledge’, an interpretation of it in a different form
3I make absolutely no claims regarding whether or not the analysis is good, I merely introduce
it as an example of an analysis that hopefully is familiar enough to motivate a better understanding
of the aforementioned aspects of analysis.
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with the same characteristics, which should thus be semantically interchangeable
with it.
Although no explicit critique of analysis in this sense exists in the Philosophical
Investigations, there are passages that raise issues with each of the aforementioned
three aspects. Since they are intertwined with passages that I see as characterizing
the proposed alternative, I will delve into these in more detail in the next section.
Before that, I would like to focus on another point. The issues with each of the three
aspects of analysis in a broad sense stem from what Wittgenstein sees as a misguided
picture of language, and with an attitude towards philosophical methodology that
goes hand in hand with that picture. I maintain that Wittgenstein’s problem is not
with a particular method like philosophical analysis, but rather with the attitude of
idealizing the power and purpose of any method. A passage quoted earlier continues
as follows:
Our inquiry is therefore a grammatical one. And this inquiry sheds light
on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings
concerning the use of words, brought about, among other things, by
certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions
of our language. – Some of them can be removed by substituting one
form of expression for another; this may be called ‘analysing’ our forms
of expression, for sometimes this procedure resembles taking a thing
apart. (2009, §90b, p. 47e)
This passage seems to strike a conciliatory tone. Wittgenstein is suggesting that
one can clear misunderstandings away by doing something which “may be called
‘analysing’”.
Wherein lies the problem, then? The section that follows §90 immediately reveals
that troubles start to arise when we expect too much of the method, when we
believe that, because once an analysis helped clear up one misunderstanding, we
can continue analyzing until we clear up all possible misunderstandings:
But now it may come to look as if there were something like a final
analysis of our linguistic expressions, and so a single completely analysed
form of every expression. That is, as if our usual forms of expression were,
essentially, still unanalysed; as if there were something hidden in them
that had to be brought to light. As if, when this is done, the expression
is completely clarified and our task accomplished.
It may also be put like this: we eliminate misunderstandings by making
our expressions more exact; but now it may look as if we were aiming at
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a particular state, a state of complete exactness, and as if this were the
real goal of our investigation. (2009, §91, pp. 46e-47e)
Wittgenstein takes issue not with analysis in particular, but with overvaluing its
merits or overestimating its potential. It is acceptable to think of analysis of an
expression as regressive, as long as we do not expect to reach a final completely
analyzed form of that expression; to see it as decomposing an expression, as if
taking a thing apart, as long as we do not see this as recovering the real meaning
of the expression; to substitute one expression for another in a particular situation,
as long as we do not get trapped in the illusion that the latter form is therefore
always better than the former and that one can or should substitute it in every
situation. The rejection is of ideals of finality, essentialism, and exactness. I believe
that Wittgenstein would reject these ideals for any philosophical method, not just
analysis. We should thus keep the following remark in mind when reflecting on
systematicity in philosophy.
Remark 3.1.2 Philosophy should stay away from the ideal that linguistic expres-
sions can have a hidden single final exact analyzed form.
The rejection of this ideal is closely related to Wittgenstein’s separation between
philosophical and scientific questions, and his rejection of theory-building and ex-
planation. The most notable passages on this issue can be found in §109:
It was correct that our considerations must not be scientific ones. [. . . ]
And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything
hypothetical in our considerations. All explanation must disappear, and
description alone must take its place. (2009, §109, p. 52e)
It has often been noted (e.g.Gruender, 1962; Baker and Hacker, 1980; Ben-Menahem,
1998; Glock, 2007; Hacker, 2012) that the notions of theory, hypothesis, and expla-
nation at stake in these remarks relate to scientific method and practice, especially
in the natural sciences. Wittgenstein thought that philosophical problems are of a
different nature than scientific problems, and thus require a different approach. It
is important to dissect the characteristics that motivate the rejection of scientific
method as suitable for addressing philosophical problems. Explicit statements on
this are unfortunately lacking in the Philosophical Investigations. However, we can
find more enlightening remarks in the Blue Book, for example the following:
Our craving for generality has another main source: our preoccupation
with the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explana-
tion of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive
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natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of differ-
ent topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the
method of science before their eyes, and are irresistably tempted to ask
and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real
source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.
I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to
anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is ‘purely descrip-
tive’. (Wittgenstein, 2002, p. 18)
It is clear from this passage that, when saying that philosophy should not aim to
explain anything, Wittgenstein is identifying explanation with this portrayal of the
method of science as reducing explanations of phenomena to a small number of laws
and striving for generalizations.
Note that the rejection of the scientific approach, has to do with the nature
of the problems, rather than with an arbitrary classification of something as phi-
losophy or science based on conventional or societal criteria. Thus, if a physicist
decides to conduct an inquiry into “What, then, is time?”, he is likely under the
same predicament as the philosopher investigating the same question. As mentioned
before, characteristically philosophical questions are about meaning, and problems
arise from misunderstanding language and being driven to hypostatize words. A
further passage is evidence of how Wittgenstein sees the relation between this issue
and the attitude of philosophers towards the method of analysis:
Philosophers very often talk about investigating, analysing, the meaning
of words. But let’s not forget that a word hasn’t got a meaning given to
it, as it were, by a power independent of us, so that there could be a kind
of scientific investigation into what the word really means. (Wittgenstein,
2002, pp. 27-8)
Meaning is, for Wittgenstein, not something objective and fixed, and thus cannot
be investigated like the objects of study of scientific inquiry.
Another way to understand the dichotomy is by looking into the opposition be-
tween explanation and description that is present in the Philosophical Investigations.
Ben-Menahem (1998) points out a number of ways in which these concepts are dif-
ferent. They can be condensed, I believe, into three main points. First, scientific
explanations purport to be objective. Natural laws are supposed to be independent
of the scientist’s idiosyncratic personal history and individual experience of the phe-
nomena. Second, scientific theories are built on hypotheses that involve theoretical
entities and nomological relations. Third, such theories typically result from induc-
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tive generalization and are presented as universal and atemporal. Wittgenstein’s
view of philosophical problems (as pointed in Remark 3.1.1, p. 57) is that their
nature is linguistic, they arise in the context of particular language-games and are
characterized as confusions or misunderstandings. They are, therefore, situated and
their resolution requires a first-person perspective, not an objective one. Regarding
the second difference, evoking theoretical entities and pursuing nomological relations
is undesirable in philosophy since it amounts to falling prey to the kind of urges that
lead to philosophical problems in the first place (see again Remark 3.1.1, p. 57). With
regards to the search for universal atemporal truths, this again conflicts with the
nature of philosophical problems as afflicting individuals which occupy a particular
position in space and time. Some of these positions will become clearer when we
discuss an alternative conception of explanation in Section 3.2. For now, what is
important to retain is Wittgenstein’s negative position which can be summarized in
the following remark:
Remark 3.1.3 Philosophy should not aim for objectivity, postulate hidden entities,
or look for universal atemporal truths.
If this interpretation is right, Wittgenstein takes issue with a number of aspects
of philosophical methodology that are not specific to analysis. First, problems start
with a picture of meaning as a Something that has properties defined independently
of us. Second, philosophical inquiry can fall prey to the urge of exactness and the
quest for objectivity, lead astray in pursuit of the chimeras of universal atempo-
ral truths. Wittgenstein notoriously eschewed explicitly naming the targets of his
criticism. In the rare occasions where he does, some ideas of Frege, Russell, and
his younger self are mentioned in a negative light. This, together with the ideas
criticized, the historical context, and Wittgenstein’s own path and influences in phi-
losophy, should make it clear that a good example of the attitude under scrutiny
can be found in the project of early analytic philosophy (Baker and Hacker, 1980,
pp. 259-293). But the criticism runs deeper, and some of the aspects just mentioned
can be found in other schools of thought. Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical remarks
target not a particular method, like philosophical analysis, but rather a broader atti-
tude towards philosophy that has an influence on how any method is used. Analytic
philosophy has changed since its early days, but this attitude can still be identified
in contemporary authors both within and beyond it.4
4It would be inappropriate to point fingers without proper argumentation, and to delve into
that would divert us greatly from the point at hand. These arguments are therefore relevant as a
criticism against analytic philosophy today only insofar as the reader agrees with this diagnosis.
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What does Wittgenstein advise philosophers alternatively do? Along with these
remarks come suggestions for different tasks for philosophy. The confusions that
arise from misunderstanding language and craving for exactness are undesirable be-
cause they “send us in pursuit of chimeras” and “prevent us in all sorts of ways
from seeing that nothing extraordinary is involved” (2009, §94, p. 48e). If phi-
losophy should not build theories, theses, or hypotheses, is there anything left for
philosophers to do? A number of observations in §§89-133 seem to suggest that
philosophy should be confined to clearing misunderstandings away (§90), describing
rather than explaining (§109, §124, §126), bringing words back to their everyday
use (§116), and throwing light on features of our language (§130) aiming to make
philosophical problems completely disappear (§133). These remarks point to the
idea that philosophy’s task should be to dismantle the problems that arise out of
the misguided picture of language and associated urges that lead philosophers into
confusion.
Does Wittgenstein propose a concrete method for such a task? As discussed in
Section 1.1, opinions vary. Many interpreters of Wittgenstein focus on the Philo-
sophical Investigations as defending a particular philosophical method or having an
overarching strategy. Defenders of the so-called orthodox interpretation (started by
Baker and Hacker, 1980) describe it as grammatical clarification, which has been
characterized as “marshalling an ordered array of familiar rules (grammatical rules)
for the use of words” (Hacker, 2012, p. 4). This can be supported by passages like
§122 and §127. This interpretation is close to the idea of dissolving philosophi-
cal problems by studying and describing ordinary uses of language in more detail,
which is characteristic of the so-called ordinary language philosophy (e.g. Ryle, 1962;
Austin, 1962). Motivation for this approach can come, for example, from §116.
Others (e.g. Wisdom, 1953; Baker, 2004) have made a parallel with psychoanalysis,
insisting that Wittgenstein viewed philosophy as a personal therapeutic activity. A
remark that can inspire such a view is §255. A related interpretation (e.g. Fogelin,
1976; Stern, 2004; Plant, 2004) sees in the Philosophical Investigations a defense
and example of the methods of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Part of §133 certainly raises
such motifs. And the list goes on (see Glock, 2007).
One could argue about the particular nuanced differences between each of these
proposed methods or strategies, and which of them is the one that Wittgenstein
truly espoused. But the simplest explanation for the variety of interpretations re-
garding Wittgenstein’s methodology, and for the ease with which each author can
find passages supporting their own view, is that elements of all of these views might
be present in the Philosophical Investigations. And this is not the result of accident
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or sloppiness on the author’s part. Wittgenstein explicitly avows for methodological
pluralism in philosophy:
There is not a single philosophical method, though there are indeed
methods, different therapies, as it were. (2009, §133d, p. 57e)
To look for a unifying method or overarching strategy is to ignore not only this
passage, but also the variety of elements of different methods and argumentative
strategies that can be found in the book. It is clear that the metaphilosophical
remarks put a strong emphasis on defending that philosophy should be confined to
clearing linguistic misunderstandings away.
This recommendation, what Wittgenstein explicitly defended, does fit better
with the therapeutic, Pyrrhonian, or quietist interpretations. But is practice reveals
something more. Even these mostly negative views are anchored in a particular pic-
ture of language and meaning, which itself is not independently supported. These
constitute what Plant (2004) would call Wittgenstein’s minimal dogmatism. There
could be a disconnect between what Wittgenstein defends philosophers should do
and his own philosophical practice that he himself did not realize. This possibility
leaves a bit more room for drawing some positive views from the Philosophical Inves-
tigations. Making the parallel between explanations of meaning and philosophical
methods, as I argue in the next section, can help us see this even more clearly.
3.2 Explanations of meaning and philosophical
method
Wittgenstein’s paradigmatic examples of misguided philosophical pursuits are
driven by questions like ‘What is language?’ or ‘What is a proposition?’ (see §92).
As discussed in the previous section, the inquiry these types of questions lead to can
be fruitless if one uncritically relies on a certain picture of language. In particular,
Wittgenstein criticizes the idea that words like ‘language’ and ‘proposition’ already
correspond to a Something, and it is the nature of this Something that is the subject
of investigation. If one sees meaning as this kind of correspondence, those questions
are no different from the questions ‘What is the meaning of the word ‘language’?’
and ‘What is the meaning of the word ‘proposition’?’, for the meaning of these
expressions is the Something one is interested in investigating..
If the assumption of correspondence is left unchecked, one will tend to go down
the same path of inquiry when considering either the first form of the questions or
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the second one. But, if one sees meaning as related to use (see Section 4.2), it is
possible to approach them differently:
“The meaning of a word is what an explanation of its meaning explains.”
That is, if you want to understand the use of the word “meaning”, look
for what one calls “an explanation of meaning”. (2009, §560, p. 158e)
Similarly, if you want to understand the meaning of the word ‘language’ or ‘propo-
sition’, look for what one calls an explanation of these words.
In general, then, Wittgenstein’s recommendation is to replace questions of the
form ‘What is X?’ with questions of the form ‘How do we usually explain X?’. This
kind of methodological advice is what connects Wittgenstein with the so-called ordi-
nary language philosophy inaugurated by authors like Gilbert Ryle and J. L. Austin.
I am not interested in defending whether or not this is an adequate interpretation
here. What I am interested in is the link between explanations of meaning and
philosophical method. The ways that we explain the use of words to one another
are, according to the view just adumbrated, relevant to how philosophers should go
about understanding those words. This is, furthermore, suggested to be a better
way of reflecting on the philosophical problems connected with those words and to
avoid falling prey to the typical misunderstandings that Wittgenstein warns of.
Before we get started, it is important to clarify the notion of explanation of
meaning. A clear characterization is given by Baker and Hacker (1980, ch. 2).
Wittgenstein talks about two ways in which meaning can be clarified between two
agents: training and explaining. Training is the most basic way of teaching the use
of words. In §5, it is said that it is by training, not explaining, that a child learns to
talk. Part of this training can involve “the teacher’s pointing to the objects, directing
the child’s attention to them, and at the same time uttering a word” (2009, §6,
p. 7e). This is what Wittgenstein calls “ostensive teaching of words”. Other examples
of activities learned by training include using a chart (§86), making calculations
according to an algebraic formula (§189), following a signpost (§198), and obeying
an order (§206), which are all instances of rule-following. Although a more explicit
definition is lacking, one can surmise that training amounts to learning how to
perform an action in response to certain linguistic expressions or symbols.
Explanations, on the other hand, are ways of teaching the use of words by means
of other words. Examples include ostensive explanation5 (e.g. §§28-36, §73), giving
examples (e.g. §68, §71), referring to samples (e.g. §50), or sentence paraphras-
ing (e.g. §20, §§60-64). For the sake of brevity, and alignment with the source text,
5Also called ostensive definition.
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in this section I will talk about explanations simpliciter, but it should be noted that
the remarks in here are about explanations of meaning, rather than nomological
explanations (of the scientific kind). This is following the distinction made in the
previous section. Although Wittgenstein rejects nomological explanations as appro-
priate for philosophy, explanations of meaning are different and, I argue, relevant to
fully understanding Wittgenstein’s attitude towards philosophical methods.
Going back to Beaney’s three aspects of analysis, I would like to first draw
attention to §§19-32, which discuss a number of questions closely linked with the
transformative aspect of analysis. The initial sections question the idea that one can
reveal the meaning of the words used in the builders’ language of §2 by translating
them into a different form. Should we say that, in that language-game, the call
‘Slab!’ actually means ‘Bring me a slab!’? That is one way we could explain the
use of the call to someone who was not familiar with that particular language-game.
But such a translation would only help someone who already knows how to use
the other words in the translated form like ‘bring’ or ‘me’, i.e. someone who has
played other language-games. To the hypothetical primitive builder that only plays
the language-game of §2, the translated form would actually be incomprehensible
because he does not know how to use those other words.
The point of these remarks is two-fold. First, to remind us that just because we
can translate a linguistic expression into another that does not make the latter the
real meaning of the former. There is nothing more fundamental to the builder than
the call ‘Slab!’, and there is no way in which he means ‘Bring me a slab!’ when he uses
it. This goes clearly against transformative ideals of unearthing true or fundamental
forms of linguistic expressions. One can think of a large part of Frege’s philosophy
(explicitly mentioned in §22) or Russell’s theory of definite descriptions (1905) as
examples of projects that implicitly or explicitly held to that ideal. The second
point of these remarks is to draw attention to how verbal explanations of meaning
are always anchored in particular language-games. This is very explicitly stated for
ostensive definitions in §§30-31, where the motto is that “an ostensive definition
explains the use – the meaning – of a word if the role the word is supposed to play
in the language is already clear.” (2009, §30a, p. 18e) And to know the supposed
role of a word is to know how to play a certain language-game.
Wittgenstein uses, in §31, the example of chess to drive home the point. The
short explanation ‘This is the king’ (while holding or pointing to a chess piece) only
helps the other if he already knows how to play, but does not know which piece is
supposed to be the king in that particular board. For a less informed partner, the
explanation ‘This is the king; it can move in this-and-this way’ can help if the other
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(a) Arrangement.
1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8 9
(b) Interpretation schema 1.
1 2 3
(c) Interpretation schema 2.
Figure 3.1: Arrangement of colored squares from §48 and interpretation schemas.
has played other games and knows what a piece is, what a move is, how these are
coordinated (e.g. taking turns), and so forth. He needs to already know how to play
games and how to use the words given in the explanation. Ultimately, this point
should follow from the simple fact that, by definition, explanations of meaning always
involve the use of words, and words are always learned in the context of particular
language-games.
This point has implications for the decompositional aspect of analysis as well.
The notions of simple and composite, the cornerstones of the idea that a concept
can be broken down into its constituent parts, are put into question in §§47-48.6
In the current context, I want to draw attention to Wittgenstein’s remarks that
these two notions are always relative to each other: what is simple depends on
what kind of compositeness one is interested in, and this can vary depending on the
language-game one is playing. This point comes back more markedly in §§60-64,
where Wittgenstein draws again on the language-game introduced in §48. Consider
Figure 3.1. Using the order represented by the numbers in interpretation schema 1
(Figure 3.1b), and the letters ‘R’, ‘G’, ‘W’, and ‘B’ for, respectively, the colors red,
green, white, and black, one could describe the arrangement in Figure 3.1a by the
sentence ‘RRBGGGRWW’. In this language-game, it might seem obvious that each
colored square is a simple, and the whole arrangement described by that sentence
is composite. Already for this setup, we are invited to consider other possibilities:
couldn’t we consider each square as composed of two smaller rectangles, or of color
and shape, for example?
In §64, Wittgenstein refers back to this game and imagines a variation7. Consider
interpretation schema 2 (Figure 3.1c) and the letters ‘U’, ‘V’, and ‘X’ as representing,
respectively, a red square above a green square above a red square, a red square
above a green square above a white square, and a black square above a green square
above a white square. In this variation, one could say that the sentence ‘UVX’ also
6I look more closely into these passages in Section 5.2.
7The following is not exactly what Wittgenstein describes, but it captures, I believe, the same
point.
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describes the arrangement in Figure 3.1a. Is then, the sentence ‘RRBGGGRWW’
a more fundamental analyzed form of ‘UVX’? Could we replace the language-game
that uses interpretation schema 2 with the one described in §48? Wittgenstein’s
answer is a negative one: “It is just a different language-game; even though it is
related to (48).” (2009, §64b, p. 35e) Based on previous remarks, one can see at
least two reasons underwriting this reply. First, someone who knew how to play the
language-game of §64, by using letters to describe columns could see each column
as a unit with a special character, just like we see the French tricolor as more than
just an arbitrary arrangement of three colors. Second, in order to understand the
sentence ‘RRBGGGRWW’ one would need to know how to play the language-game
of §48. This includes knowing that the sentence is (in the context of that game)
composite, knowing the colors associated with each of the letters, and knowing
the order represented by the interpretation schema 1. Thus, explaining ‘UVX’ as
‘RRBGGGRWW’ is neither necessarily meaning-preserving nor self-contained. One
can summarize the take-home message by the following remark:
Remark 3.2.1 An explanation is always anchored in a language-game, and its value
is relative to that language-game.
There are also remarks that hint at further issues with some expectations we
might have regarding explanations that are linked with the aforementioned regressive
aspect of analysis. One of the first comes as early as §1d. Wittgenstein sets up a
hypothetical situation where a shopkeeper is given a paper with the words ‘five
red apples’ written on it and describes the actions performed for each word. The
following dialogue between narrator and interlocutor follows:
“But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word ‘red’
and what he is to do with the word ‘five’?” — Well, I assume that he
acts as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere. –
But what is the meaning of the word “five”? – No such thing was in
question here, only how the word “five” is used. (2009, §1d, p. 6e)
We can see the interlocutor’s questions as characteristic of a regressive urge. He
is trying to understand the words ‘red’ and ‘five’ in this context, and for that he
seems to be looking for some apodictic foundation. The narrator is going one level
deep by describing the behavior of the shopkeeper when being handed the paper
with the words on them, but the interlocutor wants to go deeper. The narrator
deflects this urge twice, each being characteristic of Wittgenstein’s thought. I discuss
some implications of the second deflection in Section 4.2. As for the first deflection
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(“Explanations come to an end somewhere”), it seems to me to be revealing of
an attitude towards philosophical method that surfaces in other sections as well,
particularly clearly in §29 and §87.
The problem with regression is clear and far from new. Whenever we provide an
explanation of the meaning of a word, this is done in terms of other words. What
keeps us from asking for an explanation of the meaning of the words contained in
that explanation? And subsequently of an explanation of those? A foundationalist
might argue that such a regress cannot go on indefinitely, otherwise no one could ever
understand an explanation, so one must assume the existence of final self-sustained
explanations. Wittgenstein, however, takes a different approach:
These questions would not even come to an end when we got down to
words like “red”, “dark”, “sweet”. – “But then how does an explanation
help me to understand if, after all, it is not the final one? In that case
the explanation is never completed; so I still don’t understand what he
means, and never shall!” – As though an explanation, as it were, hung in
the air unless supported by another one. Whereas an explanation may
indeed rest on another one that has been given, but none stands in need
of another – unless we require it to avoid a misunderstanding. One might
say: an explanation serves to remove or to prevent a misunderstanding
— one, that is, that would arise if not for the explanation, but not every
misunderstanding that I can imagine.
[. . . ]
The signpost is in order – if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its
purpose. (2009, §87, p. 45e)
Words (or other linguistic entities) do not require, in and of themselves, for their
meaning to be explained. We, agents making use of words, may require explanations
whenever we encounter or expect a misunderstanding.
If we place a signpost at a crossroads where one road leads to village A and
the other to village B, indicating which leads where, and we subsequently find that
people end up in the village they intended to go to, we do not need to add another
signpost explaining how the first is to be interpreted, or a third one explaining the
second. If, however, people following the road usually get lost, we might indeed add
a further explanation. But that does not mean that, just because this possibility
exists, a second signpost is always needed. In the context of analysis, this position
is not exactly against the regressive aspect altogether. An explanation may rest on
another, and may be helpful to resolve a misunderstanding. Problems arise when
one goes looking for an explanation without a misunderstanding that needs to be
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resolved, without a practical purpose. Explanations do come to an end at some
point, but that point is dependent on the purpose.
Not only should the need for an explanation be dependent on a practical purpose,
but one should also bear in mind that both the explanation and the purpose are
situated in a context. In §§28-29, Wittgenstein discusses an example of how one
could explain the meaning of the word ‘two’ by pointing at a pair of nuts. The issues
of regression quickly arise here too: if, in order to avoid a misunderstanding, one
would accompany the gesture by the phrase “This number is called ‘two’.”, wouldn’t
one potentially also need to explain the word ‘number’? And again to explain that
explanation by means of other words, continuing this exercise ad infinitum? This
concern is, however, countered by the following remarks:
Whether the word “number” is necessary in an ostensive definition of
“two” depends on whether without this word the other person takes the
definition otherwise than I wish. And that will depend on the circum-
stances under which it is given, and on the person I give it to. (2009,
§29, p. 18e)
The dissolution of the issue is here similar to that in §87: there is no need to
provide further explanations unless the ostensive definition is taken otherwise than
is intended, i.e. unless it fails to fulfill its purpose. The important addition to this
is the reminder that whether an explanation succeeds or fails also depends heavily
on context. This implies that there is no foolproof a priori criterion for a good
explanation and “[a]ny explanation can be misunderstood” (2009, §28b, p. 17e). One
can imagine a number of circumstances having an impact on this (e.g. whether one
is pointing at two nuts isolated on a table, or whether they are far away and next to
another group of three nuts), as well as personal idiosyncrasies that might make the
listener fail to understand the explanation under the same circumstances (the most
obvious being whether or not she knows the word ‘number’). These observations
fit well with Wittgenstein’s picture of language as a practice (see Section 4.1) by
drawing attention to contingent circumstances and the involvement of agents. An
explanation is thus dependent on a situated purpose:
Remark 3.2.2 Explanations should only be pursued when driven by, and in the con-
text of, a situated purpose; their success cannot be guaranteed independently thereof.
This conception of explanation demonstrates an attitude that is very different
to the one criticized in Section 3.1. Explanations of meaning are not to be judged
on their intrinsic properties, but rather on whether they fulfill their purpose in the
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situated context where they are given. They can be ambiguous (§28b), vague (§71,
§88), and incomplete (§87), as long as they are useful. They can also be misunder-
stood, any explanation can (§28b, §71) and there is, therefore, no absolute objective
criterion for their success. Given how explanations are anchored in language-games
(Remark 3.2.1, p. 67), and that new ones are continuously invented and other ones
get forgotten (§23), explanations are inevitably provisional; they are relevant while
someone knows and is interested in playing the language-games that underwrite
them. This attitude abandons the ideals of exactness, objectivity, and atemporality
by pivoting on the primacy of contingent and situated purpose. It aims to embrace
the heterogeneous and dynamic nature of meaning, and reject the urge to look for
a priori apodictic answers to requests for the meaning of linguistic expression.
These considerations have a bearing on philosophical method for a number of rea-
sons. First, as was discussed in Section 3.1, philosophical inquiry starts, in Wittgen-
stein’s eyes, from questions of meaning, for which a certain preconception of language
leads the philosopher to look for exact, objective, atemporal answers:
We ask: “What is language?”, “What is a proposition?” And the answer
to these questions is to be given once for all, and independently of any
future experience. (2009, §92b, p. 48e)
Philosophical methods can be seen as attempts to systematize how one goes about
addressing these questions. Philosophical analysis, if conceived in terms of decompo-
sition, involves explaining a concept in terms of other, supposedly simpler concepts.
Explication, phenomenology, connective analysis, ordinary language philosophy, and
other methods might prescribe different approaches, but, according to Wittgenstein,
they are ultimately trying to understand the use of words, i.e. philosophical prob-
lems are not empirical (§109), and the inquiry is rather a grammatical one (§90).
Following a philosophical method can thus be seen as providing a sophisticated
and more or less systematic explanation of meaning, but an explanation of mean-
ing nonetheless. Therefore, whatever virtues Wittgenstein exalts in explanations of
meaning should be relevant for philosophical methods as well. Second, it is no co-
incidence that §§87-88, which heavily feature remarks on explanation, are followed
by the most markedly metaphilosophical part of the Philosophical Investigations.
Not only that, but they are even connected by the following passage: “With these
considerations we find ourselves facing the problem: In what way is logic something
sublime?” (2009, §89a, p. 46e) The immediately preceding considerations in §§87-88
defend a particular conception of explanations of meaning. That these seem to lead
to thoughts on logic (broadly construed), analysis, and method in philosophy, is
further evidence that explanation and these issues are strongly connected.
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Wittgenstein’s attitude towards explanations of meaning has pragmatist under-
tones. As I argued in this section, it is highly contextualist: explanations are por-
trayed as always tied to particular language-games, and their interpretation and suc-
cess as depending on the circumstances surrounding their use, including the person
the explanation is given to. Furthermore, no language-game is necessarily privileged
over another, some are simply different even if they can be related. If we see philo-
sophical methods in a similar light, we can interpret this as supporting the following
claim: if the force of a method depends on the context, and there is no privileged
language-game, there can be no single optimal way to approach every philosoph-
ical question. This aligns well with the picture of Wittgenstein as committed to
methodological pluralism, as mentioned at the end of Section 3.1.
This pluralism is not full-blown relativism, on the contrary. First, philosophical
language-games constitute the context in which each method is evaluated. At-
tempts to use conceptual analysis or formal logic in a conference on the philosophy
of Jacques Derrida are likely to be as denounced as arguments based on deconstruc-
tivism in a meeting on analytic metaphysics, whereas the former methods would
probably not raise any eyebrows in the latter gathering, and vice-versa. Impor-
tantly, as language-games are social practices (see Chapter 4), the success of each
method further depends on the people involved and the way they act and interact
with each other. Second, Wittgenstein has his own criteria of approval. As I argued
in Section 3.1, they apply not to particular methods, but to the attitude one has
towards them. Thus, he would likely reject the use of conceptual analysis if it was
presented as finding some objective final analyzed form of a linguistic expression,
but might not have any qualms with the method being used as a provisional tool to
dispel some perceived misunderstanding.
A common objection to pluralism could be raised. Isn’t the claim that there is
no objectively optimal method itself in need of an Archimedean point to derive its
force from? What are the basis for Wittgenstein’s criteria and picture of language,
and why should one accept them? Such concerns reflect the very attitude being
criticized. They demand for ultimate foundations, where the claim is precisely that
these foundations do not exist. Reflecting on the remarks on explanations of meaning
discussed above can illuminate a possible reply. Wittgenstein’s position with regards
to explanations of meaning, I argued in this section, is an anti-foundationalist one:
there are no ultimate self-explanatory explanations on top of which all the others
rest. What can someone who defends such a position reply when continuously
pressed for justifications?
Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and
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my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I
do” (2009, §217b, p. 91e)
Explanations come to an end somewhere. But this end is not a self-sustained foun-
dation or an apodictic truth. It is simply the point beyond which communication
breaks down, and disagreements persist. An anti-foundationalist cannot give an ir-
refutable argument that there are no irrefutable arguments. Nor can someone who
claims that there is no single optimal method provide an infallible justification for
that claim. But shouldn’t the burden of proof be on the other side? Exploring this
issue in detail is beyond the scope of this paper, as it would require delving into
a thorough discussion of the old and unresolved problems typically associated with
relativism. And Wittgenstein himself does not provide a critical examination of his
position. The important thing to retain is Wittgenstein’s methodological pluralism,
which we can summarize in the following remark.
Remark 3.2.3 There is no single valid philosophical method, but there are many
useful ones.
In Section 3.1, I argued that Wittgenstein’s critical points found in §§89-133
are directed not against particular methods, but against a certain attitude towards
them, namely the tendency to see them as means to discover atemporal apodictic
truths. Establishing a parallel between explanations of meaning and philosophical
methods allows us to see an alternative. If one employs a philosophical method with
a practical purpose in mind, with full awareness of its locality (anchored in particular
language-games, situated in a context), one is able to relinquish the craving for
exactness in favor of fulfilling the purpose at hand, in the context at hand. That
Wittgenstein’s remarks are not in defense of one particular method, but of a general
attitude towards them, is further supported by the methodological pluralism both
advocated for explicitly (e.g. in §133d) and embodied in his practice. This, I believe,
leaves plenty of room for systematicity (as method-following rather than system-
building) in philosophy. What is crucial is to maintain a pragmatist attitude towards
the methods one uses.
When it comes to the study of natural language, it is easy to interpret Wittgen-
stein’s rejection of ‘logic’ and the ideal of exactness, and his appeal to go “[b]ack
to the rough ground” (2009, §107, p. 51e), as incompatible with any kind of for-
mal approach. Even Richard Rorty defends that “if one adopts the point of view of
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, there can be no such thing as a ‘system-
atic theory of meaning for a language’” (1991, p. 57). I want to argue that signaling
games, despite being a formal approach to the study of meaning, can be seen as
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retaining the pragmatist attitude that is dear to Wittgenstein, while nevertheless
being very systematic. It is important, however, that we do not see them as a the-
ory of meaning. They are a framework, a toolbox so to speak, that constitutes a
method in the same way as Wittgenstein’s artificial scenarios of language use that
we encounter throughout the book. With that in mind, it is important to reflect on
what is said about these toy language-games, as I shall here call them.
3.3 The use of toy language-games as method
One can separate Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘language-game’ into two kinds.
One refers to the various real ways in which people use language and the activities
these are interwoven with. The best list of examples of such activities can be found
in §23, and includes things like describing an object by its appearance, making up
or reading a story, acting in a play, or telling a joke. These are scenarios of language
use that we can identify as part of our existing practices. Another sense in which
the term ‘language-game’ is used refers to admittedly artificial scenarios of language
use created by Wittgenstein in the context of discussions of specific issues. The best
examples are the often-called builders’ language, introduced in §2 and extended in
§8, §15, and §86, the language of colored squares, introduced in §48 and further
discussed in §64, and the beetle-in-the-box thought experiment of §293. Baker and
Hacker (1980) distinguish these two senses as natural and invented language-games.
I prefer to call the latter toy language-games, because they resemble the kind of
toy models often used in science and engineering (see Frigg and Hartmann, 2018).
Both are deliberately simple descriptions of self-contained hypothetical systems that
are supposed to capture the relevant elements that allow one to study particular
aspects of larger natural systems. They do not purport to be an accurate repre-
sentation of reality, but rather to allow one to play with them in order to better
understand more complex phenomena. Both are cases of thought experiments: the
author creates a specific hypothetical scenario, introducing a number of entities and
establishing the relations between those entities, and then explores the plausibility
of intuitions about the scenario, from how it should be interpreted in light of a
certain theory, to how it would play out if left to the specified devices.
In order to think of the use of toy language-games as a method, and before
one considers questions of systematicity, it is important to reflect on how one can or
should conceive of them according to Wittgenstein. Namely, this includes important
questions regarding what these models are, how they can or should be used, and how
one could develop them further. When it comes to toy language-games, Wittgenstein
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gives us some clues on his own attitude towards them. First, we are given two
ways of conceiving of them. With respect to the builders’ language, we are told
that we can imagine it as a “complete primitive language” (2009, §2, p. 6e), i.e.
a system of communication used by the builder and the assistant, or even by a
whole tribe of people engaged in such activities (§6). Another option is to see
the builders’ language as “one of those games by means of which children learn
their native language” (2009, §7, p. 8e). Even though a child eventually learns a
more complex language, the process of language acquisition starts with interactions
that are similar to toy language-games in many ways (see Ratner and Bruner, 1978
and Tomasello, 2008, §4.4). In both readings, toy language-games are thus to be
imagined as complete, in that they enable conducting a certain activity without the
need for anything else, and isolated, in that they do not necessarily interact with
other language-games (in particular because, both in the case of being a primitive
language or of being a game by which a child learns to talk, there are no other
language-games to be interacted with).
Remark 3.3.1 Toy language-games are complete and self-contained hypothetical
scenarios of language use.
Studying toy language-games enables abstracting away from the complexities of
natural language. Whereas natural language-games are diverse, ever-changing, and
interwoven with each other, each toy language-game is imagined as complete and is
typically discussed in isolation. The purpose is to gain clarity:
If one looks at the example in §1, one can perhaps get an idea of how
much the general concept of the meaning of a word surrounds the work-
ing of language with a haze which makes clear vision impossible. – It
disperses the fog if we study the phenomena of language in primitive
kinds of use in which one can clearly survey the purpose and functioning
of the words. (2009, §5, p. 7e)
If one thinks as language as a whole, and aims for a general theory of meaning,
as philosophers of language often do, clear vision is, according to Wittgenstein,
impossible. However, if one sees language as composed of smaller units, it becomes
legitimate to focus on one specific kind of use. In particular, one can do so by creating
a toy language-game as a simplified example of that kind of use. This can allow one
to get a clearer overview of the elements at play. Toy language-games are tailored
to specific questions. The builders’ language contains objects in order to motivate
reflections on meaning as reference to the external world, the colored squares game
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has complex sentences to illustrate problems of logical atomism, and the beetle-in-
the-box imagines a super-private entity to raise issues with psychologism (more on
all of these in Chapter 5). It would be very difficult to talk about compositionality
in the context of the builders’ language, but this does not invalidate the usefulness
of that particular toy language-game to motivate discussions about the kind of use
it illustrates.
Such an approach of independently studying particular kinds of use can raise
concerns that one could fail to see the forest for the trees. Wittgenstein’s position,
however, is that language does not have an essence (§92) or a formal unity (§108).
Language-games are interrelated, but there is nothing necessarily common to all of
them (§§65-67). If what is called ‘language’ is a family concept in this sense, it is
better to try to understand it in the same way one understands other family concepts,
like ‘game’ or ‘number’: by getting better acquainted with various examples, building
others on the analogy of these, and so forth (§75). This is exactly what Wittgenstein
does with toy language-games: they “stand there as objects of comparison which,
through similarities and dissimilarities, are meant to throw light on features of our
language” (2009, §130, p. 56e). Rather than starting with a theory of meaning built
on the assumption of the existence of common features to all that we call language,
and then interpreting the particular instances in terms of that theory, Wittgenstein
is suggesting one should start by studying individual kinds of use and develop further
understanding of language by contrasting several such instances with each other. It
is an approach that is bottom-up, rather than top-down.
Remark 3.3.2 The most productive way to study language is to independently study
specific kinds of use.
Another important difference between toy language-games and other systematic
approaches to studying language is one of attitude towards the method. In line with
what was pointed out in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, Wittgenstein says the following:
Our clear and simple language-games are not preliminary studies for
a future regimentation of language – as it were, first approximations,
ignoring friction and air resistance. (2009, §130, p. 56e)
For we can avoid unfairness or vacuity in our assertions only by pre-
senting the model as what it is, as an object of comparison – as a sort
of yardstick; not as a preconception to which reality must correspond.
(The dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy.) (2009,
§131, p. 56e)
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These are warnings directed at those who might feel certain urges towards toy
language-games. In particular, toy language-games are not to be taken as sim-
plifications that can eventually be generalized into a theory of meaning. Let alone
are they aimed at capturing any essential property of language or meaning. This
rejection stems from the picture of language as a family: if there is nothing neces-
sarily common to all language-games, there is no essence to what language is, and
thus no general theory of meaning to be constructed.
Like explanations of meaning, each toy language-game is best seen as local to the
particular aspect of language use it exemplifies. That the builders’ language is not
appropriate to discuss compositionality is neither a flaw of that toy language-game
nor a sign that it needs to be extended. That toy language-game has a situated
purpose (Remark 3.2.2, p. 69), namely to help someone better understand a kind
of referential use of language, and it is in order as long as it fulfills that purpose.
This is not to say that it cannot be extended, Wittgenstein does so a number of
times (§8, §15, §86), but only that it does not have to. One must resist the craving
for universality (Remark 3.1.3, p. 61). Toy language-games should be seen and
presented as models, objects of comparison, or yardsticks, i.e. as tools to further our
understanding of particular kinds of use of words and sentences, and thus indirectly
of the workings of language. The relevant lesson can be summarized in the following
remark:
Remark 3.3.3 Toy language-games are not to be generalized into a theory of mean-
ing.
One might find the use of toy language-games problematic given that the notion
of language-game, their natural counterpart, is never very clearly defined. The re-
marks that follow §65 attempt to address this issue. As already mentioned, Wittgen-
stein rejects the need for an essentialist definition (in §67 and other places). In
reaction to this, the interlocutor suggests a disjunctive characterization: one could
define a family concept, like ‘game’ or ‘number’, as “the logical sum of corresponding
sub-concepts.” (2009, §68a, p. 37e) This, the reply argues in the following remarks,
would be to draw a rigid boundary where no boundary is needed. We use concepts
like ‘game’ and ‘number’ successfully without making this kind of exact definitions.
The same should be possible with the notion of a language-game.
The concept of a language-game is thus admittedly vague, based on rough al-
lusions, metaphors, and enumerations of examples. There is neither a statement
of necessary and sufficient conditions nor a formal procedure to decide when some-
thing qualifies as a language-game or not. This is explicitly by design. It is tied not
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only to the picture of language as heterogeneous and dynamic, but also to a deeply
pragmatist stance. When pressured by the interlocutor regarding the possibility of
making a more exact definition of ‘game’, Wittgenstein retorts:
To repeat, we can draw a boundary – for a special purpose. Does it take
this to make the concept usable? Not at all! Except perhaps for that
special purpose. (2009, §69, p. 37e)
Regarding the Fregean idea that a blurred concept is no concept at all, he further
says: “This presumably means that we can’t do anything with it.” (2009, §71, p. 38e)
The idea Wittgenstein is setting up as problematic is that a concept needs an exact
definition in order to be used.
Both his rejections are thus anchored in considerations of usefulness: what mat-
ters is not whether a definition of a notion like language-game is exact (whatever
that may be), but whether or not one can do something with it. For example, if I
want to take a picture of you and tell you to “stay roughly here” (2009, §71, p. 38e),
precise GPS coordinates of where to stand are typically neither necessary nor even
desired; what matters is that I fulfill the purpose of taking a picture in a way that
satisfies us both. The need for more or less precision is tied to the particular pur-
pose we have in mind, and to the extent to which the words used serve that purpose.
The discussion in these sections leads to remarks on vagueness and rule-following
that will be addressed in later sections. For now, the important thing to retain is
Wittgenstein’s explicit acknowledgment and acceptance of the loose definition of the
notion of language-game:
Remark 3.3.4 It is acceptable to define language-game by metaphors and examples;
a stricter definition should only be advanced when needed for a special purpose.
These remarks give us an overview of howWittgenstein conceives of toy language-
games and their intended use. The way he himself uses them is already somewhat
systematic, in the sense defined in the beginning of this chapter. He himself talks
about applying “the method of §2” (2009, §48a, p. 27e) and uses it in several mo-
ments throughout the Philosophical Investigations. The method is described by
Stern (2004, pp. 10-15) as consisting of three stages: first, there is a characteriza-
tion of a certain philosophical idea; second, a toy language-game is imagined where
this idea would apparently apply quite well; third, observations are presented to
make us see that even in this ideal scenario the idea is much more limited than it
initially appears. Toy language-games are thus a tool to explore the assumptions
of philosophical ideas about meaning by laying them bare in a concrete example
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and reflecting on how such a scenario would play out. If it fails to match our ex-
pectations we have exposed a problem with the philosophical idea. Concomitantly,
they can also serve to illustrate and motivate a different perspective on meaning
(see Chapter 4). This is patent in, for example, how Wittgenstein uses the builders’
language to both raise issues with referentialism and promote the shift of attention
from reference to use (see Section 4.2). In the following section, I reflect on the
resemblance between toy language-games and signaling game model, and how well
the way they are used aligns with the remarks on methodology brought forward in
this chapter so far.
3.4 Systematizing toy language-games
When comparing toy language-games and signaling game models, one can start
by considering their structural similarities. In Section 2.2, I laid out the typical
components of signaling game models. Toy language-games can also be seen as
put together by combining a number of various elements. Baker and Hacker (1980,
pp. 54–55) identify seven. To their list, I add two additional ones8, agents and
objects, and remove one, completeness9. I thus consider the following elements as
the relevant components of toy language-games:
Agents* I start with one element that Baker and Hacker fail to mention, but that
I believe is important to include, especially when considering Wittgenstein’s
picture of language as practice (see Chapter 4): the presence of agents. For
example, in the builder’s language of §2 there is a builder and an assistant, in
the colored squares language-game there is an individual A describing colored
squares to another individual B (see §49), and in the beetle-in-the-box game
(§293) there are a number of people using the word ‘beetle’. Discussions of
meaning never present language in isolation, toy language-games are always
described with reference to agents using language in the context of a practice;
Vocabulary Consists of a set of linguistic entities (e.g. words, sentences) avail-
able to the agents. It is typically a finite set, like ‘block’, ‘pillar’, ‘slab’, and
‘beam’ (§2), but it can be a vaguely defined potentially infinite set, like num-
bers (§21) or series of signs (§143);
8I mark these with ‘*’ for the sake of clarity.
9Completeness is not an element of a toy language-game in the sense that things like agents, or
a vocabulary, are. It is at best, following Remark 3.3.1 (p. 74), simply a desired property of them.
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Instruments Includes additional elements that could be said to form part of the
vocabulary but are usually not considered linguistic, such as gestures (e.g.
§28), samples (e.g. §50), or pictorial representations (e.g. §291);
Objects* While instruments and vocabulary are used by the agents as signs, real
objects are sometimes also part of toy language-games in a different role.
Examples are the building stones in the builders’ language (§2), the sword
Nothung in §39 and §44, or the chair in §80. While these elements of the ex-
ternal world do not constitute the meaning of elements in the vocabulary, they
are relevant to the use that is given to those elements by the agents involved;
Activity Some toy language-games specify actions that agents can perform. The
best example is the builder’s language where the assistant chooses which stone
to bring to the builder. Toy language-games like the colored squares and the
beetle-in-the-box do not talk about physical actions, but they are still, as
discussed in Section 4.1, always considered as kinds of activities;
Purpose An additional ingredient in discussions of meaning is the purpose linguis-
tic entities are being used for. Toy language-games thus often characterize the
objectives of the agents involved. For example, in the builder’s language it is
relevant to the meaning of the call “Slab!” if the builder wants to simply evoke
a mental picture in the assistant, or if he wants the assistant to perform a cer-
tain action. It should be noted that not all toy language-games characterize
this in detail;
Context There are circumstances beyond the explicit elements available to the
agents (vocabulary, instruments, objects, and actions) that can additionally
influence the use of language. Baker and Hacker describe these as the “presup-
positions of meaning” (1980, p. 54), and include things like general features
of the natural world, e.g. that chairs do not usually disappear and reappear
suddenly from sight (§80), and general features of human beings that enable
us to begin to interpret an unknown language (§206);
Learning processes Discussions of toy language-games sometimes include not only
the playing of the game, but also speculations about the processes required
for an agent to learn how to play the game in the first place. The most de-
tailed examples include the learning of the builders’ language in §§6-9 and the
learning of the number series language-game in §§143-155.
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Baker and Hacker (1980, p. 55) also talk about completeness, but those consider-
ations are not exactly about any element of toy language-games, but rather about
Wittgenstein’s attitude towards them.
With these elements in mind, and recalling the typical anatomy of a signaling
game (see Section 2.2), it is possible to make a point by point structural compari-
son. As in toy language-games, considerations about agents are also always present
in signaling game models. There is no game without individuals to play it, and
their characterization has repercussions to other elements in the model as well. Re-
searchers thus tend to represent them in much more detail than Wittgenstein does.
This includes making choices about their level of rationality, whether one is dealing
with two (or more) agents or populations thereof, what kind of strategies should
be used to represent them and how they should be updated, among other things.
Vocabulary in toy language-games corresponds clearly to message space in the sig-
naling games framework. Messages can represent words or sentences used by the
agents in communication. As mentioned in Section 2.2, message spaces can be finite
or infinite, but also dynamic, which is an aspect in which signaling games can be
seen as going beyond toy language-games.
Instruments do not have a clear correspondence in signaling games. Whether
and how they can be incorporated depends on their role. Things like gestures, for
example, can be easily seen as messages. The latter need not be linguistic entities;
they simply stand for anything that the sender can produce and the receiver can
identify. Note that there is nothing ontologically special about what is exchanged
when we say we are using words or sentences. Ultimately, what is produced by
the sender is either a sound or an action that results in a visual pattern (like for
example ink marks on paper). A gesture fits this description just as well, and can
thus be represented in a signaling game model by a message. In fact, Lewis originally
describes signals as kinds of actions (1969, p. 122).
Other instruments, like for example samples, are more difficult to fit in the
picture. Wittgenstein talks about them as means of representation (§50). They
are objects used to make certain types of statements, like the standard meter can
serve as a reference point for statements about length. They could be considered
as part of the message space, but would have to be assigned a special role. This
could perhaps be achieved in a model with complex messages but, to the best of my
knowledge, this has not been attempted in the literature yet.
Objects in toy language-games can be seen as related to either states or actions
in signaling games. Pillars, slabs, swords and chairs are the kind of things that
can trigger senders to produce particular messages in response to which they expect
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certain actions to be performed by receivers. Note that the absence of objects can
easily be seen as having the same effect. The need for a pillar, rather than its
presence, can trigger the sender to produce a signal in order to obtain the missing
object. States and actions are more than mere objects, but objects can often (though
not necessarily) be related to these two components of signaling games. What Baker
and Hacker call activity can also be related to states and actions. This is clearly
the case for the receiver but, as discussed above, messages can also be interpreted
as actions performed by the sender. Again, what is relevant is that whatever the
sender does for a given state is accessible to the receiver, and that the latter makes
a choice based on it that has implications for both, but the framework is certainly
motivated with activity in mind.
The implications of agents’ choices are captured, in a signaling game model,
by the utility function. This can be seen as representing what in toy language-
games is called purpose by Baker and Hacker. As mentioned in Chapter 2, what the
utility function represents has at least three possible readings in the signaling games
literature. If a signaling game model is interpreted in terms of classic game theory,
like the ones originally proposed by Lewis (1969), one can see utility as encapsulating
the preferences of the rational agents involved in the game. This aligns well with
how purpose is described by Wittgenstein in the context of toy language-games.
If a model is analyzed using learning dynamics, utility is probably best seen as
representing the way the agents are externally reinforced. Here, one can still see
utility as related to purpose. Utility would no longer represent the purpose of the
agents playing the game, but rather that of some potential tutor. Note that, however,
just because there is learning and reinforcement that does not imply that there is a
conscious purposeful tutor. One can learn from acting in the world and have one’s
behavior reinforced simply because some choices yield positive and others negative
results. Finally, if a signaling game model is understood in terms of populations of
agents driven by evolutionary forces, seeing utility as purpose would amount to a
teleological take on evolution, an interpretation which is controversial, to say the
least (see Allen and Neal, 2019). Selection is best seen as a mechanistic process.
In the context of that perspective, utility represents fitness, which can be seen
abstractly as likelihood of replication, like survival and reproduction in biological
evolution, or propagation by imitation in cultural evolution. Therefore, in signaling
game models aiming to capture these types of processes, like the ones proposed by
Skyrms (1996), the notion of purpose present in some toy language-games plays no
role.
The element of context is somewhat vague and ill-defined, hence it is difficult to
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make a clear comparison. The specification of prior probabilities for states in the
state space is a small component of the signaling games framework that could be
considered as forming part of context. Priors can be interpreted either as the true
distribution of states, in which case they could be seen as general features of the
world, or as how likely agents think each state is, in which case they could be seen
as forming part of their presuppositions. In general, however, contextual features
will typically end up embedded in different components of each model. This can
include how the state, message, or action spaces are structured, how agents’ abilities
and commonalities are reflected in the dynamics, what defines success or failure as
captured by the utility function, and so on. Ultimately, much like in toy language-
games, these features will vary strongly from model to model.
Learning processes turn up in a lot of the different ways of signaling game models
can be analyzed. As will be discussed in Section 4.3, if a model is seen as a single
shot game, there is no room to capture any kind of dynamic adaptation, including
learning. In the context of repeated games, however, there are a number of options
to represent different types of learning processes. These range from learning by im-
itation, as in the interpretation of the replicator dynamics as cultural evolution, to
reinforcement learning, a more behavioristically inspired model, to other processes
available to agents with higher levels of rationality, like the best-response dynamics.
If one is interested in learning processes, the signaling games framework is thus well
suited to take them into account. Additionally, there are also other ways to inter-
pret and analyze models, for example in terms of rational deliberation or biological
evolution.
In order to illustrate these connections between the elements of toy language-
games and the components of the signaling games framework, it can help to consider
how one could build a concrete model for a particular example. Take the builder’s
language of §2. The agents in the toy language-game are the builder and the assis-
tant. Given their roles, one could think of the former as the sender, and the latter as
the receiver. Their possible behavior (the sender choosing one word to use, and the
receiver choosing one building stone to hand over) could be represented in terms of
simple pure strategies. The message space could be constituted by a discrete finite
set with a message per word in the vocabulary (‘slab’, ‘pillar’, etc). States would
have to represent what triggers the builder to use those words. In the context of
Wittgenstein’s story, that is the need for a particular building stone. Thus, there
could be a state for being in need of a slab, another for being in need of a pillar,
and so on. Conversely, the actions available to the receiver include handing over a
slab to the builder, handing over a pillar, and so forth. The utility function would
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encode the purpose of the game, which presumably is for both sender and receiver
to satisfy the sender’s need for a particular building stone. This could be formalized
by a function that trivially assigns a utility of 1 to the combinations of actions that
satisfy the states (e.g. the assistant hands over a slab when the builder is in need of
a slab) and 0 to other combinations. This is a simple Lewis signaling game (as de-
fined in Chapter 2) that could be analyzed in terms of learning processes, much like
it is done for the builder’s language in §§6-7. I did not specify any instruments or
additional context, and the existence of objects is only implicit, but not all elements
are relevant for all games.
It seems clear that the signaling games framework motivates representing sce-
narios of language use in a way that is structurally similar to Wittgenstein’s toy
language-games. However, there also dissimilarities that need to be noted. One is
that toy language-games are mostly used to support remarks of a negative nature.
Stern (2004) emphasizes this aspect of the ‘method of §2’:
This three-stage argument scheme suggests a more general recipe for
unsettling philosophical preconceptions. First, describe a case the pre-
conception fits as well as possible, [. . . ] then change just enough about
the case in question [. . . ] so that we run up against the limitations of
the preconception. (2004, p. 11)
According to his interpretation, toy language-games are used with the purpose of
supporting the dissolution of a philosophical preconception. This is indeed the main
angle of most uses of the method. For example, the builder’s language supports
the argument that meaning is more than reference to external entities, the col-
ored squares game is used to reveal problems with ideas of logical atomism and
compositionality, the beetle-in-the-box experiment can be seen as illustrating the
incongruence of psychologistic theories of meaning, and other toy language-games
are used to dismantle some intuitions about rules and rule-following.10 This should
come as no surprise given the many passages in the Philosophical Investigations,
urging philosophers to focus on clarificatory tasks (see again Section 3.1).
Signaling game models, unlike toy language-games, are usually created to sup-
port positive hypotheses about language and meaning, as can be seen from the
literature discussed in Chapter 2. Prima facie, they seem to therefore fail to align
well with Wittgenstein’s later philosophy when it comes to explicit considerations
about method. It might very well be the case that he would not have endorsed their
use for this very reason. However, as pointed out earlier, there is a certain conflict
10See Chapter 5 for more details on the first three cases, and Chapter 6 for the toy language-
games regarding rules and rule-following.
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between metaphilosophy and practice in the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgen-
stein’s position hinges on a particular picture of language (see Chapter 4) which
is difficult not to see as a set of hypotheses. That language is heterogeneous and
dynamic, that one should see it as a practice, that it is constituted of interrelated
language-games, that one should look at use in order to better understand meaning,
these are all suggestions that form a positive view on how language is like. Despite
being presented as platitudes, they are not obvious, not shared by everyone, and are
general enough to need further evidence and substantiation.
This picture of language (what Plant, 2004 calls Wittgenstein’s minimal dog-
matism), is to some extent motivated for in the context of discussions that make
use of toy language-games. The builder’s language supports not only the negative
claim that learning reference is not sufficient to learn the meaning of a word, but
also the positive claim that ostensive teaching “together with a particular kind of
instruction” (2009, §6, p. 8e) can bring about understanding. The beetle-in-the-box
experiment implies that, as long as the word ‘beetle’ has a use in the language-game,
it has a meaning, even when the box is empty (§293). The colored squares example
is used to illustrate how two language-games can be different but related (§64). And
more examples could be pointed out. To the extent that the aforementioned picture
of language constitutes a positive view, and that toy language-games are sometimes
used to promote it, I think that making use of the signaling games framework to
argue for further positive hypotheses about language and meaning can be in line
with Wittgenstein’s practice.
If one accepts this as valid method in philosophy, one should still take heed of
Wittgenstein’s remarks on how philosophy often goes astray. Philosophical questions
are often created by a picture of language anchored in correspondence. A failure
to see this, combined with a craving for exactness, can lead one to misjudge the
way one should approach these kinds of questions (Remark 3.1.1, p. 57). This can
lead one to look for hidden essences or universal atemporal answers (Remark 3.1.3,
p. 61) and this has an important impact on which methods one thinks are suitable
to approach the questions. If, however, one adopts a different picture of language
and recognizes that linguistic expressions do not necessarily have single analyzed
forms (3.1.2), one can stop looking for exact definitions, necessary and sufficient
conditions, or necessary truths as ends in themselves. In Section 3.1 I argued that
Wittgenstein’s negative views are not against particular methods, but against a
certain attitude towards them. It is important to keep the aforementioned remarks
in mind when making use of the signaling games framework as well.
This brings me to another aspect in which toy language-games and the signaling
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games framework differ. Whereas the former are purely verbal models, setting up
the elements and their interrelations solely in terms of natural language, the latter
make use of mathematical language and often of computer simulations. As such,
signaling game models are represented and analyzed with a much higher degree of
precision than toy language-games. This can be seen as succumbing to the craving
for exactness Wittgenstein warned against (see Remark 3.1.1, p. 57). Note, however,
that the problem with exactness is tied to a picture of meaning as correspondence.
Philosophers are lead into confusion when they assume elements of discourse neces-
sarily map to real entities which must therefore be possible to characterize precisely.
Signaling models are admittedly artificial and abstract; their elements do not
correspond to real entities, and the level of precision they are described in and
analyzed with does not therefore need to be projected onto reality. Precision is, in
the signaling games framework, merely instrumental. Taking into account what was
said in Section 3.2 as applicable to both toy language-games and signaling games
alike, additionally motivates related considerations. In particular, one should always
keep in mind that these methods are contingent, both to the particular context in
which they are being employed (Remark 3.2.1, p. 67), as well as to the purpose at
hand (Remark 3.2.2, p. 69). As such, no use of these methods should purport to be
universal, in the sense of capturing an essential property of everything that we call
language, or claim to necessarily represent reality. As long as all of this is kept in
mind, the use of mathematical language and computer simulations does not need to
lead to the same problems that the philosophical endeavors portrayed in the context
of Remark 3.1.1 (p. 57) do.
These formal tools make signaling games more systematic than toy language-
games. Going beyond the aforementioned structural similarities and comparisons
in terms of methodological aims, we can see additional resemblances by exploring
how both toy language-games and signaling game models can be seen as instances
of thought experiments. Thought experiments have been used in both science and
philosophy for as long as these practices exist (J. R. Brown, 1991; Rescher, 2005).
There are ongoing debates on what thought experiments are and what epistemic
powers they actually have. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage with that
debate11. I concur with Nersessian (1992) in seeing thought experiments as a form of
“simulative model-based reasoning” where someone reasons “by manipulating men-
tal models of the situation depicted in the thought experimental narrative.” (1992,
pp. 291-292)
It should be clear by everything said so far that both the use of toy language-
11See J. R. Brown and Fehige (2017) for an overview of the issues.
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games and of the signaling games framework can be characterized in these terms.
Toy language-games are complete and self-contained hypothetical scenarios of lan-
guage use that certainly fit the description of thought experiments (Remark 3.3.1,
p. 74). Furthermore, the method of §2 fits well into what El Skaf and Imbert (2013)
call the CUI pattern of inquiry: construction of a scenario in the context of an in-
quiry, unfolding of the scenario, interpretation of the results. Thought experimenting
involves following this pattern for scenarios that are hypothetical abstract mental
models, created to answer a “what if” question, and admittedly representing only
a limited number of aspects of reality (see Cooper, 2005). The signaling games ap-
proach also fits this pattern: models and their assumptions represent a scenario, the
consequences of the assumptions are determined by unfolding the scenario (making
calculations, either analytically or running simulations) and interpreting the results..
Toy language-games and signaling game models can thus play a similar role in the
CUI pattern of inquiry, despite most often being represented and unfolded using
different techniques (natural language for toy language-games, and a combination
of natural language, mathematics, and potentially computer simulation for signal-
ing games). This, according to El Skaf and Imbert (2013), means that they are
functionally substitutable12.
Herein lies a possibility for additional systematicity: if signaling games can per-
form the same functional role as toy language-games, while enabling a more system-
atic approach by using mathematical language and computer simulation, one should
consider them as tools to potentially supplement Wittgenstein’s practice of thought
experimenting. The study of language, in particular, is quite amenable to the use
of mathematical models and computer simulations, and the literature is rife with
them13. For questions of meaning, the dominant approach along these lines is for-
mal semantics (see Portner, 2005; Winter, 2016, for introductions). But, as Stokhof
(2013) points out, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is typically seen as antithetical to
12In particular, the authors state the following:
We have argued that [computer simulations], [thought experiments] and [experi-
ments], while involving different ontological types of particulars need not always
serve different complementary functions; but claiming that [computer simulations],
[thought experiments] and [experiments] can sometimes be functionally substitutable
simply means that they can do the same thing, like two barristers or two goal-keepers
are functionally substitutable but need not have the same talent. Similarly, [computer
simulations], [thought experiments] or [experiments] need not, from an epistemolog-
ical point of view, play their unfolding function identically nor come with warrants
or credentials of the same type, have the same degree of trustworthiness or bring the
same epistemological benefits. (El Skaf and Imbert, 2013, p. 3470)
13It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide an overview, but Jurafsky and Martin (2009)
provide a good starting point.
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its core assumptions and methods:
Arguably, formal semantics shares a number of important assumptions
with views on language, meaning, and reality, and the role logic plays
that Wittgenstein developed in the Tractatus. The distinction between
the surface, grammatical form of an expression and its logical form, the
all-pervading referentialism, including the defining role of truth condi-
tions, the assumption that meaning is not only homogeneous but also
universal in the sense that there can be one characterisation that applies
to all (possible) languages, are some of the most important features that
formal semantics shares with the Tractarian framework. This allows us to
discuss the later Wittgenstein’s ‘criticisms on formal semantics’ without
actually being anachronistic. For many of the criticisms that Wittgen-
stein vents in the Philosophical Investigations against his own earlier
views in the Tractatus, either directly or indirectly via his critique of the
Augustinian picture, can be considered as criticisms of formal semantics
as well, provided they are related to the assumptions that the Tractatus
and formal semantics share. (2013, pp. 226-227)
Because of the almost lack of alternatives to formal semantics, this can lead many
to believe that the Philosophical Investigations are antithetical with any formal ap-
proach to the study of meaning in natural language. I think that signaling games
can play a similar role to Wittgenstein’s toy language-games while promoting more
systematicity in the study of natural language14. Crucially, they present an al-
ternative to formal semantics that does not share its aforementioned problematic
assumptions. As argued in the rest of this thesis, they fit well with Wittgenstein’s
picture of language (Chapter 4), avoid the problems of referentialism (Chapter 5),
and do not conflict with Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following (Chapter 6). They
do all this while at the same time allowing for the use of mathematical modeling
and computer simulations.
As El Skaf and Imbert (2013) point out, each method has its pros and cons. One
advantage of mathematical models is that they make the workings of toy examples
very explicit, but this sometimes can come at a cost of a loss of intuitive appeal.
However, although a mathematical model allows for more control over variables and
calculations, the required level of formalism can make it less flexible and thus less
adequate in situations where a natural language thought experiment would suffice.
Sometimes, for example when studying complex dynamical systems, mathematical
14When it comes to mathematical models and computer simulations in general, the argument
is not completely new (see Parisi, 2004).
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models supported by computer simulations are the only way to fully explore the
potentially large space of possible outcomes. However, this can come at a cost of
some explanatory opacity, since sometimes it is not obvious which factors contribute
to which outcome (Di Paolo, Noble, and Bullock, 2000). The list goes on.15 I believe
that the advantages outweigh the limitations. Models, even if we see them as artifi-
cial and oversimplified, can serve as conversation starters. By making assumptions
more explicit, they allow one to communicate their ideas more clearly to others.
By exposing them, they allow their implications to be explored more thoroughly,
especially when aided by unfolding mechanisms such as computer simulations.
Is the use of the signaling games framework a method for philosophical inquiry
that is in line with Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical concerns? The question does
not, in my opinion, have a straight answer. On the one hand, signaling game models
are typically put forward to support positive hypotheses about language, which can
be seen as going against Wittgenstein’s recommendations, especially if one follows
therapeutic or Pyrrhonian interpretations of his work. On the other hand, as I
argued in Section 3.1, Wittgenstein’s concerns seem to be directed more against a
certain attitude towards methods than against particular methods. Positive recom-
mendations about the right attitude to take, I argued in Section 3.2, can be drawn
from making a parallel between philosophical method and explanations of meaning.
With this, and particularly Wittgenstein’s pluralism (Remark 3.2.3, p. 72) in mind,
a further exploration of the possibility of using the signaling games framework in
philosophical inquiry seems to be warranted.
Some of Wittgenstein’s considerations about meaning are supported by the use
of toy language-games, which are therefore implicitly endorsed. Not only that, the
method is explicitly presented as a way to investigate language that helps avoiding
confusion and enables a clearer picture of the issues involved (Remark 3.3.2, p. 75),
with the caveat that they should not be generalized into a theory of meaning (Re-
mark 3.3.3, p. 76). In this section, I argued that there are a lot of similarities between
how toy language-games and signaling game models are used, both structurally and
methodologically. This, on top of the considerations in Chapter 4, makes a strong
case for seeing the use of the signaling games framework as acceptable methodology
from a Wittgensteinian perspective. However, it is important to heed the warnings.
One should avoid the cravings that typically lead philosophers astray and keep see-
ing the models as the contingent tools that they are. Although they can help explore
or communicate some hypotheses about language, they should not be pursued as
revealing its essence or providing universal atemporal truths about the phenomena.
15See Nersessian and MacLeod (2017) and Smaldino (2017) for recent overviews of the advan-
tages and issues with the use of models and computer simulations in different areas of science.
Chapter 4
An organic picture of
language
The picture of language that emerges from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations is anchored in the notion of language-games. In this chap-
ter, I discuss this picture, how it informs a particular proposal regarding
meaning and use, and whether signaling games can allow one to study
language in a way that preserves these ideas.
A core notion of the picture of language adumbrated in the Philosophical Inves-
tigations is that of language-game. There are two (closely related) ways in which
Wittgenstein uses this term. Whenever clarification is warranted, I will use the
term toy language-game to refer to the artificial scenarios of use created as a kind of
thought experiment to explore particular ideas about language and meaning. Some
clear examples are the so-called builder’s language of §2 (extended in §8 and §86),
the language of colored squares of §48 (further discussed in §64), and the well-
known beetle in the box scenario of §293. I focused on this kind of language-game
in Section 3.3. Another way in which Wittgenstein uses the term is to refer to the
naturally occurring counterpart of these examples. They are also language-games in
the sense that they involve the use of words as part of certain activities, but they are
part of our existing practices rather than being artificial hypothetical scenarios. In
this chapter, I focus on this notion of language-game, and on the picture of natural
language that it informs.
4.1 Practice, heterogeneity, and dynamism
The term language-game is first introduced and roughly defined in §7. In the
preceding sections, however, one can already find a number of toy language-games
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put forward to illustrate certain points. In §1, the author imagines sending someone
shopping with a paper with ‘five red apples’ written on it, and how a shopkeeper
would proceed when given such a paper. In §2, we have the often-called builder’s
language, where a builder and an assistant are supposed to communicate over build-
ing stones using a limited number of words; the builder calls out the words and the
assistant is expected to bring him certain stones. The examples themselves involve
more than just signs or sentences in the abstract. They picture situated uses of
language. The discussions that follow the setup, usually revolve around the actions
that the individuals involved perform (or would hypothetically perform), and around
how they might have learned to respond to certain signs or stimuli in certain ways.
Words are pictured as something one does things with, like tools in a toolbox (§11)
or handles in the cabin of a locomotive (§12). Language itself is called an instru-
ment (§569) that enables us to do things like “influence other human beings” and
“build roads and machines, and so on.” (2009, §491, p. 145e) The term language-
game itself, by incorporating the word ‘game’ and being often compared with more
standard examples of actual games (e.g. chess, tennis), furthermore evokes an active
dimension to the concept.
Besides these implicit appeals to practice, Wittgenstein explicitly states that he
is interested in looking at language in connection with practical activities, and that
using language is itself part of an activity:
We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) as one of
those games by means of which children learn their native language. I
will call these games “language-games” and will sometimes speak of a
primitive language as a language-game. (2009, §7b, p. 8e)
I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the activities into
which it is woven, a “language-game”. (2009, §7d, p. 8e)
The word “language-game” is used here to emphasize the fact that the
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. (2009,
§23b, p. 15e)
This focus on practice is important since it hints at a picture of language that
is starkly different from what underlies some common philosophical reflections on
meaning1.
1It is impossible to do justice to all the varieties of perspectives and methodologies employed
by philosophers of language when reflecting on language and meaning. The objective with this
kind of loose and broad characterizations, as with the discussion that follows, is neither to create
a straw man, nor to covertly refer to some author or school of thought. I want to simply highlight
some hopefully recognizable features of philosophical practice that contrast with Wittgenstein’s
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Practices involve agents performing actions in the world. Thinking of language
as a practice keeps in the forefront individuals and the potential for idiosyncratic
variation; it evokes bodies, movement, and interaction; it is a first step against the
urge to sublimate language onto a realm beyond the one we inhabit:
We’re talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language,
not about some non-spatial, atemporal non-entity. (2009, §108c, p. 52e)
Highlighting the entanglement of language with practice serves as a reminder that
the activities where words and sentences are used, such as going shopping or con-
structing buildings, should be kept in mind when making considerations about mean-
ing. It opposes the idea that linguistic expressions can be detached from the context
of those activities, and meaning can be analyzed independently. Viewing language
as a tool makes us see it as a means to an end, rather than a mere repository of
information or a mirror of reality.
It also brings practical purpose to the fore: what we want to achieve when we use
language matters to understanding how we use it. A typical philosophical inquiry
into language and meaning would have no qualms in taking a sentence like ‘Every
man is mortal’, ‘Water boils at 100 degrees Celsius’, ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, ‘Snow
is white’, or ‘The cat is on the mat’, and reflect on its meaning in the abstract, not
necessarily to understand that particular sentence better, but to extract general
principles that govern the way language and meaning works2. Such an approach
would ignore who is using that sentence, in what context, and for what purpose.
Wittgenstein’s objective seems to be to move away from this kind of analysis, first
by situating any sort of reflection on language and meaning within the context of a
practice, and second by bypassing the abstract discussion of meaning by considering
picture of language in the Philosophical Investigations. It is important to mention them because
the author’s ideas were likely developed in reaction to them, and this includes Wittgenstein’s own
early work.
2Michael Dummett gives us a clear description of this project:
According to one well-known view, the best method of formulating the philosophical
problems surrounding the concept of meaning and related notions is by asking what
form that should be taken by what is called ‘a theory of meaning’ for any one en-
tire language; that is, a detailed specification of the meanings of all the words and
sentence-forming operations of the language, yielding a specification of the meaning
of every expression and sentence of the language. (1975, p. 1)
Incidentally, one can additionally recognize here the cravings for precision (aiming for “detailed
specifications”), and universality (encompassing “all the words and sentence-forming operations”),
that Wittgenstein would disavow in such a project, as discussed in Chapter 3. To be fair, this is not
exactly what Dummett himself defends a theory of meaning should be, but simply a description
of what he calls “one well-known view”. I believe Dummett’s view, although more nuanced, would
still be incompatible with Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis
to delve into that comparison.
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instead the practical applications of words and sentences. This intention can be
recognized as early as the end of §1. In the context of the ‘five red apples’ exam-
ple, where an interlocutor asks “But what is the meaning of the word ‘five’?”, the
narrator replies “No such thing was in question here, only how the word ‘five’ is
used.” (2009, §1d, p. 6e) Wittgenstein is not interested in questions of what words
or sentences mean in the abstract, but rather in how they are used in practice. The
exact nature of the relation between meaning and use will be discussed in more
detail in Section 4.2. What is important to note for now is that, for Wittgenstein,
in order to talk about meaning one needs to talk about use, and in order to talk
about use one needs to consider language in the context of practical activities. We
can summarize these ideas in the following remark:
Remark 4.1.1 Using language is part of a practice; considerations about meaning
need to take into account not only the linguistic entities but also the activities they
are employed in.
With this in mind, the unit of interest becomes not language as a whole, but
language-games. Although no detailed definition of the concept is given at any
point3, §7 and §23 are certainly key. Considering what is said there, together with
what one can surmise from the examples given throughout the book, it is clear that
language-games have both a narrower and a wider scope than what are typically
called languages. The toy language-games of §1 and §2 involve, respectively, using
written signs to send someone on an errand and using speech to achieve coordination
while doing construction work. A number of naturally occurring language-games
are listed in §23, including giving and following orders, presenting the results of an
experiment, making a joke, translating from one language to another, just to name
a few. One the one hand, all of these are somewhat circumscribed activities that
require knowledge of a much smaller set of linguistic elements than what makes up
a whole language like English or German. On the other hand, language-games are
broader in the sense of involving other things beyond a set of signs and rules for
sentence formation. Buying apples or taking a bus might require a very reduced
knowledge of vocabulary and grammar, but can involve other things like gesturing,
making eye contact, or smiling. Although these actions would not typically be
considered as part of a language, they could definitely be included as part of a
language-game.
Language, in a broader sense, is portrayed as a collage or a patchwork of a large
number of these language-games. A metaphor used to illustrate this at one point is
3And this is obviously a conscious decision (see, for example, §69) that has to do with Wittgen-
stein’s conceptions of meaning, explanation, and his metaphilosophical position.
4.1. PRACTICE, HETEROGENEITY, AND DYNAMISM 93
that of an ancient city: “a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, of
houses with extensions from various periods, and all this surrounded by a multitude
of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform houses.” (2009, §18,
p. 11e) One imagines language-games as different as neighborhoods from various
periods in a city: some more organically developed, others following a strict high-
level plan; some more baroque with many purely decorative elements, and some
more minimal and functional in spirit. Despite the variability, language-games are
nevertheless linked together in making up what one calls a language, the same
way that different boroughs make up a city. The objective of this metaphor is to
highlight the heterogeneity of language in terms of the diversity of language-games
that compose it.
The analogy also brings out another important aspect of Wittgenstein’s picture
of language: dynamism. Observing how different parts of the city developed in
different periods is not only a historical curiosity, it is also a reminder that it will
most likely keep developing in various ways in the future. As with the ancient city,
so too happens with language:
But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question and
command? – There are countless kinds; countless different kinds of use
of all the things we call “signs”, “words”, “sentences”. And this diversity
is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new
language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become
obsolete and get forgotten. (2009, §23a, pp. 14e-15e)
We should never assume that a natural language is complete, but rather expect it
to keep changing over time, with new language-games being added, and old ones
falling out of use. The number of language-games that compose a language is thus,
for all practical purposes, countless, not only for their sheer number and variety,
but for their dynamic nature as well. The following remark summarizes the ideas
discussed so far:
Remark 4.1.2 Language is deeply heterogeneous and dynamic, consisting of an
ever-changing multitude of language-games.
The metaphors just discussed, although highlighting heterogeneity and dyna-
mism, can be somewhat misleading in another respect. One could get the idea of
language-games as clearly bounded and separate from each other, only connected
at the edges like the patches of a quilt or the boroughs of a city. This is not,
however, how Wittgenstein envisions the relation between language-games, and this
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is quite patent in the discussion starting in §65. Language-games are said to have
all sorts of affinities between them (§65), characterized as a “complicated network
of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and in the
small.” (2009, §66, p. 36e) Thus, two language-games can be similar to each other
but different from a third with respect to one aspect, but this third can be similar
to the first and dissimilar to the second according to another aspect. The relation
between language-games is thus seen as multi-dimensional, breaking with the two-
dimensional metaphors of the patchwork and the city.
It is important to notice that the idea of multi-dimensional overlapping and
criss-crossing similarities raises the possibility of some language-games being hard
to distinguish from others. This can happen, for example, when the similarities are
many and the differences depend on subtleties, like tone of voice or facial expressions
(see §21). We can all recognize this possibility by considering examples like when
an ironic remark is taken literally, or when a joke goes over someone’s head: one
interlocutor might have been trying to play one language-game which the other
failed to identify. Because of this, and unlike what the metaphors of a patchwork or
a city could lead us to believe, boundaries between language-games can be hard to
draw.
Wittgenstein is very adamant about the idea that there is not, however, neces-
sarily anything in common between all language-games. This is the main point of
§§65-67, where the examples of ‘game’ and ‘number’ serve to illustrate the idea that
one can use the same word to talk about things that do not all necessarily share a
common feature. Things in such a situation are said to have a family resemblance
between them and thus form a family. The analogy is with how people who are
blood relatives can share similarities and also have differences, depending on which
aspect, like eye color, type of hair, nose shape, and so forth, one is considering,
without necessarily there being one characteristic that is common to all. One could
nevertheless talk about them as a family, just like one can talk about a language
as composed of many interrelated language-games without there being a common
aspect that all those language-games share. We can summarize these points in the
following remark:
Remark 4.1.3 Language-games are interrelated along many different dimensions,
without anything necessarily common to all.
The remarks summarized in this section paint a picture of language as organic:
heterogeneous, ever-changing, adaptable. I use the term ‘organic’ in a loose sense.
I want to suggest that language, in this picture, shares similarities with the results
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of living processes. For example, the process of evolution by natural selection, as
we understand it today, has created a heterogeneous set of interrelated species that
continuously change and adapt to their environment. One can think of language in
similar terms.4 Wittgenstein’s notion of language-game is a key component of this
picture that additionally evokes the interconnection between language and practice.
Words are portrayed as instruments used to enable the achievement of certain goals.
In the context of this picture, there is little room for a notion of meanings as entities
standing in a relation of correspondence to linguistic expressions. I discuss the
relevant remarks for this negative claim in more detail in Chapter 5. In the following
section, I want to first explore remarks Wittgenstein makes about what seems as
a positive proposal of a way of thinking about meaning that goes along with this
organic picture of language.
4.2 Meaning and use
Wittgenstein’s general pragmatist stance when it comes to language feeds into
a particular conception of meaning in relation to use. Though no sequence of sec-
tions in the Philosophical Investigations is dedicated to the topic, one observation
that repeatedly appears in the discussion of other topics is the importance of under-
standing use in order to understand meaning. This observation occurs often when
Wittgenstein talks about learning a language or a language-game. For example, in
§§5-9 one is lead to imagine what would be involved in the teaching of the builder’s
language of §2 (and an extension thereof laid out in §8). The exercise serves to
expose the limitations of ostensive teaching. In drawing attention to those limita-
tions, Wittgenstein suggests that learning a language is not a matter of explaining
but training (§5b). An important part of this training might involve the teacher
pointing to an object and uttering a word (§6). This training could be interpreted
as having the effect of establishing a connection between the object and the word.
However, Wittgenstein counters the following:
But if this is the effect of the ostensive teaching, am I to say that it
effects an understanding of the word? Doesn’t someone who acts on the
call “Slab!” in such-and-such a way understand it? – No doubt it was
the ostensive teaching that helped to bring this about; but only together
with a particular kind of instruction. With different instruction the same
4This has been more recently formulated, for example by Beckner et al. (2009), in terms of the
notion of a complex adaptive system. I briefly discuss this idea again in the conclusions.
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ostensive teaching of these words would have effected a quite different
understanding. (2009, §6c, pp. 7e-8e)
What is being drawn attention to is that, although instilling an association between
object and word in the learner might be important in teaching the meaning of the
call “Slab!”, it is not enough. The purpose of the call in the language-game is not
to evoke mental imagery, but to elicit a certain behavior (§6b). If someone only
learned the connection between the object and the word, this would not be enough
to know how to get someone to pass him a slab, or know what to do when hearing
the call “Slab!”.
This point is illustrated again in §31, with an example from chess: we can only
be said to understand what the king is, not by naming it, but by knowing what to
do with it, how to move it around the board, and so on. In §§40-44, the case is made
that for a proper name to be said to have a meaning it is quite enough that it has
a use in the language-game, even if the bearer of the name, for example, ceases to
exist. The discussion in §§139-142 draws attention to how a picture of a cube is, in
most cases, insufficient for one to be able to use the word ‘cube’ successfully. In the
‘beetle in the box’ though experiment5 (§293), what seems to be crucial about the
word ‘beetle’ having meaning is not the object in each person’s box, but that the
word has a use nonetheless. The idea being called into question throughout these
remarks is the idea that “[o]nce you know what the word signifies, you understand it,
you know its whole application” (2009, §264, p. 100e). This is repeatedly challenged
throughout the book, sometimes more explicitly as in the examples just discussed,
sometimes more implicitly. Whenever Wittgenstein seems to be making a point
about what meaning is not, reminders about use are always present.
In addition to the importance of use in language acquisition, Wittgenstein also
makes remarks regarding how the meaning acquired through such a process is main-
tained. To this respect, we are often reminded that signs, words, or sentences do
not have meaning in and of themselves. This idea, although tempting, is quickly
dismissed in passages such as the following:
I am told: “You understand this expression, don’t you? Well then –
I’m using it with the meaning you’re familiar with.” As if the meaning
were an aura the word brings along with it and retains in every kind of
use. (2009, §117a, p. 53e)
Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? – In use it lives. (2009,
§432, p. 135e)
5The experiment is discussed in more detail in Section 5.3.
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How does it come about that this arrow 6 points? Doesn’t it seem
to carry within it something extraneous to itself? – “No, not the dead
line on paper; only a mental thing, the meaning, can do that.” – That
is both true and false. The arrow points only in the application that a
living creature makes of it. (2009, §454, p. 140)
Vibrations of air molecules or ink marks on paper (the material things we exchange
when using language) do not carry with them or within them something extra that
endows them with meaning. The dismissal of these metaphors in these passages is
accompanied by appeals to both use and to the organic picture of language discussed
in the previous section. The objection in the first quote from §117a is even more
significant if we consider the vision of language as diverse and dynamic.
These aspects of language make it even harder to believe that an expression
could contain in itself, not only the meaning for every known use of the word, but
also potentially all future uses that could ever be invented. The second quote from
§432 suggests that signs come to life during use. The image of life appears again in
different form in the third quote from §454, where it is said that a living creature is
necessary to make an arrow point. These associations reinforce the idea of language
and meaning as something dynamic. The third quote again evokes the picture of
words and language as tools, something a creature makes use of, and is thus a
reminder that language is part of a practice. Meaning does not exist outside of signs
and expressions constituting with them a special bond, nor is it a static property or
comes attached to them in some mysterious way. An arrow points when it is used to
point. Note that these are again grammatical remarks about meaning and relate to
the way that we talk about signs, rather than to a hypothetical metaphysical entity.
Thus, it is not that a sign has meaning when is it used in a certain way, but that
we say of a sign that it has meaning when is it used in a certain way. These points
can be summarized in the following remark:
Remark 4.2.1 Signs do not carry or possess meanings; we say that they have mean-
ing when they are being used.
Clear statements regarding the exact nature of the relation between meaning
and use are rare. The well-known passage that does appear to provide this reads as
follows in the revised translation by Hacker and Schulte:
For a large class of cases of the employment of the word “meaning” –
though not for all – this word can be explained in this way: the meaning
of a word is its use in the language. (2009, §43a, p. 25e)
6This is not an accurate rendering of the arrow portrayed in the book.
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The interpretation of this remark is, however, slightly contentious. One can distin-
guish between two main interpretations. The first takes the passage as defending
the idea that we can define meaning as use. A strong advocate of this proposal is
Paul Horwich (e.g. 2004; 2008) who defends what he calls a Use Theory of Meaning
(UTM). In his reading, §43a is taken as clear evidence that Wittgenstein is con-
cerned with “the facts in virtue of which a given word has the meaning it does—with
the underlying characteristics that are responsible for its possessing that particular
meaning” (2008, p. 134). The suggestion is thus that words have particular mean-
ings and that these are grounded in facts related to their use. This, according to
UTM, applies in general, i.e. “the meaning of a word, every word, is its use” (2008,
p. 138). Under this interpretation, a research program that could “discover the
particular meaning-constituting use-properties of particular words” (2008, p. 137,
footnote 3) is a plausible endeavor, albeit one for linguistics, not philosophy.
This interpretation seems to me to be at odds with many aspects of Wittgen-
stein’s later philosophy. First, it aims to be a general characterization of the essence
of meaning. This goes against the anti-essentialist picture of language as a heteroge-
neous patch of language-games linked by family resemblances (Remark 4.1.3, p. 94).
To declare a definition of meaning as use is to fail to see Wittgenstein’s words in
§43a in the broader context of the conception of language that runs through the
rest of the book. It is also to fall into the temptation of trying to “see right into
phenomena” (2009, §90, p. 47e) and thinking there is “something that lies beneath
the surface” (2009, §92, p. 48e), a mistake Wittgenstein repeatedly warns us not
to make. Second, UTM construes words as having definite meanings, something
that goes against Wittgenstein’s rejection of the idea of meaning as something that
accompanies, or that is related to, words and linguistic expressions (Remark 4.2.1,
p. 97). Talk about words “possessing meanings” or having “meaning-constituting
use-properties” is, it seems to me, to go against those remarks. Third, such a strong
conception of the connection between use and meaning readily invites the idea that
the former can determine the latter. This is something that Wittgenstein himself
explicitly questions at time, for example in §§139-141 using the example of the word
‘cube’7, and more generally in §§191-197.
For these reasons, I think the formulation “the meaning of a word is its use in
the language” in §43a is somewhat misleading. When taken out of context, it could
be interpreted in a way that runs counter to a number of aspects of Wittgenstein’s
later philosophy. But what is being suggested in §43 is not a theory of meaning. It is
simply a reminder that the meaning of a word is usually explained by characterizing
7For more on this example, see discussions leading up to Remark 6.1.2 (p. 149) in Chapter 6
of this thesis.
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its use in the language, just like “the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by
pointing to its bearer.” (2009, §43b, p. 25e) This does not imply that the meaning of
that name actually is the bearer, neither should we in general identify the meaning
of a word with its use. Martin Stokhof (2013) also rejects UTM as something
that Wittgenstein would not have endorsed, and does so on similar grounds. He
recognizes a different possible reading of §43a, namely as more of a methodological
advice:
The minimalistic interpretation of ‘explaining meaning by looking at the
use’ reads it as a purely methodological statement. On this view it is not
so much a connection between meaning and use that is made, but a shift
of attention that is effected. It invites us to stop looking for some ‘thing’
that we can call meaning, and focus instead on the way expressions are
used: that should suffice. (2013, p. 223)
The interpretation is that the point of §43a is not to identify meaning with use,
but to suggest that one should divert questions about meaning to discussions about
use. Rather than falling prey to the temptation of trying to answer questions of the
form “What is the meaning of X?” as “The meaning of X is Y”, one should instead
investigate the ways in which ‘X’ is used. And this is not meant as a first step towards
later identifying those as the meaning of ‘X’, but simply as a different method
of answering the question. For example, when facing the question “What is the
meaning of the word ‘game’?”, how should one proceed? One could feel tempted to
provide a definition; a philosopher would most likely try to investigate the necessary
and sufficient conditions for something to be called a ‘game’. Wittgenstein’s advice
goes in a different direction:
How would we explain to someone what a game is? I think that we’d
describe games to him, and we might add to the description: “This and
similar things are called ‘games’.” (2009, §69, p. 37e)
Describing activities that one would call ‘a game’ is a way of describing the use of
the word ‘game’. It is also, for Wittgenstein, a perfectly acceptable way to explain
the meaning of the word ‘game’, and thus to try to answer the question “What is a
game?” without providing any type of precise definition.
This methodological advice is similarly recognized by other authors. For exam-
ple, by Richard Rorty when he defends that the association of meaning and use
proposed in the Philosophical Investigations “is not a ‘use-theory of meaning’, but
rather a repudiation of the idea that we need a way of determining meanings.” (2007,
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p. 172) This methodological interpretation strikes me as the best fit with Wittgen-
stein’s later philosophy: it rejects the confusion of thinking that meaning must be
a property (or a set therefore) of linguistic expressions; it fully recognizes the het-
erogeneous and dynamic nature of language; and it acknowledges the importance of
use without constraining it into an essentialist characterization of meaning.
Remark 4.2.2 Meaning is not constituted by use, but in order to understand mean-
ing we should study how language is used.
Wittgenstein’s remarks about meaning and use, when taken together with the
rest of his later philosophy, should not be interpreted as endorsing any sort of iden-
tification between the two: it is not that meaning is use, but rather that we should
always reflect upon meaning in use. Learning or teaching the meaning of words or
other linguistic expressions always involves learning or teaching some use for them;
language can only said to have meaning when it is being put to some use. Think-
ing of meaning in these terms aligns with Wittgenstein’s appeals to the primacy of
practice and fits well with the organic picture of language advocated throughout the
book.
4.3 Signaling games and the organic picture
In order to ascertain whether or not, and to what extent, the framework of sig-
naling games fits with Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language, it is crucial to
consider how the approach fares in light of the remarks discussed so far. The study of
signaling game models aims to illuminate hypotheses about certain features of nat-
ural language. The framework provides guidelines to construct abstract models that
are more akin to Wittgenstein’s toy language-games than to their natural counter-
parts (see Chapter 3). However, in providing abstractions, they purport to capture
some features of real-life practical activities where use of language is involved. As
such, the assumptions embodied in their implementation, and the methodology used
to study them, can be subject to comparison with Wittgenstein’s remarks.
One key focus lies in the characterization of language in terms of practice (Re-
mark 4.1.1, p. 92). As discussed above, this serves as a reminder that linguistic
entities do not stand as an object of study on their own. They are tools used by in-
dividuals situated in a context and driven by a purpose. These elements are strongly
intertwined, and therefore should not be abstracted away. Practices are multifarious
and complex. Signaling games embody these lessons very well. When creating a
model according to the framework, the researcher includes and characterizes senders
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and receivers (or populations thereof), a context (states, messages, actions, and pos-
sibly other elements), and a purpose (captured by the utility function). These ele-
ments form a system of interlocking parts, and the questions that drive the study of
the models almost always revolve around how (and to what extent) agents, context,
and purpose interact and influence signal use. Section 2.2 gives an impression of
the extent to which this motivates a variety of explorations that go beyond simple
considerations of linguistic entities and their meanings. This includes studying vari-
ous types of agents and how they are connected, different number and distributions
of states, signals, and actions, dynamic versus static contexts, aligned versus con-
flicting purposes, and many others. The variety of issues explored by researchers
working with signaling games comes from taking the phenomenon of meaning as an
irreducible interplay between all the elements that constitute language as a practice.
The ability of the framework to provide insight into them attests to the benefits of
taking this picture seriously.
Much like with Wittgenstein’s language-games, each individual model captures
something, on the one hand, broader, and on the other hand, narrower than what
we typically call a language. Broader because it includes more elements than the
linguistic entities, narrower because the scope of each model is more limited. One
author can explore a model where agents exchange a signal in order to coordinate
on a place to meet, and another can devise a signaling game where agents have a
conflict of interest. There are models where states are distributed uniformly, and
there others designed to study the impact of skewed priors. That these example
scenarios are difficult, or potentially impossible, to reconcile under a more general
model is, however, not usually seen as a problem. And it would only be so if one was
looking for something like a general theory of meaning. On the methodological level,
researchers working with the signaling games framework can be seen as embracing
the heterogeneity of language (Remark 4.1.2, p. 93), first by focusing on particular
cases of use, and second by not attempting to coerce all possible scenarios into the
same model. They can be seen as appreciating the perspective that these models,
like different language-games, can be related but need not have something common
to them all (Remark 4.1.3, p. 94).
When it comes to heterogeneity, one should also reflect on how it is handled on
a more technical level. Most models in the literature represent one specific game.
Agents, or populations thereof, engage in interactions characteristic of a well-defined
situation. Not everything is, however, set in stone. One source that creates some
room for variation is parameterization. Most models have characteristics that can
be changed by setting different values to a parameter. Drawing again on the models
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discussed in Section 2.2, think of something as simple as the number of states in
the state space, or other aspects like the bias in a prior distribution, the cost of
sending a given message, the perceptual acuity of agents, the average number of
connections in the social network of the population, and so forth. The possibilities
of what to parameterize in a model are typically only restrained by the imagination
of the researcher. Each value of a parameter specifies an instance of the model that
can be seen to characterize a slightly different scenario of signal use. By stemming
from the same model, these different instances are nevertheless strongly related to
each other along various dimensions. This is one additional way in which signaling
games can be seen as promoting the embrace of heterogeneity and Remark 4.1.3
(p. 94).
If a given feature of the model is chosen to be left as a parameter, it is impor-
tant to study the effect of that parameter in the outcome of the analysis of the
model. This is typically done by studying model instances independently from each
other and subsequently comparing the results in terms of external metrics. With
this approach, however, heterogeneity is not fully being taken into account. Each
instance of the model is studied in isolation from the other. However, it is important
to realize that, in natural language, all these variations can simultaneously coexist
and this can have an impact on signal use. Even in the context of a single model,
studying a truly heterogeneous environment can reveal unexpected effects.
An example of this can be found in the literature on vagueness. Both O’Connor
(2014b) and Franke and Correia (2018) propose signaling game models where vague
signal use is shown to develop as a result of, respectively, a type of learning dynamic
and an imitation-based evolutionary process. Each model has its own parameter
conditioning the degree of vagueness observed in the states of equilibria. Various
parameter values are analyzed for each adaptive process. In both cases, based on
comparing independent runs in terms of external metrics, the authors hypothesize
that certain values of the parameter that induces a degree of vagueness stimulate
faster convergence on a coordinated signal use. This, in turn, is hypothesized to
potentially allow agents that tend to evolve a communication system with some
vagueness to dominate over agents that use those signals more precisely, because
they can temporarily attain an advantage. However, as Correia and Franke (2019)
show8, when one studies one of these models in a more heterogeneous environment—
using a multi-population variant of the replicator dynamic—unexpected interactions
between populations with different parameter values can make this story much more
complicated than it may seem from studying homogeneous environments indepen-
8See Appendix A.
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dently.
There is another interesting way in which this relation between language-games
can be taken into account in signaling game modeling. When thinking of language-
games played by rational agents, one needs to consider the level of awareness the
agents have of the situation they are involved in. As mentioned in relation to Re-
mark 4.1.3 (p. 94), given the potential close similarities between slightly different
language-games, it is possible for one agent to believe he is playing one game, while
the other agent thinks he is playing another. This kind of scenario is studied in the
game theory literature as hypergames, a notion first introduced by Bennett (1977).
Some recent work has explored evolutionary dynamics for these models (Kanazawa,
Ushio, and Yamasaki, 2007; Jiang et al., 2018), as well as their relationship with
Bayesian games (Sasaki and Kijima, 2012, 2016). To the best of my knowledge, no
direct applications of this literature to signaling games have been studied yet. How-
ever, there is at least one independent proposal of so-called games with unawareness
that serve the same purpose: they represent situations where agents might not be
fully aware of the game they are playing, and consider the implications that the
same happens to the agent they are playing with. Franke (2014b) advances these
models as ways of studying pragmatic inferences of the Gricean kind. The signaling
games framework thus has the tools to represent and study such complex relations
between language-games as those foreseen by Wittgenstein.
Remark 4.1.2 (p. 93) mentions not only heterogeneity but also dynamism. Going
back to the methodological level, recognition of the dynamic aspect of language is
usually present in the signaling game approach, although this is intimately tied to
the way models are analyzed. Lewis approached his models along the lines of classic
game theory, i.e. by providing a story about which strategy or strategies a rational
player would choose in the situation characterized by the game. Note that in this
type of analysis there is no room for considerations of dynamism in signal use, be-
cause the models are seen as single shot (or single stage) games. The choices of which
signal to use (by the sender) and of which action to take (by the receiver) are one-
off, and do not have any temporal dimension. The processes of rational deliberation
that lead up to the choices can be iterative, but the actual signal exchange is seen as
a single event, potentially independent from other instances. Single shot games are
typically analyzed using static notions like the Nash equilibrium. Interestingly, the
notion of an evolutionarily stable strategy, although motivated in dynamic terms, is
actually also static, because the story about potential invasions by other strategies
is simply considered in the hypothetical.9
9For more on these notions, see again Section 2.1.
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In order to take the dynamic aspect of language into account, one needs to study
repeated games, i.e. situations where a single shot game is played several times by
either the same agents or the same populations of agents. This gives the opportu-
nity to consider strategies that can be adapted from one instance to another based
on previous successes or failures. As discussed in Chapter 2, adaptive processes
can be motivated in terms of evolution (biological or cultural), learning, or rational
deliberation. The important thing to note here is that, because of the repeated
nature of the interaction, signal use can change over time. This can happen even
in a static environment, simply as sender and receiver strategies mutually adapt to
each other. Static notions like the Nash equilibrium can inform the analysis of such
models, for example by indicating some attractors of the system. But ultimately
these games should also be studied using dynamic equations or agent-based simu-
lations, approaches which can reveal much more about the adaptive processes and
how they drive the system towards equilibria, if at all10. Some systems, like the
simple binary signaling game, can almost always11 be driven to one of the two sig-
naling systems, but others can have local attractors that pull strategies away from
reaching global optima, or forever be stuck in cycles, like in the signaling variant of
rock-paper-scissors (e.g. Wagner, 2012).
But taking the dynamic nature of language seriously means going even further
beyond the notions of attractors and equilibria. Wittgenstein sees language as con-
tinuously changing, rather than evolving towards some eventually stationary state
and stopping there. Awareness of this possibility creates additional motivation to
understand how information exchange can still occur outside of stable equilibria, as
in the work of Wagner (2012), to consider scenarios where the environment itself is
regularly changing, as in the work of Alexander (2014), and to study how change
sparked from creativity propagates in a network, as in the work of Mühlenbernd
(2017). These examples show how the signaling games framework lends itself to
deeply embracing the dynamism of communication, and how that helps illuminat-
ing some of the questions arising from that perspective.
The majority of questions addressed using the signaling games framework, when
translated in the technical terms of the model, take the form of considerations about
strategies. The researcher is typically interested in knowing, given a characterization
of a certain activity as a concrete model in terms of agents, context, and utility, how
different strategies fare against each other, and which ones are favored by some
adaptive process or another. Strategies are representations of either which signals
10For a more detailed argument on the importance of analyzing signaling game models using
dynamic approaches, see Huttegger and Zollman (2013).
11In a mathematical sense, i.e. it happens with probability 1.
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are produced by an agent (or a population thereof) given a certain state of affairs, or
which actions are undertaken upon exposure to a certain signal. They are, therefore,
specifications of signal use. The important thing to notice here is that this is usually
the focus of analysis within the signaling games framework. Here is how Lewis talks
about meaning after characterizing the Paul Revere signaling game12:
I have now described the character of a case of signaling without men-
tioning the meaning of the signals: that two lanterns meant that the
redcoats were coming by sea, or whatever. But nothing important seems
to have been let unsaid, so what has been said must somehow imply that
the signals have their meanings. (1969, pp. 124-125)
This passage can be seen13 as expressing a similar idea as Remark 4.2.2 (p. 100),
i.e. that in order to understand meaning one need not conceive it as an entity, but
can rather focus on studying language use. Signaling games provide a way to do
so. Rather than focusing on what signals mean, researchers direct their attention
to how they are used. We are still talking about meaning, but without having to
hypostatize meanings. I will return to this point in Chapter 5.
Remark 4.2.1 (p. 97) sheds additional light on the matter. As mentioned there,
linguistic entities do not have meaning in and of themselves. In the signaling games
framework, messages do not have any intrinsic meaning either. What intuitively
seems, from a third person perspective, as a meaningful use of signals depends first
on the strategies, i.e. on how signals are being made use of by the agents. Consider
the simple binary signaling game of Section 2.1 and the example strategy profiles
represented in Figure 2.1. Signaling systems are combinations of strategies which
one would intuitively describe as meaningful: whenever a certain state obtains the
sender chooses one and the same message given which the receiver chooses the
optimal action, and conversely for the other state. Perfect coordination between
state and action is achieved via univocal exchange of messages. However, pairing
the sender strategy of one possible signaling system with the receiver strategy of
the other leads to complete miscommunication (anti-signaling). Having separate
strategies for sender and receiver already allows one to notice something important:
what looks like a meaningful message exchange depends on how both parties behave.
If one further considers the dynamic aspect of language and how it is taken
into account in the signaling games framework, another dimension of meaning is
12An example of a signaling game based on the famous code established by Paul Revere and
the sexton of the Old North Church in Boston to signal the movements of English troops before
the start of the American Revolutionary War (see Lewis, 1969, pp. 122-125).
13Although other passages in the book are somewhat at odds with this interpretation. More on
this in Section 5.4.
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t1
t2
ma
mb
a1
a2
.21
.63
.46
.11
Figure 4.1: Example of a random mixed strategy profile for a simple binary signaling
game. Values can be read as probabilities and add up to 1 per choice
point. In this example, σ(t1,ma) = .21 indicates that the probability
of ma being chosen by the sender on state s1 is .21, and this implies
σ(t1,mb) = .79.
revealed. When a signaling game is analyzed in terms of an adaptive process, one
usually starts with random strategies for both sender and receiver. An example is
the mixed strategy profile represented in Figure 4.1. In such a profile, messages and
actions are chosen with a certain probability, but without any clear systematicity;
one would hardly call such an exchange meaningful. As discussed in Section 2.1,
adaptive processes like reinforcement learning or the replicator dynamics can be
shown to gradually drive such strategy profiles into a signaling system. However,
there is no point in such a gradual process where signals are imbued with meaning,
they are contentless throughout. Yet, the system goes from a state where there
is no apparent meaningful exchange of messages, like what is represented by the
strategy profile in Figure 4.1, to a signaling system, where systematic coordination
through the exchange of messages is achieved by the agents. This supports the idea
that meaning is not a property of a linguistic entity, but that meaning arises in use.
And it further strengthens the observation that, in order to understand meaning, one
needs to study a whole system of agents, context, purpose, and dynamic adaptation.
In conclusion, the Philosophical Investigations contains a number of remarks that
can be seen as constituting a picture of language as organic: heterogeneous, dynamic,
and adaptive. This is partially anchored in the notion of language-games as practices
that involve the exchange of linguistic entities by agents situated in a context and
driven by a purpose. What we call natural language can be seen as a family of an
ever-changing myriad of such language-games, related to each other along several
dimensions, but without anything necessarily common to all. Within this picture,
meaning is related to, but not constituted by, use. To better understand meaning,
one should direct our attention to studying use. The signaling games framework fits
well with this perspective. If we see each signaling game model as attempting to
capture a particular language-game, heterogeneity and dynamism are usually well
embraced on a methodological level
On a technical level, this depends on the type of analysis conducted, which
varies between individual approaches. More can be done to explore the interrela-
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tions between similar language-games and the truly continuous dynamics of natural
language, but some work in the literature shows that both technical tools and inter-
est in the topic exist. With regards to the shift of perspective from seeing meaning
as entities to studying use, the framework seems to be much more strongly aligned
with the latter. It is important to note that there are many aspects of natural lan-
guage that have not yet been considered in the signaling games literature. This is
to be expected in a somewhat young research approach dealing with a highly com-
plex phenomenon. Embracing the organic picture of language that Wittgenstein
presents seems to me as the best way to handle this complexity. It motivates an
approach that is piecemeal, in that it directs its attention to narrower aspects of
the whole phenomenon at a time, but also open, in that does not attempt to make
hasty generalizations or universal claims. But, in order to defend these observations,
one should further reflect on the many remarks concerning method in Philosophical
Investigations. This is the focus of the next chapter.

Chapter 5
It’s not the word that counts
The Philosophical Investigations contains a criticism of the notion of
meaning as anchored in correspondence. In this chapter, I explore Wittgen-
stein’s remarks against different varieties of this idea, and how to keep
those concerns in mind when interpreting signaling game models.
A common, even perhaps intuitive, idea about meaning is to conceive of it in
terms of a relation between linguistic entities (words, expressions, sentences) and
other things. If we can ask “what is the meaning of so-and-so?” it seems somewhat
natural to expect the possibility of a reply of the form “the meaning of so-and-so
is this-or-that”. This way of talking about meaning motivates the idea that the
meaning of a linguistic entity is some other entity that is somehow related to it.
This is what Wittgenstein describes, somewhat mockingly, in the following passage:
People say: it’s not the word that counts, but its meaning, thinking
of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, even though
different from the word. Here the word, there the meaning. The money,
and the cow one can buy with it. (2009, §120f, p. 54e)
This is possibly an intuition that guides everyday considerations about meaning. But
the reason Wittgenstein is interested in this picture is most likely because it also
underlies many philosophical discussions. Especially since the late 19th century1,
philosophers have tried to make their assumptions about language more explicit
by developing theories of meaning. Philosophical discussions about meaning usually
revolve around the nature of the entities to which expressions of language correspond.
But the idea that for an expression in a language to have meaning is for it to
correspond to something else has largely gone unquestioned throughout.
1See Rorty (1967).
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Even nowadays, one can see how this picture is ingrained. Speaks, for example,
identifies two sorts of theories of meaning:
The first sort of theory—a semantic theory—is a theory which assigns
semantic contents to expressions of a language. [. . . ]
The second sort of theory—a foundational theory of meaning—is a the-
ory which states the facts in virtue of which expressions have the seman-
tic contents that they have. (2018)
The task of the former is to determine what meaningful linguistic entities correspond
to, whereas the former investigates how such a relation was established, but both
types of theories presuppose that for a linguistic entity to have meaning is for it to
have semantic content. I have briefly discussed how Wittgenstein rejects this picture
of meaning in general (see especially the arguments leading up to Remark 4.2.1,
p. 97). In this chapter I want to explore Wittgenstein’s objections against particular
incarnations of this idea. This includes three varieties: meanings as everyday objects
(Section 5.1), meanings as metaphysical simples (Section 5.2), and finally meanings
as mental entities (Section 5.3). Wittgenstein does not strictly separate the criticism
of these three varieties. Furthermore, the target is usually the general picture of
meaning as correspondence. Because of this, even though I separate the discussion
that follows in three sections, remarks are not exclusively relevant to only one variety
and can often be applied to others.
It should be noted that theories of meaning have grown more elaborate since
Wittgenstein wrote the Philosophical Investigations. It can therefore seem that the
three varieties of the picture of meaning as correspondence are not relevant any
more. As mentioned before, I believe that Wittgenstein criticism is aimed at the
general conception of meaning as correspondence and, insofar as this picture still
underlies many contemporary theories of meaning, his remarks probably still apply.
However, it is not the purpose of this chapter to make that argument. I look into the
criticism in more detail in order to understand how they may point beyond them,
but I only focus on they apply to the signaling games framework (Section 5.4).
5.1 Everyday objects
The Philosophical Investigations opens with a quote from Augustine describing
how he recalls learning language as a child. This serves to illustrate an idea about
how language works that Wittgenstein summarizes as follows:
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These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence
of human language. It is this: the words in language name objects –
sentences are combinations of such names. — In this picture of language
we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This
meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word
stands. (2009, §1b, p. 5e)
This is a clear characterization of a possible variety of the picture of meaning as
correspondence: the idea that the meaning of words like ‘table’, ‘chair’, and ‘bread’
are just those everyday objects that these words refer to. I will henceforth call this
position externalism2. The rest of §1 follows with a number of remarks that prefigure
the discussion up to §38. The first (§1c) is the reminder that this idea is probably
inspired by considering only a certain kind of word, namely common and proper
nouns, but that other kinds of words also exist and the picture portrayed might not
work well for all of them. In the remaining paragraph (§1d), a first instance of what
could be called a toy language-game (see Section 3.3) is introduced. The imagined
scenario is one where someone is sent shopping with a slip of paper that has “five red
apples” written on it, followed by a possible account of how the shopkeeper could
operate with those words. In this interchange, one can find hints of the question of
how one knows what to do with words, and the suggestion that understanding the
use of a word is enough to understand its meaning (on this, see again Section 4.2).
The first way Wittgenstein resists this picture of meaning is to remind the reader
of the heterogeneity of language (see again Section 4.1). These reminders are not
necessarily a full-blown refutation, but they certainly contribute to making us see
the limitations of the idea. They are, at the very least, an attack on externalism as a
general theory of meaning. This is quite clear in §§2-5, for example in the following
passage:
Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication; only
not everything that we call language is this system. And one has to
say this in several cases where the question arises “Will that description
do or not?” The answer is: “Yes, it will, but only for this narrowly
circumscribed area, not for the whole of what you were purporting to
describe.” (2009, §3a, p. 6e)
2In philosophy of language, this label is typically attributed to a particular theory of meaning,
made famous by Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1975) (see Hale and Wright, 1997, p. 681), restricted
to proper names and indexicals. It would be anachronistic to say that Wittgenstein is addressing
this theory. However, the underlying intuition behind it is very similar to the one stated here, thus
I think it is useful to slightly abuse the label here.
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Here it is granted that externalism might work for a certain type of use of words,
but potentially only for that particular case, not for the whole of language. This
type of reminder, and an initial description of the risk of ignoring it, show up again
in §§11-14. In these remarks, Wittgenstein compares words with tools in a toolbox
and handles in the cabin of a locomotive. Like with those objects, the spectrum of
types of use of different words is broad. However, because words appear similar to
each other (when written in print, or in speech), one can fail to see that. The risk
is then to take one type of use, like making reference to an object, and assume the
rest of language functions in the same manner. One would either get an account
of meaning that doesn’t work for most linguistic expressions, or, in order to try to
make it fit, create generalizations so broad that they become useless (§§13-14).
Not only is there a variety of uses of signs, words, and sentences, but also that
their applications are countless and language is ever-changing, with new language-
games being created and others being forgotten (§23). In §24 there are again hints
at the repercussions that a single-minded view can have in the context of this het-
erogeneity: if one considers externalism as a general theory of meaning, one will
be prone to apply its model to language-games where it doesn’t fit, and potentially
be lead to create pseudo-problems that would not otherwise arise. In §§26-27 it is
suggested again that naming is not enough to characterize everything that we do
with words, with examples of one-word exclamations used to illustrate the point.
The reminder is always the same: language is more heterogeneous than the cases
externalism could apply to, thus a one-size-fits-all approach might not do. This
leads us to our first remark of this section:
Remark 5.1.1 There are more kinds of words than nouns, more kinds of sentences
than assertions, more ways to use language than naming objects.
In order to further chip away at the assumptions behind externalism, Wittgen-
stein introduces a toy language-game where this picture of meaning apparently ap-
plies:
Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine
is right: the language is meant to serve for communication between a
builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building stones: there
are blocks, pillars, slabs, and beams. B has to pass him the stones and
to do so in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they
make use of a language consisting of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”,
“beam”. A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to
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bring at such-and-such a call. — Conceive of this as a complete primitive
language. (2009, §2b, p. 6e)
The scenario just described is one where it would seem natural to say that the
meaning of ‘block’ is a particular building stone, and that the word refers to those
objects. Some of the remarks that follow reflect on how such a language could be
taught to a child. One possible method would be simple ostensive teaching, which,
in the case of this particular language-game, would consist in “the teacher’s pointing
to the objects, directing the child’s attention to them, and at the same time uttering
a word” (2009, §6b, p. 7e).
Even if we concede that this method could establish a relation between words
and objects for a particular child, by itself it would not be enough to teach the child
to use the language successfully:
This ostensive teaching of words can be said to establish an associative
connection between word and thing. But what does this mean? Well,
it may mean various things; but one very likely thinks first of all that
a picture of the object comes before the child’s mind when it hears the
word. But now, if this does happen – is it the purpose of the word? – Yes,
it may be the purpose. – I can imagine such a use of words (of sequences
of sounds). [. . . ] But in the language of §2 it is not the purpose of the
words to evoke images. (It may, of course, be discovered that it helps to
attain the actual purpose.) (2009, §6b, p. 7e)
Imagine a child that has learned the language in this way and interacts with a
builder. She hears the word ‘slab’ and imagines an object but does nothing. Would
the builder think that she understands the word? Would we like to say that she
knows the meaning of ‘slab’ if she does not bring a slab to the builder? Wittgenstein
does not here deny that the ostensive teaching of words can play a role in leading the
child to understand their meaning. He is simply observing that it is not sufficient for
a child to learn to use them. Knowing an association between a word and an object
is not the same as knowing what to expect when uttering the word to someone, or as
knowing what to do when hearing the word uttered. This suggests that the relation
word-object cannot by itself be constitutive of what we call meaning. A variation
of the language-game of §2 is introduced in §8 and similar observations about the
limitations of ostensive teaching are discussed in §§9-10. We can summarize this
idea in the following remark:
Remark 5.1.2 Explaining a relation between a word and an object is not enough
to explain the meaning of the word.
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Although the previous remark concedes that a relation between word and object
could be established by ostensive teaching, subsequent observations raise questions
regarding the possibility of doing so unequivocally. Consider the example, intro-
duced in §28, of trying to define the number two by pointing to two nuts and saying
“That is called ‘two’”. It is quickly suggested that such an attempt at an ostensive
definition might run into trouble from the simple fact that there is always more than
one option available for the person trying to interpret the definition:
But how can the number two be defined like that? The person one
gives the definition to doesn’t know what it is that one wants to call
“two”; he will suppose that “two” is the name given to this group of
nuts! [. . . ] And he might equally well take a person’s name, which I
explain ostensively, as that of a colour, of a race, or even of a point of
the compass. That is to say, an ostensive definition can be variously
interpreted in any case. (2009, §28, p. 17e)
The following section (§29) explores the possibility that one could clarify the ex-
planation by specifying that one is trying to define a number. This also runs into
problems, since if our model of explanation is ostension, then an ostensive explana-
tion of the word ‘number’ must be given as well. This could then easily lead us into
an infinite regress, where to explain what ‘number’ means, given the underdeter-
mination of ostension, one would require an ostensive explanation of another word,
and so forth ad infinitum. The point, restated in §30 and illustrated in §§31-32, is
that one forgets how much must already be in place for an ostensive definition to
work. Establishment of a word-object relation is thus not fully guaranteed by this
method. The aim is not to conclude that establishing such a relation is therefore not
possible, but simply to remind us that there is always room for misinterpretation
when attempting to do so.
The sections that follow (§§33-36) consider a proposal to break this infinite
regress by potentially identifying the type of pointing that is being done. The
idea is that there would be something characteristic about pointing at a number,
or at a shape, or at a color, that could enable one to guess what is being defined
without needing the recourse to another word in the language. But what would it
be like to point at a piece of paper, first pointing at its shape, then its color, then
its number? By repeatedly putting this idea into question, Wittgenstein seems to
suggest that the belief that this is possible might be somewhat of a myth. Not only
is it dubious to think that we can do this by ourselves, but we have to remember
that for that to work in an ostensive definition, we have to think of the individual
who we want to give the definition to. Whether the definition works will depend
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on the interpretation she gives, and how she begins to use the word being defined.
This, again, is open to mistakes. Wittgenstein wants here to poke more holes in
the intuitions that can surround the idea of meaning as correspondence to everyday
objects, like the idea that establishing this correspondence is straightforward and
error-free. This leads us to our final remark for this section:
Remark 5.1.3 Establishing a relation word-object suffers from underdetermina-
tion.
The remarks discussed in this section draw attention to the lack of generality
and limited explanatory power of externalism as a theory of meaning. If my inter-
pretation is correct, we can thus read §§1-38 of the Philosophical Investigations as
defending a substantial negative view that one should not conceive of meaning solely
as a relation between words and everyday objects in the world.
5.2 Simples
Logical atomism is a theory associated with Russell (1919) and the early work of
Wittgenstein (1922). Its perspective regarding meaning, together with the reasoning
that can lead to it, is illustrated in the Philosophical Investigations in the following
passage:
It can be put like this: a name ought to really signify a simple. And one
might perhaps give the following reasons for this: the word “Nothung”,
say, is a proper name in the ordinary sense. The sword Nothung consists
of parts combined in a particular way. If they are combined differently,
Nothung does not exist. But it is clear that the sentence “Nothung has a
sharp blade” has a sense, whether Nothung is still whole or has already
been shattered. But if “Nothung” is the name of an object, this object
no longer exists when Nothung is shattered into pieces; and as no object
would then correspond to the name, it would have no meaning. But
then the sentence “Nothung has a sharp blade” would contain a word
that had no meaning, and hence the sentence would be nonsense. But
it does have a sense; so there must still be something corresponding to
the words of which it consists. So the word “Nothung” must disappear
when the sense is analysed and its place be taken by words which name
simples. It will be reasonable to call these words the real names. (2009,
§39, pp. 23e-24e)
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The characterization of the position is exemplified again in §46 with a quote from
Socrates and an explicit reference to Russell and Wittgenstein’s early work.3 The
idea is explored from §39 up until §64, where a number of remarks are put forward
to question its plausibility.
The versions of logical atomism presented by the two authors may differ slightly4,
but they are both anchored in the following core tenets: the purpose of language is
essentially to assert or deny facts; the meaning of a sentence, which is a complex
of signs, can be determined by an analysis of its components; when the proposition
expressed by a sentence is completely analyzed, it consists only of simple symbols,
which have meaning by corresponding to objects; both simple symbols (also called
names) and objects are irreducible, in the sense that they cannot possibly be decom-
posed further. Wittgenstein’s attacks on some of these assumptions have already
been discussed. In this section, I focus mainly on criticism that is specific to this
position.
The sections immediately following the characterization of the position (§§40-
45) start by suggesting an alternative to one of the core assumptions of the line
of argumentation presented in §39. Wittgenstein goes back to a variation of the
language-game of §2, introduced in §15, where building stones can have names. A
situation is imagined where a tool named “N” is broken and the builder A sends B
the sign “N”:
Now suppose that the tool with the name “N” is broken. Not knowing
this, A gives B the sign “N”. Has this sign a meaning now, or not? –
What is B to do when he is given it? – We haven’t settled anything
about this. One might ask: what will he do? Well, perhaps he will
stand there at a loss, or show A the pieces. Here one might say: “N”
has become meaningless; and this expression would mean that the sign
3Wittgenstein quotes a passage from the Theaetetus as follows:
“If I am not mistaken, I have heard some people say this: there is no explanation
of the primary elements – so to speak – out of which we and everything else are
composed; for everything that exists in and of itself can be signified only by names;
no other determination is possible, either that it is or that it is not. . . But what exists
in and of itself has to be. . . named without any other determination. In consequence,
it is impossible to give an explanatory account of any primary element, since for it,
there is nothing other than mere naming; after all, its name is all it has. But just
as what is composed of the primary elements is itself an interwoven structure, so the
correspondingly interwoven names become explanatory language; for the essence of
the latter is the interweaving of names.” (2009, §46b, p. 25e)
It is anachronistic to call the ideas presented in this quote ‘logical atomism’, since the label was
only invented later by Russell to describe his philosophy (see Klement, 2016), but the key ideas of
Russell’s approach are certainly there in Socrates’s reasoning.
4See Klement (2016) and Proops (2017).
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“N” no longer had a use in our language-game (unless we gave it a new
one). “N” might also become meaningless because, for whatever reason,
the tool was given another name, and the sign “N” no longer used in the
language-game. – But we could also imagine a convention whereby B
has to shake his head in reply if A gives the sign for a tool that is broken.
– In this way, the command “N” might be said to be admitted into the
language-game even when the tool no longer exists, and the sign “N” to
have meaning even when its bearer ceases to exist. (2009, §41, p. 24e)
Here we have another example of a situation where the logical atomist would say
that, since the tool supposedly referred to by “N” no longer exists, if we want to say
that the sign still has a meaning then it must be in virtue of a correspondence with
something else that still exists.
Wittgenstein’s approach is to counter this apparent necessity with an alternative.
Namely, whether the sign has a meaning or not will depend on whether it has a use
or not. Thus we can imagine situations where the name still refers to a tool but one
would say the sign no longer has a meaning because it stopped being used in the
language-game. Conversely, we can imagine situations where the name refers to a
broken tool but one would still say it has a meaning because there are appropriate
actions for uses of names when the tools they supposedly refer to are broken. Even
names that never named any tool could be said to have a meaning as long as A and
B know what to do with them (§42). The remarks in these sections revolve around
the importance of considering use when reflecting on meaning. This relates back to
the discussion in Section 4.2. With respect to logical atomism, these remarks simply
attempt to undermine the necessity of embracing it by presenting another plausible
alternative. This is summarized in the following remark:
Remark 5.2.1 A linguistic expression does not need to refer to existing objects in
order for it to be said to have meaning.
A discussion starting in §47 draws attention to problems with another notion
that is essential for logical atomism: the dichotomy between simple and compos-
ite. The question that drives it is the following: “What are the simple constituent
parts of which reality is composed?” (2009, §47, p. 25e) We are invited to consider
several examples of everyday objects, such as a chair, a tree, or a chessboard, and
properties of objects, such as color and length, and think of different ways we could
consider them as composite and what the simple constituents would be in those
situations. A chair could be said to be composed of pieces of wood, or molecules,
or atoms (§47a); a tree composed of trunk and branches, or many different sized
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individual branches (§47c); a chessboard composed of 32 white squares and 32 black
squares, or of the colors white and black and a grid (§47d). A color can be consid-
ered simple or a combination of other colors; a length could be said to be simple,
composed of smaller lengths, or even of a bigger length and another subtracted from
it (§47e).
The problem with the driving question is that it does not have a straight an-
swer. Logical atomism assumes the existence of absolute simple constituents of
reality. But as soon as we start looking for them, we realize that what one counts
as simples depends on the kind of composition one is interested in. Different no-
tions of composite imply different simples, e.g. physical decomposition could lead
to talk of atoms or quarks, visual decomposition of colors and shapes, and so forth.
Wittgenstein’s strategy is clear:
To the philosophical question “Is the visual image of this tree compos-
ite, and what are its constituent parts?” the correct answer is: “That
depends on what you understand by ‘composite’.” (And that, of course,
is not an answer to, but a rejection of, the question.) (2009, §47f, p. 27e)
He is not interested in providing an answer, but in dissolving the driving question,
and with it undermine a crucial assumption of logical atomism. The same point
is illustrated again in the following sections (§§48-49) by applying the method of
§2, i.e. devising a toy language-game where the idea seems to correctly apply and
drawing attention to the problematic hidden assumptions. The conclusion is the
same, which we can summarize in the following remark:
Remark 5.2.2 Different notions of composite yield different kinds of simples, thus
it makes no sense to speak of simples in the absolute.
Further intuitions regarding the nature of simples are dissected in §§50-59. This
is accompanied by a proposal of an alternative way of thinking about them. The first
idea challenged is that one can attribute neither being nor non-being to an element5.
If an element is something that, by definition, is not composite, it cannot have
different properties that characterize it, otherwise it could be said to be composed of
those properties. Therefore, it seems, an element can only be named, not described.
Thus it would make no sense either to say of an element that it exists or that it
does not exist, since the mere use of its sign would guarantee, by virtue of reference,
that assertions of its existence are tautological and statements of its non-existence
nonsensical.
5‘Simple’ and ‘element’ are used interchangeably.
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Wittgenstein seems to consider this line of reasoning circular, for example in the
following passages:
What does it mean to say that we can attribute neither being not non-
being to the elements? – One might say: if everything that we call
“being” and “non-being” consists in the obtaining and non-obtaining of
connections between elements, it makes no sense to speak of the being
(non-being) of an element; just as it makes no sense to speak of the
destruction of an element, if everything we call “destruction” lies in the
separation of elements. (2009, §50, pp. 28e-29e)
“A name signifies only what is an element of reality – what cannot
be destroyed, what remains the same in all changes.” – But what is
that? – Even as we uttered the sentence, that’s what we already had in
mind! (2009, §59, p. 33e)
The properties attributed to the elements are baked into their postulation, and the
plausibility of their existence is dependent on a conception of meaning as correspon-
dence. If we take that away, we would perhaps not be at all compelled to accept
logical atomism as a credible or useful theory of meaning.
Wittgenstein proposes an explanation for why one might be tempted to think of
simples in the terms we just described. He considers likely candidates for simples,
including the standard meter in Paris and a color sample for sepia (§50b). Of the
former, it does not make sense to say that it is or is not 1 meter long, for it is by
virtue of comparisons to it that we speak of lengths and distances in meters. The
same happens about whether a sepia sample is or is not itself sepia. These are,
however, not metaphysical pronouncements about special entities. They are simply
grammatical remarks about the role these samples play in those particular language-
games. The standard meter works as a reference point, or as Wittgenstein calls it
a paradigm, in language-games that involve communicating measures in meters. Its
status is special in that “it is not something that is represented, but is a means
of representation.” (2009, §50c, p. 29e) The reason why a paradigm seems logically
indestructible is that we cannot do away with it without doing away with the whole
language-game. This is, again, only a feature of the particular language-games
where these paradigms serve as instruments to enable us to make moves in those
games. They are thus contingent to them and not general properties of metaphysical
objects, as logical atomism would lead us to believe. The considerations relevant to
this section can be summarized in the following remark:
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Remark 5.2.3 What logical atomism sees as symbols referring to metaphysical sim-
ples can alternatively be seen as linguistic expressions that have a contingently special
role in particular language-games.
The observations in §§60-64 address the methodological partner of logical atom-
ism: the method of analysis. Logical atomism sees analysis as the way to reveal
the meaning of linguistic expressions. As such, it sees an analyzed name as better
than its un-analyzed form. To start questioning this assumption, an example of a
broom is put forward. If we consider the broom to be composed of a broomstick
and a brush, should we say that a statement containing the word ‘broom’ is actually
about the two simpler components? The example is not accurately representative of
the ideas of logical atomism, since a broomstick and a brush are not good examples
of simples, but it serves to illustrate the underlying idea that language stands in
need of analysis, i.e. that in order to understand a sentence like “My broom is in
the corner” one needs to break down the complex meaning of ‘broom’ into smaller
components.
Against this, Wittgenstein simply counters with two objections. The first is an
appeal to everyday intuitions:
Then does someone who says that the broom is in the corner really mean:
the broomstick is there, and so is the brush, and the broomstick is fixed
in the brush? – If we were to ask anyone if he meant this, he would
probably say that he had not specially thought of either the broomstick
or the brush. And that would be the right answer, for he did not mean
to speak either of the stick or of the brush in particular. Suppose that,
instead of telling someone “Bring me the broom!”, you said “Bring me
the broomstick and the brush which is fitted on to it!” – Isn’t the answer:
“Do you want the broom? Why do you put it so oddly?” — Is he going
to understand the further analysed sentence better? – This sentence,
one might say, comes to the same thing as the ordinary one, but in a
more roundabout way. (2009, §60, pp. 33e-34e)
What we’re being asked to consider is whether, when using a word that supposedly
refers to something complex, we have any intuition of having intended to refer to
its components, or conversely whether, when hearing a sentence where the compo-
nents are explicitly broken down, we would understand it better in that form. The
suggestions are that one does not typically think of the components of a supposed
complex when producing a sentence about that complex, and that a sentence where
these components are explicitly mentioned is not more understandable, and might
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actually appear more odd and unnecessarily complicated. It runs counter to these
intuitions to think that there is any need for analyzing a complex to get to a hypo-
thetical actual meaning. This is not to claim that an analysis is not possible, but
simply that it is often neither necessary nor useful.
The second objection builds on this to question whether a supposed analysis
produces an equivalent, but somehow more fundamental, representation of the same
thing. We are asked to imagine two language-games, one where complex objects have
names and another where only the constituents of the objects are given names (§60).
The question immediately arises of whether these two games can be said to be
two different forms of the same game, and how we would go about defining an
equivalence between statements in both. Although one could perhaps say that a
given statement in one language-game “comes to the same thing” (2009, §61, p. 34e)
as a particular statement in the other, this does not mean that the two statements
are fully interchangeable. We might not be able to use the unanalyzed form in the
game where only constituents have names, neither the other way around. If that is
the case, each game has its merits, and none is more fundamental than the other:
We may think: someone who has only the unanalysed form has got it
all. – But can’t I say that an aspect of the matter is lost to the latter
no less than to the former? (2009, §63, p. 35e)
This is illustrated again in §64 with a variation of the game of §48, where rather
than monochrome squares one could have squares with two different colors on each
half6. The conclusion is the same: names for such multi-colored squares would not
stand in need of analysis, nor would it be necessarily possible to replace one game
by the other. The suggestion is that the possibility of analyzing a name does not
necessarily imply that an analyzed form is hidden when we use the unanalyzed form,
we might just be playing a different language-game.
These considerations about analysis are relevant to the intuitions behind logical
atomism since they chip away at the idea that linguistic expression can or need
to be broken down in a unique way that reveals their fundamental constituents.
Wittgenstein’s remarks remind us that, first, one can understand a word like ‘broom’
without analyzing it (often even better), and second, that there is no unique way
of performing such analysis independently of the particular context. These points
make it less appealing to think that there is such a thing as a unique meaning of a
linguistic expression to be found in the simple elements it corresponds to. Further
evidence that this is what Wittgenstein has in mind can be found, for example, in the
6See Section 3.2 for a more in-depth discussion of this example.
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passage from the Blue Book quoted in Section 3.1 (Wittgenstein, 2002, pp. 27-28).
We can summarize these points in the following remark:
Remark 5.2.4 Analyzed forms of linguistic expressions are neither better nor unique.
These remarks on logical atomism suggest that Wittgenstein came to reject his
own older theory as not especially plausible or useful. Furthermore, they seem
to dismiss the urge to sublimate the discussion of meaning to the realm of the
metaphysical by anchoring the discussion in more everyday contexts. One can thus
read §§39-64 as a rejection of the idea that linguistic expressions stand in need of
analysis for their meaning to be unearthed, and that they get their meaning by being
composed of irreducible elements that correspond to simple objects in the world.
5.3 Mental entities
Another common intuition about language is the idea that words get their mean-
ing by standing in relation to entities in the mind, be it concepts, ideas, feelings,
sensations, or other inner private experiences. Wittgenstein explores some notions
related to this view mostly in §§243-315, in large part by reflecting on a related
problem: the possibility of a private language. This, he characterizes as follows:
But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could
write down or give voice to his inner experiences – his feelings, moods,
and so on – for his own use? — Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary
language? – But that is not what I mean. The words of this language are
to refer to what only the speaker can know – to his immediate private
sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. (2009,
§243b, p. 95e)
Following Stern (2004, p. 174), I will call the type of privacy here described ‘super-
privacy’. A super-private language is one in which expressions refer exclusively to
entities that are available only to the speaker, and nothing else. If meaning is
constituted by these entities, this implies that nobody else could ever know the
meaning of the expressions that make up such a language. Discussion of this idea
is relevant because it is warranted by a conception of meaning as correspondence to
mental entities. I will henceforth call this internalism7. Debating the possibility of a
7This term is used in contemporary philosophy in the context of different topics, with corre-
spondingly various definitions. As with my use of the term externalism, it would be anachronistic
to portray Wittgenstein as attacking those positions. I use the term simply to label the general
intuition that underlies a particular picture of meaning.
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super-private language allows one to consider internalism in a scenario that excludes
additional issues related to the use of language as a means of communication. The
content of these sections of the Philosophical Investigations has often been called
the ‘private language argument’.
Wittgenstein starts the discussion by reflecting on how something like a super-
private language could be taught and learned. The word ‘pain’ is used as a paradig-
matic example of a word for which it is easy to think that its meaning lies exclusively
in its correspondence to a super-private experience. However, such a word needs to
be taught and learned. How would it be possible to teach a child the meaning of the
word ‘pain’ if the meaning were constituted only by his super-private experience?
How would an adult refer to an experience that is not available to them in order to
establish the correspondence with the word? What typically happens, it is suggested
in §244, is that teaching is done by observing the child’s behavior, making a guess
(one presumes) that the child is in pain, and teaching her new “pain-behavior”, i.e.
using a word to signal this rather than crying. Wittgenstein is not here adumbrating
a fully behavioristic theory of language learning (he himself seems to reject this in
§§304-308); he is merely reminding us of some non-private dimensions of what can,
at first glance, be considered as super-private as it gets.
Behavior not only enables us to teach and learn these words and expressions
that purportedly refer to super-private experiences, but is also very important in
sustaining our beliefs regarding those very experiences. This is defended in §§281-
288, with the main point summarized in the first passage:
“But doesn’t what you say amount to this: that there is no pain, for
example, without pain-behaviour?” – It amounts to this: that only of
a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human
being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is
conscious or unconscious. (2009, §281, p. 103e)
The following sections explore different examples to draw attention to the impor-
tance of identifying or projecting some kind of human behavior in order to accept
attributions of the ability to have private sensations. A pot in a fairy tale can be
imagined to see and hear, but we also attribute it the ability to speak (§282). Al-
though it is difficult to ascribe private sensations to an inanimate object or a corpse,
we do not have the same qualms with attributing pain to a fly as soon as it starts
wriggling (§284). Speaking, wriggling, making facial expressions (§285), these are all
behaviors that naturally pair up with ascriptions or explanations of pain and other
private sensations. Behavior, it is later said, belongs to the language-game (§300).
The analogies in these sections serve to remind us of the role that behavior plays in
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our understanding of what pain is, and thus of what the word ‘pain’ means. This
contributes to undermining the picture of meaning as depending only on words and
mental entities. This leads us to the first remark on this topic:
Remark 5.3.1 There are non-private dimensions relevant to the meaning of ex-
pressions that supposedly correspond to super-private experiences.
Without the public dimension of behavior, one would require other criteria to
underwrite our practices of learning, explaining, and understanding meaning. This
is mostly explored in §§253-292. Wittgenstein starts with the problem of how to
internally identify super-private experiences:
“Another person can’t have my pains.” – My pains – what pains are
they? What counts as a criterion of identity here? Consider what makes
it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of “two exactly the
same”: for example, to say, “This chair is not the one you saw here
yesterday, but is exactly the same as it”. [. . . ]
I have seen a person in a discussion on this subject strike himself on the
breast and say “But surely another person can’t have THIS pain!” –
The answer to this is that one does not define a criterion of identity by
emphatically enunciating the word “this”. Rather, the emphasis merely
creates the illusion of a case in which we are conversant with such a
criterion of identity, but have to be reminded of it. (2009, §253ac, p. 97e)
This is relevant for the idea of a super-private language if one imagines that such a
language could get started by associating words and super-private experiences in a
form analogous to an ostensive definition (§258): one concentrates his attention on
such an experience and commits to memory the connection with a word. However
we do this, the purpose would be to later access the particular experience when
hearing the word, or to produce the appropriate word when wishing to refer to the
experience.
But how do we know we have performed these steps correctly? Aren’t we prey to
confabulation, to simply convince ourselves that we have done the right thing even if
we haven’t? This problem is illustrated with examples of mental acts like consulting
a mental image of a timetable to determine the schedule of a train (§265), looking at a
clock in one’s imagination to tell the time (§266), or making imaginary load tests on a
projected bridge to justify the choice of dimensions in a design (§267). In all of these
cases one might be under the illusion that something has been achieved, but a great
deal of doubt would remain before external validation is performed. Beyond these
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sections we also find the examples of the hypothetical scenarios of talking to oneself
without ever having spoken an audible language (§344) and learning to calculate in
the head without ever calculating aloud or on paper (§385). These scenarios sound
at least odd if not impossible to imagine, exactly because the possibility of validating
those mental acts is inaccessible even for the person hypothetically conducting them.
This issue casts doubt on the coherence of the whole idea of creating a super-
private language by a process analogous to ostension. In §269, Wittgenstein makes a
rough distinction between three types of ways to relate to linguistic expressions: not
understanding, thinking one understands, and understanding correctly. A super-
private language of an individual would consist of sounds that no one else under-
stands but that he appears to understand. One could never say that he understands
the language correctly, for the lack of external criteria that could validate his beliefs
regarding how to use those sounds. A super-private language, if possible, is there-
fore not on par with the natural languages we know. This is important, because
exactly what makes the latter different is their public dimension which provides the
criteria that enable us to talk about knowing the meaning of a linguistic expression
rather than merely believing one knows it. This might sound like a metaphysical or
essentialist pronouncement about what a language is or isn’t, but that is not how it
is intended. We can recall an earlier passage in order to clarify this:
The criteria which we accept for ‘fitting’, ‘being able to’, ‘understanding’,
are much more complicated than might appear at first sight. That is,
the game with these words, their use in the linguistic intercourse that
is carried on by their means, is more involved – the role of these words
in our language is other than we are tempted to think. (2009, §182b,
p. 79e)
The same idea is restated in a later passage in §573. The defense of the need for
external criteria is a reminder of how we talk about knowing a language, knowing the
meaning, even of expressions that supposedly refer to private experiences, and how
having external criteria is important in those language-games.8 These considerations
again support the view that a postulated mental entity that corresponds to a word
like ‘pain’ cannot constitute the meaning of the word by itself. We can summarize
this in the following remark:
Remark 5.3.2 Linguistic expressions referring to private experiences require the
existence of public criteria.
8With this in mind, we can understand the often quoted passage declaring that “[a]n ‘inner
process’ stands in need of outward criteria” (2009, §580, p. 161e) not as a statement about inner
processes as entities, but as a reminder about how one usually uses the expression ‘inner process’.
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In the passages discussed so far, Wittgenstein seems to merely attempt to com-
plement internalism by suggesting that behavior in particular, and public criteria in
general, are important additional dimensions of what we typically call the meaning
of an expression of a private experience. But there are also other passages that
seem to more fully reject private experiences as even contributing to the meaning of
private expressions. Consider the following example: “Imagine a person who could
not remember what the word ‘pain’ meant – so that he constantly called different
things by that name – but nevertheless used it in accordance with the usual symp-
toms and presuppositions of pain.” (2009, §271, p. 101e) Rather than taking this
as a challenging scenario, Wittgenstein quickly dismisses it by stating that this is
how we all use the word ‘pain’. The private experience of remembering or not the
meaning seems to be considered irrelevant as long as there is an external criterion
available or an accordance of behavior. The following sections (§§272-280) illustrate
this point by delving into the use of color terms like ‘red’ and ‘blue’.
Slightly later on we encounter a famous passage in the Philosophical Investiga-
tions where Wittgenstein lays out the often-called beetle-in-the-box thought exper-
iment:
Well, everyone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own
case! — Suppose that everyone had a box with something in it which
we call a “beetle”. No one can ever look into anyone else’s box, and
everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. –
Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different
in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.
– But what if these people’s word “beetle” had a use nonetheless? – If
so, it would not be as the name of a thing. The thing in the box doesn’t
belong to the language-game at all; not even as a Something: for the
box might even be empty. – No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing
in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
That is to say, if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation
on the model of ‘object and name’, the object drops out of consideration
as irrelevant. (2009, §293bc, pp. 106e-107e)
The scenario described has been variously interpreted9. It can be construed as
another application of the “method of §2”, in that the narrator designs a situation
where the interlocutor’s views seem to apply correctly, only to let us see that, under
close inspection, it does not work as expected.
9See Stern (2007) for an overview.
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In this case, the issue is the same as was adumbrated in §§272-280: a publicly
shared word or expression cannot get its meaning from a super-private experience
since, given that we cannot access other people’s experiences, these could vary wildly
and we could never be sure about what others meant. It is important to note
the conditional formulation of §293c. Between §294 and §315, Wittgenstein makes
it clear that he does not deny that private experiences exist or inner processes
can accompany or even trigger our use of words. He is simply stating that, if we
conceive of these experiences as super-private they cannot constitute the meaning
of the expressions that supposedly refer to them, because they would be irrelevant
as an explanatory factor. The following remark summarizes this point:
Remark 5.3.3 Public words and expressions cannot get their meaning from super-
private entities or experiences.
There is an additional aspect of Wittgenstein’s attack on internalism: the sug-
gestion that its intuitions are rooted in grammatical confusion. Sections §§246-252
begin to attempt a deconstruction of some assumptions about super-private en-
tities. The first sections articulate the idea that knowledge of these entities or
experiences is qualitatively different between the person that experiences them and
others. Namely, whereas when one is in pain one certainly knows it, when one thinks
another person is in pain there is always room for doubt, i.e. there is always a pos-
sibility that the other person is mimicking the external behavior without having the
internal experience. Hence, “it makes sense to say about other people that they
doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.” (2009, §246c, p. 96e)
Without denying this intuition, Wittgenstein’s subtle remarks up to §252 attempt
to warn against potential misinterpretation of this kind of statements.
For example, the observation just quoted can lead us to state that pain is thus
private. There is nothing wrong with such a statement by itself. The problem only
arises if we take it as a statement about an entity, and imagine that the word ‘pain’
refers to it. This touches on two earlier remarks: that we should be careful not to
“confound the meaning of a name with the bearer of the name” (2009, §40, p. 24e)
or, one could add, even assume that because there is a name there is a bearer; and
that some sentences, despite looking like they are about something external to them,
are actually merely about the use of the words or expressions involved (see also §58).
The cryptic §248 is an example that is meant to evoke this idea: just as “One plays
patience by oneself” shouldn’t be seen as an empirical statement about the game of
patience as an external entity, but rather as part of setting up the game, so should
“Sensations are private” be interpreted as setting up a language-game that uses the
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word ‘sensation’, rather than as a statement about an independent thing referred to
by that word.
Later one gets a somewhat more explicitly portrayal of this idea:
What does it mean when we say, “I can’t imagine the opposite of this”
or “What would it be like if it were otherwise?” – For example, when
someone has said that my mental images are private; or that only I
myself can know whether I am feeling pain; and so forth.
Of course, here “I can’t imagine the opposite” doesn’t mean: my powers
of imagination are unequal to the task. We use these words to fend
off something whose form produces the illusion of being an empirical
proposition, but which is really a grammatical one. (2009, §251ab, p. 96e)
What is suggested is that, for example, the sentence “Only I can know whether I am
feeling pain”, although looking like an empirical proposition about pain, is actually
more a statement about the words in the sentence than a statement of empirical
fact, just like “One plays patience by oneself” (2009, §248, p. 96e), “Every rod has
a length” (2009, §251d, p. 97e), or “This body has extension” (2009, §252, p. 97e).
These are sentences that set up the rules of particular language-games and this is
why we either reply “Of course!” or “Nonsense!”, we either reject or accept playing
the game.
The issue returns again later, interspersed with the beetle-in-the-box thought
experiment. In §§294-308, Wittgenstein addresses potential concerns that he is
denying mental processes and the charge of being a behaviorist. To the accusation
that he repeatedly reaches the conclusion that the sensations are a Nothing, he
replies:
Not at all. It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The con-
clusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a
Something about which nothing could be said. We’ve only rejected the
grammar which tends to force itself on us here. (2009, §304, pp. 108e-
109e)
The grammatical confusion is to believe that there is necessarily a Something because
we talk as if we are referring to something. This is what Wittgenstein means when
saying that the grammar is forcing itself on us. When we say “my table” we think of
it as referring to an external object, so when we say “my pain” we can think we must
be referring to some entity as well, hence creating the image of a private experience
as a thing, albeit internal rather than external. The grammatical similarity invites
us to make the analogy without even realizing it.
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Replying to a further accusation (by the interlocutor’s voice) that he considers
everything except human behavior a fiction, he retorts that he is only talking about
a grammatical fiction (§307), and spells out how these fictions come about in the
next section:
How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states
and about behaviourism arise? — The first step is the one that altogether
escapes notice. We talk of processes and states, and leave their nature
undecided. Sometime perhaps we’ll know more about them – we think.
But that’s just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the
matter. For we have a certain conception of what it means to learn
to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring
trick has been made, and it was the very one that seemed to us quite
innocent.) (2009, §308, p. 109e)
The grammatical confusion is again to take the existence of expression like ‘men-
tal process’ or ‘mental state’ as implying the existence of corresponding entities.
Wittgenstein, as he repeatedly states, does not want to deny the existence of men-
tal life or experiences, only to expose this conjuring trick and suggest that, just
because we have words like ‘pain’ or ‘sensation’ that seem to relate to something
super-private, that does not necessarily imply that there are mental correlates of
these words which constitute their meaning. We might just be being misled by
an unreflected analogy between empirical and grammatical propositions. We can
summarize this point in the following remark:
Remark 5.3.4 The existence of mental entities corresponding to private expres-
sions is not guaranteed by the existence of these expressions in our language.
These remarks taken together raise doubts about internalism as a useful or even
coherent theory of meaning. The only way out seems to be to “make a radical break
with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same
purpose: to convey thoughts – which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or
whatever.” (2009, §304, p. 109e) It would be good to abandon the picture of meaning
as a form of correspondence, and the idea that linguistic expressions have meaning
by corresponding to other entities. In the following section, I reflect on whether or
not the framework of signaling games gives us a way of doing so.
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5.4 Correspondence in signaling games
I presented the remarks in this chapter as addressed against three particular
variants of the correspondence picture of meaning. Pointing out issues with these
variants is not, I believe, an invitation for the development of another variant that
would not suffer from them. It is rather a way of rejecting the general picture. Some
remarks are specific, but many apply quite generally. What is the correspondence
picture of meaning? We can describe it again, by slightly paraphrasing a quote from
§1b, as the following idea: every linguistic expression has a meaning; this meaning is
correlated with the linguistic expression. I use ‘linguistic expression’ to encompass
what we usually call ‘signs’, ‘words’, or ‘sentences’. Externalism, logical atomism,
and internalism are particular variants of this picture that differ in how they see the
nature of this correlate. Even if we prefer one variant over another, the basic idea
they share seems intuitive and innocuous. What is Wittgenstein’s problem with this
picture?
Although it might be somewhat obvious, I think it is important to point out that
it is very unlikely Wittgenstein’s criticism of this intuition is aimed at correcting
our everyday use of it. In this respect, it seems safe to take him at his word when
saying that “[p]hilosophy must not interfere in any way with the actual use of lan-
guage” (2009, §124, p. 55e). Wittgenstein is not trying to reform language (§132),
at least not in how it is used in an everyday non-philosophical context. The criticism
of the correspondence picture of meaning is aimed at attempts at theorizing about
language that take the idea for granted.
One reason to find the correspondence picture problematic in philosophical theo-
rizing has to do with the remarks discussed in Section 3.1. The idea that a linguistic
expression can have a meaning that corresponds to it motivates seeing meaning as
a separate entity which, given that we do not have any direct access to it, is hidden.
This can lead to the expectation that linguistic expressions have some single final
completely analyzed form that can be unearthed through an investigation. This
kind of project is, according to Wittgenstein, misguided (Remark 3.1.2, p. 59). Talk
of meaning only in terms of correspondence to linguistic expressions additionally
encourages ignoring all the aspects that make meaning vary, like context, purpose,
and the role of agents in how they make use of those expressions. It can invite
hypostatizing meanings as entities, something Wittgenstein would also be against
(Remark 3.1.3, p. 61).
Other reasons to take issue with the correspondence picture of meaning can be
generalized from some of the specific remarks addressed at its variants. One of the
most central is a recurrent theme in Wittgenstein’s attempts at the dissolution of
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various apparent problems: the issue of heterogeneity. As mentioned in Section 3.2,
one can see the search for a theory of meaning as an attempt at defining the word
‘meaning’. One problem immediately faced by such an enterprise is that we use
the word in various ways. Even if we ignore uses that do not clearly relate to
linguistic meaning10, there are kinds of signs, words, and sentences that we say
are meaningful but might not fit the correspondence picture very well. Although
Remark 5.1.1 (p. 112) was discussed in the context of externalism, it is formulated
in a way that applies to the general idea. That linguistic expressions have meanings
which are correlated with them might seem intuitive for common nouns, names,
sentences that we can paraphrase in a simpler way. And that is in the context of
particular language-games. Trying to generalize this picture to the whole of what we
call language, given its heterogeneity and dynamism (Remark 4.1.2, p. 93), might
not be warranted. The uses of the word ‘meaning’ are tied together by family
resemblance, and meaning is just not something we can define in all generality.
Further criticism of the three variants of the correspondence picture raises con-
cerns that, even if we restrict it to scenarios where it seems to apply somewhat
innocuously, it might be a limited notion. The imaginary builder does not use
the word “slab” solely to evoke images in the mind of the assistant (Remark 5.1.2,
p. 113), understanding an analyzed linguistic expression is not necessarily sufficient
to understand its unanalyzed counterpart (Remark 5.2.4, p. 122), and there is more
to the meaning of a word like “pain” than some correlated super-private experi-
ence (Remarks 5.3.1, p. 124, and 5.3.3, p. 127). This applies to the correspondence
picture in general:
If we say, “Every word in the language signifies something”, we have so
far said nothing whatever ; unless we explain exactly what distinction we
wish to make. (2009, §13, p. 10e)
Saying that every linguistic expression has a meaning is, by itself, a vacuous claim.
It can serve a purpose if we are trying to distinguish a word like “table” from a se-
quence of letters like “tnetennba”. Explaining the meaning of a linguistic expression
in terms of an object, a paraphrase, a concept, or anything else, can help prevent
or resolve a misunderstanding, but only if everything else is already in place (Re-
mark 3.2.1, p. 67). Defining the king in chess by establishing a correspondence
with the piece does not in general determine how the piece is to be used in the
game (§31). Similarly, establishing the meaning of an expression by correspondence
is not sufficient to say everything about its meaning.
10For example, uses like “Life has meaning” or “She means a lot to me”.
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A demand that usually accompanies the correspondence picture is that mean-
ing must be determinate. Against this, Wittgenstein points out the problems of
the underdetermination of ostensive definitions. If one can never establish an exact
correspondence between a word and an everyday object by physical ostension (Re-
mark 5.1.3, p. 115), or with a super-private experience by some mental equivalent
of that (Remark 5.3.2, p. 125), how is one supposed to ever fix those correlates
as their meaning? A similar issue could be raised regarding sentences and their
analyses or paraphrases, given how those are tied to language-games, and the latter
are numerous and subject to change. The problem of underdetermination and its
implications for the correspondence picture of meaning appear more prominently in
Wittgenstein’s remarks about rules and rule-following (see Chapter 6). For now,
it suffices to say that the points made about the determinacy of meaning in the
context of externalism and internalism generalize well to the correspondence picture
of meaning.
In Section 4.3, I argued that the signaling games framework allows us to study
meaning by focusing on use. They therefore permit us to forego the intuitive urge
to see meaning in terms of correspondence, if we take Wittgenstein’s remarks on
use as a methodological advice rather than as a theory of meaning, as I defended in
the discussion leading up to Remark 4.2.2 (p. 100). This is, to a certain extent by
design, as evidenced by the following passage:
Communication by conventional signals is a commonplace phenomenon,
so much so that we must make an effort not to take it for granted. We
could exercise our tacit understanding all we want without ever making
it more explicit. That is what would happen if we started by saying
that actions are signals when we endow them with meanings. This tru-
ism will bring us no nearer to describing the phenomenon of signaling
without depending on our prior tactic understanding thereof. So let us
describe the phenomenon in other terms and leave meaning to look after
itself. (Lewis, 1969, p. 122)
I believe this attitude is in line with the Wittgensteinian remarks discussed so far.
Lewis’ suggestion seems to be to forget our tacit understanding of signals as being
endowed with meaning, describe them in other terms, and we’ll understand meaning
better. The fits the idea of rejecting the correspondence picture of meaning and
following Wittgenstein’s methodological advice to “look at the use”.
Lewis follows this up with the characterization of the Paul Revere signaling game
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(Lewis, 1969, pp. 122-125). This is accompanied by the following observation11:
I have now described the character of a case of signaling without men-
tioning the meaning of the signals: that two lanterns meant that the
redcoats were coming by sea, or whatever. But nothing important seems
to have been left unsaid, so what has been said must somehow imply
that the signals have their meanings. (1969, pp. 124-125)
Again, the attitude just discussed seems to be reiterated. After describing the
use of signals, “nothing important seems to have been left unsaid”. A thoroughly
Wittgensteinian attitude would be to conclude “we are, therefore, done”. But the
intuitive appeal of the correspondence picture is strong. And although the signaling
games framework allows one to avoid it, it does not fully eliminate it. Some authors
have therefore tried to provide definitions of the meaning of signals in signaling
games that to me go awry by regressing into viewing meaning in terms that are
close to the correspondence picture.
Lewis is, surprisingly (given the aforementioned passages), the first one to go
down that road:
I have been trying to demonstrate that an adequate account of signaling
need not mention the meanings of signals—at least, not by name. But
of course signals do have meanings. (Lewis, 1969, p. 143)
He subsequently develops an account of meaning anchored in his notion of conven-
tion. Consider the signaling system in Figure 2.1. Let us call σ and ρ the sender
strategy and the receiver strategy, respectively, depicted therein. Lewis claims (1969,
pp. 143-152) that there are a number of things that we can say about the meaning
of, for example, signal ma in that situation12:
1. ma is a conventional signal in (σ, ρ) that t1 holds or ma conventionally means
in (σ, ρ) that t1 holds;
2. ma is a conventional signal in (σ, ρ) to do a1 or ma conventionally means in
(σ, ρ) to do a1.
These are two alternative ways to “give the meaning” of a signal in a signaling
system. Lewis makes further distinctions and definitions regarding meaning, which
I believe are best addressed after reviewing Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule and
rule-following (see Chapter 6).
11Also quoted in Section 4.3.
12These are close paraphrases, merely adapted to use more the notation used in the examples
in this thesis.
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This conceptualization of signal meaning is likely to align well with our everyday
intuitions. Given all the regularity and common knowledge in a signaling system
anchored in convention, it can seem natural to want to say something along the lines
of “ma means t1” or “ma means a1”. And Lewis’ definitions give us a way of saying
such things in the context of the signaling games framework. However, they are
technical notions. As such, in order to be faithful to the framework, meaning needs
to be hedged as “conventional meaning” and the particular sender and receiver
strategies that constitute the equilibrium need to be included in the definitions.
With these caveats in place, I don’t think they are problematic as technical notions,
partly because the don’t bring anything new; they are mere paraphrased descriptions
of the sender and receiver strategies.
Nevertheless, by attempting to interface between the technical notions of the
framework and our natural ways of speaking about meaning, one can invite a per-
spective that is very different from the original objective of leaving “meaning to
look after itself.” (1969, p. 122) Huttegger (2007b), while revisiting some of the
ideas introduced by Lewis, states the following:
As long as no signaling system or convention is established in a pop-
ulation, signals have no meaning. [. . . ] On the other hand, meaning
may be considered as a property of signals in equilibrium. If almost all
individuals play according to a signaling system, then signals are repre-
sentations of parts of the world and have these parts as contents. To be
more specific, signals in a signaling system refer to a state of the world
and to an act that is a proper response to this state. We will say that
signals in signaling systems refer to state-act pairs. (2007, p. 413)
What is described in this passage is a notion of meaning in signaling games that
is an instance of the correspondence picture. In equilibrium, signals are said to
have meanings (as a property or content) which are constituted by the state-act
pairs they refer to. Rather than illuminating the notion of meaning by describing
the phenomenon in different terms, we have come full circle and are back to the
standard quasi-metaphysical truisms couched in our tacit understanding that Lewis
claimed to want to avoid.
Further problems with shifting the approach to meaning in signaling games from
the former attitude to the latter, can be realized by taking Wittgenstein’s remarks
into account. The first thing to note is that it is a very limited account, even if we
take it as a notion of meaning within the signaling games framework. The definitions
given above attribute meaning to signals only when they are used in equilibrium and
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the strategies are pure-strategy equivalents13. Perhaps it is easy to find what the
candidate for a signal’s meaning is when both sender and receiver are in a stable
situation by consistently (100% of the time) either using the same signal for one and
the same state or performing the one and the same action for a given signal. But this
makes it unclear at which point in an adaptive process signals “get” their meaning
(see Section 4.3), signals can enable coordination even when strategies are not in
stable equilibrium (e.g. Wagner, 2012) and there are games with stable equilibria
that do not consist of pure-strategy equivalents, such as partial pooling in simple
Lewis signaling games (e.g. Huttegger, Skyrms, Smead, et al., 2009), vague signal
use in sim-max games (e.g. Franke, Jäger, and van Rooij, 2011; O’Connor, 2014b;
Franke and Correia, 2018), and hybrid equilibria in costly signaling games (e.g.
Huttegger and Zollman, 2016). Strict notions of meaning, like those proposed by
Lewis and Huttegger, exclude all of these cases as meaningful signal use.
The matter only gets worse if one considers these notions of meaning as some-
thing that can be generalized to the broader context of natural language. Language
is deeply dynamic, so it is (almost) never in a fully stable state, and heteroge-
neous, so each word is likely used or potentially usable in more than one language
game (Remark 4.1.2, p. 93). If this picture is correct, notions of meaning that only
work for pure-strategy equivalents at equilibrium and nothing else are irrelevant for
natural language. This is important to mention, since Lewis himself makes close
parallels (1969, pp. 152-159) between his definitions of meaning and Grice’s notion
of non-natural meaning (Grice, 1957). The latter, however, is supposed to have a
much broader applicability. That Lewis finds a comparison between the two a legit-
imate step to take is perhaps a good demonstration of how choosing to talk about
meaning in correspondence terms, rather than talking about use alone, invites hasty
generalizations.
I suggested that these definitions of meaning in signaling games were introduced
driven by the appeal of the intuitiveness of the correspondence picture. But they
might have another source. One can feel a certain urge to want to distinguish a
random strategy from a signaling system in terms that go beyond total expected
utility and capture something related to communication. Skyrms (2010, pp. 33-47)
proposes that we do this using notions from information theory14. In particular, in
a signaling game model, one can calculate the amount to which the use of a signal
by the sender makes it more likely that a certain state obtains. Conversely, the
13A pure sender univocally assigns a choice (signals for senders, actions for receivers) per choice
point (states for senders, signals for receivers). The equivalents in mixed and behavioral strategies
would be, respectively, a strategy that is 100% composed of a single pure strategy, and a strategy
that, per choice point, assigns a unique choice with 100% probability.
14See Cover and Thomas (2006) for an introduction.
136 CHAPTER 5. IT’S NOT THE WORD THAT COUNTS
receiver strategy makes it the case that each signal affects, by a certain amount,
the probability that a certain action is performed. Omitting some technical details,
these are called the signal’s amount of information about a state and amount of
information about an action, respectively. These values can be used to define a
signal’s informational content about states (resp. about actions) as a vector indicating
the amount of information it is said to carry about each of the states (resp. actions).
Averaging over this vector gives the quantity of information in a signal. For example,
in a binary signaling game with equiprobable states, like the example discussed in
Section 2.1, if each signal is used 50% of the time for each state, that signal carries
no information about any state; the amount of information is maximal when the
sender strategy perfectly discriminates the state by using a separate signal for each
separate state 100% of the time.
One attractive aspect of this notion of quantity of information is that it is a
matter of degree. The measures can be calculated for any pair of sender and receiver
strategies in a signaling game model. It is neither required that they are pure-
strategy equivalents nor that they are in equilibrium. Its applicability is therefore
much broader than the notions of meaning suggested by Lewis (1969) and Huttegger
(2007b). One can, for example, use it to observe how the amount of information
increases gradually as strategies are driven towards a signaling system by an adaptive
dynamic in a binary signaling game (Skyrms, 2010, p. 40). Another advantage is
that it is a technical notion that captures part of what we feel compelled to say
about the differences between how signals are used in random strategies versus
separating strategies that foregoes the title of ‘meaning’. By introducing it in such
a way, Skyrms avoids the invitation for unwarranted generalizations. Quantity of
information is not the same as meaning, even though it seems to capture aspects
of it. But the separation helps avoid confusion between a technical notion defined
within the context of signaling games and an everyday expression used in a broad
family of cases.
Despite these advantages, the notion of information can still be seen as problem-
atic since it is presented in terms similar to the correspondence picture of meaning.
Skyrms describes signals as having informational contents, or as carrying informa-
tion. These ways of speaking seem to elicit misleading analogies, something Wittgen-
stein also warned us to avoid15. A signal is not a container that can be pried open
for access to its contents, nor can a signal hand over information like a person hand-
ing over a bag of groceries she is carrying. These analogies could encourage one to
think, much like in the correspondence picture, that a signal has information, one
15See the discussion leading up to Remark 3.1.2 (p. 59).
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need only to know how to access it. This apparently leaves all the other elements of
the signaling game behind. But looking more closely into the technical definition of
information, reveals that this is an issue of presentation.
Following the notation used in Section 2.1, the amount of information a message
m carries about a state t is given by the following formula:
I(m, t) = log
(
P (t|m)
Pr(t)
)
Here, P (t|m) is the probability that state t holds when message m is used, and
Pr(t) is the prior probability that state t holds. According to Skyrms (2010, p. 35),
P (t|m) can be given, by Bayes’ theorem, as follows:
P (t|m) = P (m|t)
P (m)
Additionally, the probability that message m is used given the state, i.e. P (m|t), is
defined by the sender strategy σ. The probability that a message is used simpliciter,
i.e. P (m), is also defined by the sender strategy, but additionally taking into account
the probability that message m is sent in all other states as well. This still only gives
us the ability to calculate the information a message carries about a state. Similar
considerations apply to the calculation of the amount of information about an action.
Ultimately, something close to knowledge of the whole game structure is needed to
compute all the amount of information in a message. Thus, information is not a
property of a message, as one may be misled to believe given the way the notion is
presented; it is a property of the game. Speaking of messages or signals as having
or carrying information can help us forget that.
This leads to another related issue that has to do with the availability of this
information. From the modeler’s perspective, who has a God’s eye view of the sig-
naling model, it may seem natural to think that “information is just there” (Skyrms,
2010, p. 44), but this is not necessarily the case for the agents involved in the game.
This is duly noted by Skyrms:
None of the probabilities used so far are degrees of belief of sender and
receiver. They are objective probabilities, determined by nature and the
evolutionary or learning process. Organisms (or organs) playing the role
of sender and receiver need have no cognitive capacities. (2010, p. 44)
This is very important to keep in mind, since statements like saying that information
is “just there” or saying that signals “contain” information can invite the idea that
information is available to any kind of agent. As argued before, in order to calculate
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the measures of information proposed by Skyrms, one needs knowledge of the whole
game. An agent that has less than perfect omniscient rationality does not have the
same access to information as the modeler does.
There is one additional issue with the notion of information that needs to be
pointed out before going back to more general considerations related to Wittgen-
stein’s remarks. One should be careful in taking information as an indicator of suc-
cessful communication, as is sometimes done in the literature (e.g. Wagner, 2012).
In a simple Lewis signaling game, information about states and about actions is
minimal for strategy profiles where sender and receiver uniformly randomize their
choices, which is a scenario where intuitively one would say no communication is
taking place. Conversely, information is maximal in a signaling system, a scenario
of perfect communication. But information is also maximal in another situation.
Consider again the examples in Figure 2.1. In the anti-signaling strategy profile
(Figure 2.1b), the amount of information about states is maximal, since the sender
strategy perfectly discriminates by using a different signal for each state. The same
happens with the receiver strategy, so the amount of information about actions
is also maximal. However, the anti-signaling profile is an example of an extreme
case of miscommunication, where the receiver performs actions that are completely
inadequate given the states.
This shows that one cannot blindly take high values of quantity of information
about states and actions independently as direct proxies for successful communica-
tion between agents. The anti-signaling example is relevant because the metric is
supposed to apply to any situation, not just strategies at equilibrium in fully coop-
erative scenarios. It is especially relevant when the argument is about information
exchange in zero-sum games, where interests are completely misaligned, as is the
case in the work of Wagner (2012). A better way of measuring successful commu-
nication is to calculate the amount of information between states and actions, as
proposed by Godfrey-Smith and Martínez (2013). This requires one to merge the
sender and receiver strategies into one function giving the probabilities that a given
action is performed when a certain state obtains. An example of this merging op-
eration is illustrated in Figure 5.1. Interestingly, Wagner’s qualitative results still
hold when using this measure instead (Martínez and Godfrey-Smith, 2016).
I believe that the notion of information is a useful one. However, because of the
issues just raised, I think it is important to keep two things in mind when making
use of it. First, that one should not speak of information content as something
that signals have or carry. This invites misunderstandings of the same nature as
the correspondence picture of meaning, and obscures the fact that a great deal of
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Figure 5.1: Example of how a mixed strategy profile for a simple binary signaling
game can be merged. The probability that an action a is chosen when a
certain state t obtains is calculated by taking into account the likelihood
of each messagem being chosen by the sender, and the likelihood of each
of those messages leading the receiver to choose action a. Formally,
P (a|t) = ∑m∈M σ (m|t)× ρ (a|m).
knowledge about the whole particular signaling game is needed in order to calculate
it. Second, one should be careful in taking information as an indicator of successful
communication. I suggest that it is best to think of the amount of information
about states (resp. actions) as a measure of the entropy, or conversely the degree
of order or systematicity, exhibited by the sender (resp. receiver) strategy in the
context of a game. Successful communication can be measured by the amount of
information between states and actions, but this requires merging the sender and
receiver strategies (see again Figure 5.1 for an example) and thus foregoing the idea
that information is a property of signals.
With all that was said about information, it should be clear that I do not con-
sider the notions of informational content or quantity of information as defining, or
providing means to define, the meaning of signals in signaling games. Despite being
notions that have a broader applicability than the notions of meaning provided by
Lewis (1969) and Huttegger (2007b), and that can be useful in analyzing and un-
derstanding signaling game models and their dynamics, they are unable to capture
every aspect of interest of what we intuitively would call meaning in a signaling
game. This obviously precludes them from being a candidate for defining meaning
in the broader context of natural language.
Not only do each of these proposals have specific problems of their own, they
also share the more general issues stemming from attempting to conceive of meaning
in terms of correspondence. It is surprising how strongly this picture keeps philoso-
phers captive, and how often it keeps resurfacing, even in cases like that of Lewis,
who originally saw the power of abandoning it and describing meaning in other
terms, and Skyrms, who recognizes meaning as a “dangerous word” (2010, p. 34).
Wittgenstein gives us at least three reasons why the correspondence picture is inad-
equate and we should abandon it. First, there is the issue of underdetermination in
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establishing relations between linguistic expressions and whatever their meaning is.
Second, even if it would be possible to establish such a relation, that would not con-
sist of everything that one needs in order to understand or make use of a linguistic
expression in a successful way. Third, even if such a picture could successfully char-
acterize certain types of use of linguistic expressions, in the broader heterogeneous
and dynamic context of natural language, it would not cover all possible language
games, and all the family of cases for which we use the word meaning.
In my opinion, the signaling games framework should never be taken as a theory
of meaning, especially if the latter is seen as something yielding “a specification of
the meaning of every expression and sentence” (Dummett, 1975, p. 1) of a language.
The framework promotes the study of meaning not as a kind of correspondence,
but rather in terms of use in a context with a driving purpose. One advantage
of such a paradigm shift is that we are no longer tied to the need to explain how
language hooks on to the world; this question is no longer relevant on this account.
We can merely focus on trying to see how agents can use signals to cope with the
world and achieve their purposes. On the way, we will better understand meaning,
not by trying to say what meaning is, but by trying to better understand how
communication works.
Chapter 6
Rules and meaning∗
In this chapter, I address Wittgenstein’s remarks regarding the role played
by rules and rule-following in our mastery of language, and their impli-
cations for possible interpretations of signaling game models.
In order to understand Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following, it is important
to first try to clarify the conception(s) of rules that they are based on. As should be
expected from the author’s considerations on method (see again Chapters 1 and 3),
no explicit definition is provided in the book. Furthermore, challenges put forward in
various places against certain intuitions regarding rule-following are often implicitly
anchored in different conceptions of rules. The discussion is, however, infused with
analogies. A frequently used image is that of rules as tables, schemas, or charts,
depicting a correspondence between linguistic and/or extra-linguistic elements (e.g.
§1, §53, §62, §73, §86, §141, §§162-163, §265). Many remarks address the role of
rules in actual games like chess (e.g. §31, §197, §200, §205, §§563-568) or tennis (e.g.
§68). Another example of what is paradigmatically seen as a rule is a mathematical
formula, like one specifying a number series (e.g. §§146-155, §§179-190, §226). The
discussions around these examples usually address possible intuitions about the role
rules play in the activities of which they are a part.
Wittgenstein’s ultimate goal with these analogies is to illuminate a discussion
on natural language. This is clear from how remarks directly about meaning and
understanding are interwoven with considerations on rules in the book. Wittgen-
stein delves into the analogies not only because they illustrate general issues about
rule-following, but also because he identifies them as representative of intuitions
∗Wittgenstein’s remarks on rules and rule-following in the Philosophical Investigations have
motivated a prolific discussion in philosophy of language, at a certain point greatly fueled by Saul
Kripke’s influential, though highly contested, interpretation (1982). Despite its notoriety, I will
here stay away from this debate and continue a mostly immanent reading following the choices
laid out in Chapter 1. Good overviews of the debate are given by Miller and Wright (2002) and
Hattiangadi (2007).
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underlying some conceptions of meaning in philosophy. The rules of a game can be
thought of as fully defining it, in the sense that they are sufficient and necessary
knowledge for someone to be able to play the game; mathematical formulas can be
imagined to characterize infinite cases and thus fully contain their own method of
application as a self-sufficient mechanism; tables and schemas, like other rules, seem
to force upon us a specific interpretation or behavior, leaving no room for choice;
finally, rules can strike us as having an independent normative force that both under-
writes our actions and establishes the distinctions between right and wrong, correct
and incorrect. When it comes to language, similar intuitions are common: that the
meaning of linguistic entities is fully defined, that knowledge of these definitions
is a necessary condition to use or understand them successfully, that we have no
choice in what our words mean, and especially in deciding whether an application
or interpretation is correct or incorrect.
In the context of talking about language and meaning, Wittgenstein mentions a
distinction that I believe can be useful in illuminating some of the general issues on
rule-following that will be brought forward in this chapter. Despite not being given
a sharp definition of rules, the following passage points to some possibilities:
What do I call ‘the rule according to which he proceeds’? – The hypoth-
esis that satisfactorily describes his use of words, which we observe; or
the rule which he looks up when he uses signs; or the one which he gives
us in reply if we ask him what his rule is? (2009, §82, p. 43e)
This passage highlights some different perspectives on what we call following a rule.
When someone engages in a behavior that seems to exhibit a regularity, we often say
that they are following a rule. One way of being motivated to say that is if we have
a hypothesis for describing the observed behavior, and perhaps even attempting to
predict future behavior. For example, if I observe someone producing the sequence
of numbers ‘0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, . . .’, I can advance the hypothesis that they are following
the rule ‘+2’, whereby one starts with the number 0 and subsequently adds ‘2’ to
the last number in the sequence in order to produce the next. This I will call the
descriptivist perspective on rule-following.
We also say that someone is following a rule if they are using what we recognize
as a specification of a rule as an instrument to guide their behavior. Imagine that
the person producing the aforementioned sequence was at every step consulting a
piece of paper with instructions in order to produce the next number in the series.
This I will call the material perspective on rule-following. Note that, and this is a
crucial point I will come back to later, these two possible cases do not necessarily
overlap. I can advance a rule as a hypothesis to describe someone’s behavior, and
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even if that description fits that does not imply that they must somehow, consciously
or unconsciously, be making use of that very rule, or any rule for that matter, in a
material sense. Conversely, if I observe someone apparently consulting instructions
to produce some behavior, I may not necessarily be able to describe it or even see a
regularity.
If we are dealing with communicative agents, we can have an additional moti-
vation to characterize someone as following a rule. If I observe someone producing
a certain behavior, I can simply ask them how they are doing it, and they can ad-
vance an explanation in terms of rule-following. I observe someone producing the
sequence ‘0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, . . .’, and when I ask them how they are calculating the next
number at each step, they tell me they are simply following the rule ‘+2’. Note that
it is again possible that their reply does not align with either the rule we describe
them as following, or with the rule they are actually using in a material sense. This
justificatory perspective is different from the other two in the sense that it is first-
person, rather than third-person. However, it can also be given in the descriptivist
or material sense. One can characterize one’s behavior in terms of a rule when one
is making use of a specification of it as an instrument to guide one’s behavior, or it
can simply be provided as an a posteriori hypothesis.
In this chapter, I will discuss a bit more in depth Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-
following focusing mostly on two parts of the Philosophical Investigations. Sections
§§82-88 can be seen as a summary of some of the issues with common intuitions
behind rule-following and some of Wittgenstein’s proposals to clarify associated
misunderstandings. Most of these are again discussed in more length in §§139-242,
although remarks on, or related to, rules and rule-following can also be found in other
parts of the book. In Section 6.1, I first discuss how most of Wittgenstein’s remarks
attempt to deflate various intuitions on the topic. Subsequently, in Section 6.2, I will
try to characterize his more positive remarks on the role rules play in our practices.
Finally, in Section 6.3, I reflect on the implications of these considerations for the
signaling games framework.
6.1 Misunderstanding rules
One of the first mentions of rules in the Philosophical Investigations occurs in
§31 and uses the example of chess. We are led to imagine showing someone a
chess piece and saying “This is the king.” This explanation, Wittgenstein observes,
can serve to teach the other person how to use the piece but only if, for example,
they already know the rules of chess and are only missing the knowledge of which
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particular piece in that context stands for the king. In this case, rules appear to
have a foundational role: learning how to use the chess piece presented is anchored
in the person’s knowledge of the rules of chess. But what is to know the rules of
chess? It is tempting to think that one has learned explicit instructions like “This is
the king; it can move in this-and-this way” (2009, §31c, p. 19e). However, it is also
possible to imagine the other person having learned to play chess empirically, by
observing and imitating others, “without ever learning or formulating rules”. In this
case, the explanation “This is the king” would work just as well as in the former.
The ostensive explanation thus teaches the use of the piece to the other person if
they already know how to play the game, but knowledge of explicit rules is not
necessary for that.
Similar remarks are made with respect to other examples of rules. In §143 we
are introduced to a language-game involving two agents, A and B, where “when A
gives an order, B has to write down series of signs according to a certain formation
rule.” (2009, §143a, p. 62e) Suppose A’s order is to write down the series of the
natural numbers in the decimal system, and we are testing B by observing their
behavior. When can we say that B has understood this order correctly? Since the
series is infinite, it seems that there is no one number that we can stipulate as a
criterion such that, if B continues the series correctly up to that number, we can
say that they have definitely mastered the series (§145). Is understanding then
necessarily anchored in explicit knowledge of the algebraic formula? The following
remarks (§§146-155) cast doubt on that idea. In particular, §151 advances again
the suggestion that we can easily imagine someone continuing a series without the
formula necessarily occurring to them. Think about whether you would need to call
to mind a formula to continue, for example, the series of even natural numbers.
Related considerations are made about tables and charts. Consider the builder’s
language of §2 and the toy language-game of §48. One can imagine agents playing
these games with the help of a chart associating elements of the game and signs (see
§86 and §53). However, both games were originally imagined without appealing to
such rules, and we plausibly had no need to imagine them when we were presented
with the characterization of each game. It is additionally plausible to picture agents
learning and using signs in the context of these games without the need for such
tables. Although it is possible to introduce them, it is not always necessary. One can
understand and play either of these language-games without the need for explicit
rules.
Learning and playing chess, reproducing a number series, associating objects or
colors with words, those are all activities that involve repeatable patterns and reg-
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ularities. One of the upshots of Wittgenstein’s considerations is a plain reminder
that it is perfectly imaginable that any of these activities can be mastered without
the need for explicit rules to anchor our understanding of them (see §§208-209). It
serves as a first palliative to the urge to hypostatize rules from regularities and con-
flate the various conceptions of rule-following. If one can describe some behavior in
terms of rules (descriptivist conception), this does not imply that a rule is necessar-
ily anchoring that behavior (material conception). Similarly, just because someone
justifies their own behavior by appeal to a rule (justificatory conception), that does
not imply that they were making use of that rule when performing the behavior
(material conception). These considerations can be summarized in the following
remark:
Remark 6.1.1 Producing behavior that exhibits regularities does not necessarily re-
quire knowledge of explicit rules.
Even if one agrees that knowledge of explicit rules is not necessary for under-
standing regularities or behaving accordingly (playing chess, expanding a number
series, and so forth), it is possible to still hold that it is nevertheless sufficient.
When one has knowledge of an explicit rule, our behavior when following it can eas-
ily appear to be fully determined and guided solely by the rule. Against this idea,
Wittgenstein repeatedly raises various incarnations of an objection that is aptly
summarized in the following passage:
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule,
because every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule.
The answer was: if every course of action can be brought into accord
with the rule, then it can also be brought into conflict with it. And so
there would be neither accord nor conflict here. (2009, §201a, p. 87e)
One of the first illustrations of this point can be found in §86, where a variant of
the builder’s language of §2 is introduced. In this toy language-game, the builder
A shows the assistant B written signs, and B makes use of a table to handle them.
This table has two columns: one with signs, and another with pictures of building
stones. B uses this table by looking up the signs received from A in the first column,
tracing the opposite picture in the second column, and handing A a building stone
that looks like that picture. The table works as a rule: it appears prima facie to
fully determine how B should interpret the written signs given by A.
Is the table sufficient to condition B’s interpretation of the written signs? One
presumes the elements in the two columns are to be related horizontally, as illus-
trated by the schema in Figure 6.1a. However, it would be possible to relate them
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(a) Horizontal (b) Alternative (c) Random
Figure 6.1: Interpretation schemas for the builder’s language variant of §86.
according to an alternative, but apparently systematic schema, for example the one
illustrated in Figure 6.1b, or even according to an apparently random schema like
the one illustrated in Figure 6.1c. So, it now seems that the table is not sufficient to
determine how to interpret the signs, since it is itself subject to different interpreta-
tions. What about the table together with the schema, could that alone determine
the interpretation of the signs in the language-game? One needs to realize that the
schema is itself also made of signs, which in turn could be interpreted alternatively.
Do we also require an additional rule to interpret the schema? We are on the path
to an infinite regress.
The possibility of variously interpreting a table is briefly raised again in the
context of the example of copying text from print to handwriting (§§162-163) and
discussed a bit more extensively in relation to algebraic formulas, namely in the
case of the example of learning to write down a number series (broached in §143
and picked up again in §§185-186). In particular, we are invited to consider the
following case. Say a tutor A is teaching a pupil B to write down series of the form
‘+n’, such that A expects B to write down ‘0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, . . .’ when given the order
‘+1’, ‘0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, . . .’ when given the order ‘+2’, and so forth. Imagine that B
has demonstrated to have correctly expanded different series up to the number 1000,
but when tested again for ‘+2’ beyond 1000 he writes ‘1000, 1004, 1008, 1012, . . . ’.
About this situation, Wittgenstein writes:
[. . . ] we might perhaps say: this person finds it natural, once given our
explanations, to understand our order as we would understand the order
“Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000, and so on”. (2009, §185c,
p. 81e)
Even though we would probably continue the series by writing down ‘1000, 1002,
1004, 1006, . . . ’, there is no principled reason why B’s alternative interpretation is
less valid than ours. The point here is that the algebraic formula ‘+2’ apparently
does not, in the thought experiment, determine its own interpretation by itself; it
was subject to different interpretations by A and B. Although A’s interpretation
feels more correct to us, Wittgenstein suggests this is just a matter of familiarity.
B’s interpretation feels like if someone would react to a pointing gesture “by looking
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in the direction from fingertip to wrist, rather than from wrist to fingertip.” (2009,
§185d, p. 81e) However, there is in principle no guarantee that either order could
not be interpreted otherwise. If one is tempted to postulate a further meta-rule to
constrain those interpretations, we again face the possibility of an infinite regress.
These issues naturally carry over to language and meaning. Explicit connections
are made in various places. We find a clear statement on that in the following
passage:
Speaking of the application of a word, I said that it is not everywhere
bounded by rules. But what does a game look like that is everywhere
bounded by rules? whose rules never let a doubt creep in, but stop up
all the gaps where it might? – Can’t we imagine a rule regulating the
application of a rule; and a doubt which it removes – And so on? (2009,
§84a, p. 44e)
These remarks connect the intuition that a game is completely delimited by its
rules, with the expectation that a language-game similarly fully constrains the ways
words and sentences can be used within it (see again Chapter 4). This relates to our
current discussion because a language-game that would be everywhere bounded by
rules, that would never let a doubt creep in, would be a game that fully determines
the application of words, and hence their meaning, within that game. But, we are
again confronted with the suggestion that we can always entertain a doubt, if not
in the application of a word, maybe in the application of a rule that supposedly
regulates the application of the word, and so forth.
Do all of these problems throw doubt on Wittgenstein’s own notion of language-
game and his propounded connection between meaning and use? Other passages
show that problems only arise if one is tempted to identify meaning with use or
misunderstand the role of use in language production and understanding. In §§139-
141 we are presented with questions about whether we grasp the whole use of a word
like ‘cube’ when we understand it, and whether use can therefore determine meaning.
If one imagines that a picture of a cube comes to mind, does that picture leave no
doubt as to which situations would warrant the use of the word ‘cube’? Wittgenstein
suggests that the picture of a cube could fit a triangular prism under a certain
method of projection. Should the whole use then consist of picture plus method
of projection? In §141 we are again confronted with the idea that this purported
solution simply triggers an infinite regress. Although we might have an intuition
that we grasp the whole use of a word at a stroke, Wittgenstein defends that we do
not have a concrete model of how such a thing would actually be possible (§§191-
192). A word cannot fully and unequivocally determine its own meaning, just as
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no explicit rule is sufficient to fully determine the actions that are carried out in
response to it.
A foundationalist reply to these considerations would suggest that such problems
simply show that some rules must, therefore, be fundamental; there needs to be a
backstop to the infinite regress. This idea is addressed by Wittgenstein by discussing
the possibility of a rule, or an interpretation thereof, containing its own method of
application. This would supposedly stop the potential infinite regress by making the
rule self-sufficient. Going back to the algebraic formula ‘+2’, if the tutor corrects
the pupil when he writes ‘1000, 1004, 1008, 1012, . . . ’, doesn’t that show that he
already knew in advance what values to expect? In §§186-190, there is an attempt
to flesh out this intuition. Is it implied that the tutor knew all the possible values
in the series? This can hardly be the case, since the series is infinite. Did the
tutor know a procedure that dictates how to obtain any number in the series from
its predecessor? But that is exactly what the explicit rule was supposed to do:
to determine what follows from one stage to the next. If knowing how to use the
rule requires knowing how to follow this procedure, how do we then know how to
interpret the procedure? There doesn’t seem to be a clear picture of what it would
be like for a rule to contain its own method of application without getting us back
to the problem of interpretation.
In the following paragraphs, Wittgenstein makes another analogy:
A machine as a symbol of its mode of operation. The machine, I might
say for a start, seems already to contain its own mode of operation.
What does that mean? – If we know the machine, everything else –
that is the movements it will make – seem to be already completely
determined. (2009, §193a, p 83e)
The picture of a machine illustrates a self-contained rule: it seems that its mechanism
is built in, that its parts can only move in one way, that its future behavior is fully
pre-determined. But we need only remember the possibility of the parts “bending,
breaking off, melting, and so on” (2009, §193b, p 84e) to realize that this is not
necessarily so. In these cases, there is a possibility that the machine behaves in a
way that is different from what we would expect, either from the way it is built, or
from our familiarity with the mechanism. Similarly, even though the beginning of
a series might strike us as “a visible section of rails invisibly laid to infinity” (2009,
§218, p. 91e), we should not forget that it is always possible that at each stage the
rails bend, break, or melt, or that it strikes others as a different track altogether.
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These insights can be generalized in the following remark2:
Remark 6.1.2 A rule can be variously interpreted in any case.
These considerations focus on an aspect of rule-following that relate to whether
or not it is possible for a rule to be interpreted in more than one way. Rules are
also typically perceived by us as having a normative side. Even if it is possible for
the aforementioned pupil to interpret ‘+2’ differently than we would expect, there
is an additional feeling that they would be wrong in doing so. This is closely inter-
twined with the previous remark, but raises further issues. Consider the example
of teaching a series. In §143 we are asked to imagine how this would go about.
The series of the natural numbers in the decimal system could be taught by requir-
ing the pupil to copy numbers previously written down for him. In this learning
process, it is always possible that the pupil makes mistakes. When given the first
10 digits as ‘0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9’, examples of mistakes would be to write down
‘8, 2, 9, 4, 5, 1, 3, 7, 6, 0’ or ‘1, 0, 3, 2, 5, 4, 7, 6, 9, 8’. Although there does not appear to
be any discernible order in which the numbers were supposedly copied in the first
example, the second mistake could be attributed to the pupil swapping the numbers
pairwise. The latter behavior could be described as rule-following, but one would
also like to say that the pupil in that case, although following a rule, is following
the wrong rule.
One first problem has to do with the binary mindset normative issues usually
motivate. In the context of the aforementioned example, it is tempting to sep-
arate possible mistakes into random and systematic. Wittgenstein invites us to
notice that, however, “there is no sharp distinction between a random and a sys-
tematic mistake” (2009, §143c, p. 62e). If the pupil repeatedly produces the se-
quence ‘1, 0, 3, 2, 5, 4, 7, 6, 9, 8’ we would like to say they are making a systematic
mistake. But what if they produce that sequence once and then repeatedly produce
‘0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9’? Should we call the first event a random mistake? What if
they do it every 1000 tries? How often does the pupil need to do it as we expect for
us to be completely sure they have mastered the system? And even if the sequence
is reproduced to our satisfaction once, how can we rule out the possibility that this
was done by chance?
These remarks are reiterated in the context of other examples. In §157, we are
asked to imagine the process of training pupils to read mechanically, i.e. producing
sounds from written text. Here too, through the different stages of learning there is
no clear distinction between a pupil that produces random sounds, one that produces
2Adapted from a passage in §28, and following Stern (2004, p. 142).
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the expected sounds but only by accident, and one that is already able to read. In
§163, in the case of using a table to copy from printed text to handwriting, again
we are confronted with cases which we would probably classify as simple systematic
mistakes, like using the table according to the schema in Figure 6.1b rather than the
one in Figure 6.1a. One could imagine additional variations further complicating the
systematic mistake, potentially to a point where one would be unable to demarcate
systematic from random3.
The effect of these remarks is to undermine the binary character that our nor-
mative talk about rule-following seems to impose on experience. Although it seems
that whether someone is following a rule or not should be subject to a this binary
classification, a sharp distinction between behaving randomly and following a rule
correctly is difficult to pin down precisely. Because of that, we might feel the urge
to project the distinction onto the rules themselves. Maybe we cannot always say
whether an application of a rule is correct or incorrect, but surely, we feel, there
are criteria of correctness corresponding to the rule. However, if we just consider
Remark 6.1.2 (p. 149) again, we see how it is problematic to think that rules come
with their own criterion of correctness. If the rule cannot by itself determine its
own interpretation, it certainly cannot determine which possible interpretations are
right or wrong.
Similar considerations are made in §§139-141 about the aforementioned example
of the cube. In particular, the question of whether or not a mental picture of a cube
could determine the use of the word ‘cube’ is also a question of normativity. The
example of a method of projection under which one could consider the use of the
word ‘cube’ when pointing to a triangular prism is advanced to defy the intuition
that, when one understands the word ‘cube’ (in this case as a picture in the mind)
one is in possession of the criteria establishing the correct uses of the word:
What was the effect of my argument? It called our attention to (re-
minded us of) the fact that there are other processes, besides the one
we originally thought of, which we should sometimes be prepared to call
“applying the picture of a cube”. So our ‘belief that the picture forced
a particular application upon us’ consisted in the fact that only the one
case and no other occurred to us. (2009, §140b, p. 61e)
3Case in point, the sequence ‘8, 2, 9, 4, 5, 1, 3, 7, 6, 0’ was created using a pseudorandom number
generator, a computer program which follows a deterministic algorithm to produce, from a so-
called seed value, sequences of numbers that share properties with truly random sequences. A
pupil producing such a sequence could thus ultimately be interpreted as making a systematic
mistake. One would need only to find the right value for the seed that would generate such a
sequence, and describe the pupil as following a rule: the pseudorandom algorithm.
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The belief that language contains in itself a normative force is to a certain extent
attributable to the feeling we are struck with when encountering familiar words.
But an exercise in imagination can make us see that there are additional cases
that, although at first sight seem to be incorrect uses (e.g. ‘cube’ for a triangular
prism), can be made correct without changing our understanding of the original
word (e.g. by considering different methods of projection). These observations can
be summarized in the following remark:
Remark 6.1.3 A rule cannot contain its own criteria of correctness.
In order to strengthen these remarks, Wittgenstein accompanies them with a
diagnosis of the origins of the problems. Unsurprisingly, the intuitions criticized
are seen as arising from the same source as philosophical confusions in general (see
again Section 3.1): misunderstanding language and the ways we talk. This is first
broached in §81 in relation to logic. Wittgenstein observes that “in philosophy
we often compare the use of words with games, calculi with fixed rules” (2009,
§81a, pp. 42e-43e). This, he claims, can mislead one into thinking that language
approximates such calculi. An example is the expectation that formal logic could
provide an accurate model of natural language. But, Wittgenstein insists:
[. . . ] logic does not treat of language – or of thought – in the sense in
which a natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and the most
that can be said is that we construct ideal languages. (2009, §81a, p. 43e)
Overlooking the status of the comparison and taking the analogy too far can lead
us into “thinking that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it, he is
thereby operating a calculus according to definite rules” (2009, §81b, p. 43e). Even
if formal logic could be used to describe regularities in natural language in terms of
rules, this would not imply that someone who is using natural language is following
those rules in a material sense. The latter is not necessarily the case, as the previous
remarks emphasize.
We are again facing the issue of conflating different perspectives on rules. To
describe someone’s behavior as following a rule is simply to provide a hypothesis or
a model to sum up what one observes (§156g). We do this by identifying regularities
and paying attention to characteristic signs of mistakes and correct actions in how
others react to them (§54), which we identify based on our knowledge of shared
human behavior (§206c). But these kind of descriptions need not (and should not)
be taken as committed to the idea that the agents so described are making use of
rules in a material sense, nor that they would necessarily justify their behavior in
terms of those rules that we attribute to them.
152 CHAPTER 6. RULES AND MEANING
Another source of misunderstandings stems from our familiarity with natural
language. One reason why we might feel that a rule compels a certain application,
or that a word determines its own usage, is our being used to applying the rule or
using the word in a certain way, which can blind us to the possibility of alternatives.
The case of the application of the word ‘cube’ (§§141-142) was already discussed
above. Another clear statement of this issue pertaining to the case of reading can
be found in §§166-171, where Wittgenstein contrasts the cases of reading a familiar
versus a strange sign. Whereas an unfamiliar sign does not immediately elicit a
specific sound to us, the feeling is different with a letter of the alphabet we normally
use or words in a language that we do recognize. In the latter case, it feels like
the connection is not merely arbitrary. Familiar signs make a deep impression on
us (§167), we have the feeling that they cause our utterances (§169), as if the signs
themselves guide our behavior (§170) and intimate their sounds to us (§171).
These are possible ways one would describe the experience of reading a familiar
sign when trying to look closer into the activity of reading. But we need to be
careful not to be misled into attributing these properties to our actual experience:
But now, just read a few sentences in print as you usually do when you
are not thinking about the concept of reading, and ask yourself whether
you had such experiences of unity, of being influenced, and so on, as
you read. – Don’t say you had them unconsciously! Nor should we
be misled by the picture of these phenomena coming forth ‘on closer
inspection’. (2009, §171b, p. 76e)
With the association sign-sound serving as an example of a rule, the danger seems to
lie in conflating the justificatory with the material conceptions, i.e. in taking our a
posteriori justifications of rule-following behavior as evidence that our actions made
explicit use of rules all along.
Another example reiterates this point in §§175-178. Wittgenstein asks us to
make an arbitrary doodle on a piece of paper, and subsequently make a copy of it
by letting ourselves be guided by the original. Again, it is said that nothing special
seems to be going on while we are performing this task. But afterwards, when we
reflect upon it and are asked (or ask ourselves) how it was that we managed to do
it, we are tempted to explain the experience in certain terms, and project elements
of that explanation back onto the experience. This is not because we necessarily
remember it as such, but because we are looking at it through the medium of the
terms that we use to provide such explanations (§177).
Finally, this issue is mentioned again in the context of the example of a machine:
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When does one have the thought that a machine already contains its
possible movements in some mysterious way? – Well, when one is doing
philosophy. And what lures us into thinking that? The kind of way in
which we talk about the machine. (2009, §194a, p. 84e)
The point is clear, and applies to the problems of rule-following in general. The issues
raised in Remarks 6.1.1, 6.1.2 (p. 149), and 6.1.3 (p. 151) attempt to dismantle two
intuitions: first, that knowledge of a rule is necessary and sufficient for generating or
understanding behavior that exhibits a regularity; and second, that a rule can be self-
sufficient and carry with it its own criteria of correctness. According to Wittgenstein,
these intuitions stem from the way we describe regularities or justify or own behavior
in terms of rules. Conflating these descriptive and justificatory practices with a
material conception can mislead us into hypostatizing rules as necessarily underlying
regularities in our practices, and attributing them inflated powers in those practices:
Remark 6.1.4 We are misled into hypostatizing rules and projecting special powers
onto them by the ways we talk about behavior that exhibits regularities.
In summary, Wittgenstein’s perspective seems to be that rules are often misun-
derstood. Some of our behavior exhibits regularities. We often talk about this type
of behavior in terms of rules: we can describe others, or justify our own actions,
as following a rule. To take these descriptions or justifications as evidence that
rules necessarily underlie such behavior is to incur in a misunderstanding. Once we
make that leap, another confusion that can easily follow is to think that rules have
the ability, by themselves, to guide or even force our choices and actions. These
misguided intuitions can form part of a picture of language where linguistic entities
have the capability independently determining their own meaning. In order to resist
these misunderstandings, Wittgenstein intersperses the discussion with additional
remarks that give hints towards an alternative conception of rules and rule-following.
6.2 An alternative picture
The path to an alternative picture of rule-following can start by reminding our-
selves that there are various roles rules can play in different language-games, and
that there are various activities we can characterize in terms of following a rule.
For example, in reference to the language-game of colored square of §48 (see again
Section 3.2), in §53 Wittgenstein imagines different scenarios in which one could
say that a sign in that game names a square of a certain color. This includes the
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teaching of the game being done in a particular way, or there being a chart estab-
lishing a correspondence between signs and elements in the game, to be either used
in teaching, resolving disputes, or as an actual tool in the use of the language. This
is subsequently reiterated for rules in general:
Just think of the kinds of case where we say that a game is played
according to a particular rule.
The rule may be an aid in teaching the game. The learner is told it and
given practice in applying it. – Or it is a tool of the game itself. – Or a
rule is employed neither in the teaching nor in the game itself; nor is it
set down in a list of rules. One learns the game by watching how others
play it. But we say that it is played according to such-and-such rules
because an observer can read these rules off from the way the game is
played – like a natural law governing the play. (2009, §54, p. 31e)
These scenarios are examples of cases where we are likely to characterize practices
in terms of rule-following according to the material and descriptive conceptions of
rules. We can imagine an explicit rule as a tool, either involved in the teaching of
a practice, or used in the practice itself. But we can also imagine both activities
conducted without any employment of an explicit rule, but in a way that an external
observer could describe as involving rules by extrapolating those from the observed
regularities. Wittgenstein makes this observation, I believe, as a reminder for us not
to conflate the two.
We are also confronted with various possibilities regarding other examples of
activities that we might characterize as involving rule-following. In §151, we are
given several descriptions of the behavior, and hypotheses of the mental experiences,
of an agent B that is trying to find a rule for number series used by another agent
A. As A writes down series of numbers, B can mentally try out explicit algebraic
formulas until the next number confirms his suppositions, he can be watching “with
a certain feeling of tension” while “all sorts of vague thoughts float through his
head” (2009, §151c, p. 65e), or he simply recognizes the series with ease without
even thinking about it. Similar scenarios are presented in §§156-171 for the activity
of reading, and in §172 for the experience of being guided.
The exploration of the various experiences one might go through when involved
in an activity that could be characterized as following a rule, and of the alternative
ways an external observer might describe such experiences, serves to suggest that
we might be in the presence of a family of cases (see in particular §164) and that,
therefore, there might not be one feature that occurs in all cases. The lesson is that
“we must be on our guard against thinking that there is some totality of conditions
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corresponding to the nature of each case” (2009, §183, p. 80e). It is thus important
to keep the following in mind:
Remark 6.2.1 Rules can have various roles in a game; there is a diverse number
of activities and experiences that we can characterize as following a rule.
Another observation that can help us form a different picture of rule-following
is realizing that when we follow a rule, even an explicit one, we ultimately do so
blindly (§219). One might feel a certain discomfort in following the regress argu-
ments advanced by some remarks in the previous section. This is because, in our
everyday practices, when we make use of a table in a way similar to the language-
game of §86, we don’t feel the need for an infinite chain of additional schemata to
clarify how to interpret the table; we simply use it. When we need to continue a se-
ries that we are familiar with, we act with perfect assurance, without being troubled
by the lack of self-sufficient reasons (§212). Even if there are steps of interpretation,
we eventually reach a point where we simply need to stop the regress in order to
act. In general, at a certain step in the chain, we ultimately “read the lips of the
rule and act, without appealing to anything else for guidance” (2009, §228, p. 93e).
Additionally, when we justify our behavior in terms of rules, we are also not
prepared to further appeal to rules for those rules, and so on ad infinitum. If asked
why we produce certain sounds when reading text in a familiar language, we justify it
by the letters which are there (§169b) and probably cannot give any further reasons.
Once we exhaust our justifications, and we eventually do, we are left with nothing
more than the observation: “This is simply what I do.” (2009, §217, p. 91e) This is
not to deny that we can sometimes characterize one rule in terms of another, but
simply to observe that even when we do have a chain of such justifications, at some
point we are at a loss to provide more.
How do we get to produce rule-like behavior, or get to understand regularities
in terms of rules as we do? Wittgenstein’s answer is that we learn this simply by
training. The pupil in the language-game in §86 learns to use the chart by being
trained, which may include for example learning to pass his finger horizontally from
left to right. We also learn to use a number series by a process of training like the
one described in §145 (see also §189b). Thus a causal connection between explicit
rules and rule-following is established: we are trained to react in a certain way to a
particular rule or sign, and so we do react to it (§198). Wittgenstein’s description
of the process of teaching a rule to a pupil is as mundane as it is intuitive:
I do it, he does it after me; and I influence him by expressions of agree-
ment, rejection, expectation, encouragement. I let him go his way, or
156 CHAPTER 6. RULES AND MEANING
hold him back; and so on.
Imagine witnessing such teaching. None of the words would be explained
by means of itself; there would be no logical circle. (2009, §208cd, p. 89e)
We can all recognize such a process by having been on at least one side of it in our
lives. And we can then see how it is possible to learn to follow a rule without the
need for an infinite chain of explanations or interpretations; the process is simply
anchored in shared human behavior (§206).
An important thing to note about this perspective is that, although a backstop
for the regress problem is being suggested, it is of a different kind of that proposed
by the hypothetical foundationalist. It is not that certain rules are special and
thus immune to reinterpretation. The point summarized in Remark 6.1.2 (p. 149)
still holds. It is rather that when an agent follows a rule they have, at some point
in the infinite chain of possible re-interpretations, acted without questioning an
interpretation. A possibility of doubt need not force one to doubt. One can take the
chart of §86, appreciate the various possible schemas of interpretation, but simply
choose one and use it to determine which building stone to hand over when observing
a certain sign. Naturally, because of the possibility of other interpretations, success
is not fully guaranteed. But, given one’s training and experience in the practice, it
is possible to have a feeling of how likely one is to get it right. It is also a highly
contingent and subjective backstop. Just because one person in one instance decided
to stop the regress there, does not imply that they will do so in other circumstances,
or that others do exactly the same.
We can summarize these points in the following remark:
Remark 6.2.2 When we follow a rule, we ultimately do so blindly, and learning to
do so is a matter of training.
But there is more to Wittgenstein’s positive observations. There a number of
characterizations of rule-following in terms of regularities (e.g. §207, §237), customs
(§198, §199, §205, §337), and practices (§197, §202). Starting with the first, in §237,
we are asked to imagine someone intently following a line in a way that reveals no
regularity to us. About this scenario, Wittgenstein says:
We can’t learn his way of following the line from him. Here perhaps we
really would say: “The original seems to intimate to him how he has to
go. But it is not a rule.” (2009, §237, p. 94e)
Note that this is a remark related to the descriptive conception of rules. From a
third-person perspective, one describes some behavior as conducted according to a
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rule only if one can recognize a regularity. The agent might justify his own behavior
in terms of following the line according to a certain rule. And even if he doesn’t, it
is conceivable that he could be making use of an explicit rule as an instrument of
the particular game he is playing. But if we are unable to observe any regularity in
his behavior, we are unlikely to describe him as following a rule. This is perhaps the
reason why, for Wittgenstein, the behaviors we call following a rule do not occur on
only one isolated occasion (§199): one cannot identify a regularity based on a single
occurrence.
These observations extend to language as well. In §142, it is pointed out that
our language-games rely heavily on regularities. In particular, regularities allow us
to expect certain words to be used in a certain way, and to predict a particular
use of a word to be likely to be successful. Wittgenstein talks about normal and
abnormal cases. The former are those situations where the use of a word seems
clearly laid out in advance. We are used to observing others uttering a certain
word in a certain context, or have past experience in using or reacting to a word
in a certain way, and expect these regularities to hold up again in the future. In
abnormal cases, doubt creeps in. But the way we use language in normal cases is not
necessarily invalidated by the abnormal cases. As mentioned before, just because
a doubt is possible does not imply that we need to constantly be in doubt. Our
normal use of language still holds as long as there are regularities to rely on. If that
was not the case, however, our language-games would, according to Wittgenstein,
lose their point (§142). Being able to identify regularities is also crucial for calling
any observed practice a language (§207).
What we call following a rule involves not only a regularity for a single individual,
it involves other individuals as well. In this regard, §199 is key:
Is what we call “following a rule” something that it would be possible for
only one person, only once in a lifetime, to do? – And this is, of course,
a gloss on the grammar of the expression “to follow a rule”.
It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which
only one person followed a rule. (2009, §199b, p. 87e)
The purpose of these remarks is to remind us that there is more to rule-following
than an explicit rule and an isolated individual purportedly following it. For a
behavior to be characterized in terms of following a rule, it is not only important
that it is anchored in and recognized as a regularity, but also that this regularity is a
custom, i.e. an established usage between more than one person. One characterizes
some behavior as following a rule only when it is taken in this broader context. A
custom, like a practice, has a history behind it, and it is passed on and upheld by
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a group. To say that someone is following a rule is to say that that individual is
participating in that practice (§202). Note that these statements are not intended
as metaphysical claims. They are rather, as is pointed out in the same passage, a
remark on how the expression ‘following a rule’ is normally used.
As this applies to practices that involve rule-following in general, it also applies
to language in particular:
To follow a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of
chess, are customs (usages, institutions).
To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To under-
stand a language means to have mastered a technique. (2009, §199bc,
p. 87e)
Making a report and giving an order are part of Wittgenstein’s list of examples
of language-games (§23). The rules of language ultimately rest on this edifice of
convention as well (§355). And this is crucial to realize in order to understand
meaning. Words and sentences, to be used meaningfully, need to be embedded in
the larger context of a language (see also §337). This context is usually implicit in the
ways we behave, it forms the scaffolding that makes communication possible (§240).
We can summarize these general points about rules in the following remark:
Remark 6.2.3 Using a rule is a custom, a practice backed by regularities and an
established usage within a group.
It may seem that Remark 6.2.1 (p. 155) precludes the advancement of these gen-
eral positive characterizations of rule-following. If all the practices we characterize as
following a rule belong to a family of cases that do not necessarily share one common
set of properties, how can one justify the general claims of Remarks 6.2.2 (p. 156)
and 6.2.3 (p. 158)? The relevance of the first remark is exactly to keep one from
taking the remaining observations as forming the basis of a theory of rule-following.
They simply serve as observations to keep in mind when reflecting on rule-following
behavior to avoid falling prey to the urges of precision and universality that can lead
to the misunderstandings identified in the first place.
6.3 Rules in signaling games
How are these considerations relevant in the context of the signaling games frame-
work? We can start by thinking of how signaling games could potentially illuminate
Wittgenstein’s remarks. In his discussion of rule-following, Wittgenstein often uses
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tables, schemas, or charts as examples of rules. One can see these as devices that
make explicit some direct relation between two sets of elements, like signs and build-
ing stones in the game of §86. One immediate parallel that comes to mind when
considering this kind of examples is between rules and signaling strategies. Much like
these examples of rules, signaling strategies establish relations, either between states
and messages (for the sender), or between messages and actions (for the receiver).
But, as we have seen in Chapter 2, there are many possible ways of interpreting
what these strategies represent.
Lewis (1969) based his considerations on the traditional game-theoretic approach
of speculating about individual agents making rational choices in an interactive
setting. Within this picture, he viewed signaling strategies as possible contingency
plans. Agents would consider alternative strategies, calculate their expected utilities,
compare them to each other (for example in the manner illustrated in Table 2.1),
and choose one to commit to for playing the game. The chosen strategy presumably
serves, during actual play, as a guide that the sender (resp. receiver) makes use of for
deciding the choice of message (resp. action) when confronted with a certain state
(resp. message). This evokes a lot of similarities with the material conception of
rules. Strategies can be seen as instruments, explicit rules used by agents to guide
their behavior.
There are many practices where we do make use of and have to coordinate on
explicit rules. Suppose Alice and Bob, from the example given in Section 2.1, cannot
communicate directly since they are meeting in secret. Bob can see Alice’s balcony
from his window, so they sit down to agree on a code Alice can use to signal Bob in
the future whether she wants to go to Café One or Bistro Two. Alice can hang either
a red or a blue scarf on her balcony, and Bob will use this to decide where he goes
to meet her. They analyze their options by considering something like Table 2.1,
conclude that they are better off using one of the two possible signaling systems.
They choose one, each writes their own part down, and go their separate ways. The
next day, Alice wants to meet Bob in Café One. Not remembering the agreed upon
code, she consults the piece of paper where she wrote it down, and hangs a scarf of
the appropriate color on her balcony. Bob, upon seeing the signal (and also having
a bad memory) looks up in his own piece of paper which place he is supposed to go
to given the color of the hung scarf.
In this example, Alice and Bob are each following rules in a material sense.
Alice wrote down a sender strategy, and Bob a receiver strategy. The scenario can
be modeled as the binary signaling game presented in Section 2.1. This in turn can
be used to make explicit why Alice and Bob behave the way that they do, or to
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speculate on a number of other issues. One can use to model to explore, for example
what could happen if one or both were to lose their papers, what the role of repeated
play and memory limitations could be, what could happen if preferences suddenly
changed, among many other things. These are all valid and potentially interesting
questions to explore. Problems only arise if one tries to overgeneralizes this picture.
As Wittgenstein reminds us, not all instances of what we call following a rule require
knowledge or use of explicit instructions (Remark 6.1.1, p. 145). This would make
such a picture limited to the cases where we do. Additionally, if this story is supposed
to illuminate questions of meaning, one should not forget that explicit rules can be
variously interpreted (Remark 6.1.2, p. 149). The material picture does not give us
a better understanding of how the strategy itself is understood by the agents.
I have been discussing the possibility of seeing strategies as rules, but this might
be too narrow. Many characteristics of strategies that motivate the comparison
depend on their place as a part of a broader context of a signaling game. Perhaps
the appropriate comparison is rather between rule-following and conventions. This
is something that Lewis himself explores (1969, pp. 100-107). He suggests that most
conventions4, including those involving signaling, can be naturally understood as
rules. However, he also argues that not everything we call a rule can be framed
in terms of convention, and gives a number of counterexamples. He concludes the
following:
We might be tempted to try distinguishing several senses of the word
“rule,” hoping that one of them would agree with my definition of con-
vention. I doubt that the project would succeed. [. . . ] We seem to be
dealing with an especially messy cluster concept, and one in which the
relative importance of different conditions varies with the subject mat-
ter, with the contrasts one wants to make, and with one’s philosophical
preconceptions. (1969, p. 105)
Prima facie, a comparison between rule-following and Lewis’ notion of convention
would be inadequate according to the author’s own opinion. Sillari (2013) argues
that, nevertheless, “all rules pertinent to Wittgensteinian rule-following involve a
conventional element and hence can be analyzed as pertaining to situations [. . . ] con-
sistent with Lewis’s analysis of convention in terms of coordination” (2013, p. 876). I
think that an appreciation of Remark 6.2.1 (p. 155) shows that Wittgenstein proba-
bly had a similar position to Lewis’ on this matter, and that any attempt at equating
rules and conventions is likely to be unsuccessful. But, even if not all rules are con-
4Lewis mentions that there are potential exceptions to this (1969, pp. 104-105).
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ventions, nor vice versa, I agree that the two notions are close enough to motivate
a comparison, even if Lewis would disagree.
Consider Lewis’ first definition5 of convention:
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when they
are agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if, in any
instance of S among members of P ,
1. everyone conforms to R;
2. everyone expects everyone else to conform to R;
3. everyone prefers to conform to R on condition that the others do,
since S is a coordination problem and uniform conformity to R is
a proper coordination equilibrium in S. (1969, p. 42)
There are a lot of connections between this definition and Remark 6.2.3 (p. 158).
Wittgenstein’s appeal to customs and practices is designed to draw attention to
the idea that one can be said to follow a rule when one’s behavior is embedded
in a context of the kind spelled out by Lewis. To follow a rule is to repeat a
pattern of established behavior in a population. The behavior is a known regularity
as a response to a recurrent situation which, for that very reason, is expected by
other agents in the population to be repeated. In a Lewis convention, conformity is
preferred since it is the optimal behavior for all agents involved. In rule-following,
this might not always be the case. Lewis’s definition is obviously stricter and more
precise than Wittgenstein’s appeal to customs6, but they both evoke similar ideas.
One aspect of rule-following that can be better understood by looking into re-
search on signaling games has to do with the notion of blind action. One of Wittgen-
stein’s remarks on this topic is a reminder that, when we follow a rule, our behavior is
ultimately anchored in conduct that is not a process of interpretation (Remark 6.2.2,
p. 156). Sillari (2013, pp. 885-888) argues that the evolutionary game theory ap-
proach to signaling games gives us a way to capture this insight7. Instead of thinking
of strategies as instruments used by Alice and Bob, one can see them as simply rep-
resenting regularities observed in the behavior of individual agents or populations
thereof. This interpretation need not make any assumption about the cognitive ca-
5The final definition (1969, p. 78) is more refined, but for the purpose of this discussion, I
believe that this first rough definition should suffice.
6See also the contrast with other related notions (agreement, social contracts, norms, confor-
mative behavior, and imitation) given by Lewis (1969, pp. 83-121).
7Although I agree with this point, I disagree with the application to Kripke’s paradox provided
(Sillari, 2013, pp. 887-888).
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pacities of those agents. We can see them as black-boxes, and ultimately even think
of their behavior as simply hard-wired.
When we move from a material to a descriptivist stance in this way, the prob-
lematic step of interpretation is removed from the picture. Strategies simply capture
what agents do, while the modeler is agnostic about the way they do it. As Skyrms
(1996) and others have shown (see again Chapter 2), coordination of signaling strate-
gies can emerge in a variety of situations even between extremely simple agents with
hard-wired behavior. Signaling games can help illuminate how regularities in be-
havior between multiple agents can arise as a result of adaptive processes of various
kinds. In particular, this can happen even when one assumes the behavior of the
agents is blind. One may have qualms about calling strategies, under this interpre-
tation, rules. But they do fit the descriptivist conception, as they are hypothesis
that describe an agent’s use of signals. In a signaling equilibrium, agents could be
said to be following rules as their behavior exhibits regularities in the context of
a practice. And as rule-following is a family of cases (Remark 6.2.1, p. 155), such
an interpretation could be said to capture some of those cases. Strategies, under
this interpretation, can at least be said to capture behavior that, although poten-
tially consisting of purely blind action, can develop to become highly regular and
systematic in a mutually rewarding way.
Not all cases of rule-following involve only blind action. As mentioned before,
following a rule in a material sense can require a certain number of steps of interpre-
tation. Alice and Bob, in the example above, interpret the strategies that they wrote
down on paper. But they don’t, one presumes, need to further interpret the sym-
bols used to write those strategies down. A step of blind action supports a further
step of interpretation. Such complex processes can be explored using the signaling
games framework. Barrett (2013b) gives an example of this. He proposes a model
to capture the transitive behavior of pinyon and scrub jays. These birds can infer
a linear order of colored elements by being trained on pairwise similarities between
those elements. Barrett suggests that this could be explained by the evolution of
two systems: a basic system that can learn to classify two stimuli in terms of their
relative order, and a higher-order system that can in effect perform the transitive
closure using the results of the basic system. Similar hypotheses about hierarchical
processes could perhaps be explored further using models of multi-level selection or
hypergames (briefly discussed in Section 4.3). These ideas are highly speculative,
and their connection with Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations would need
to be made much more explicit, but I see them as providing a glimpse to future
research on the topic.
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There is another important aspect of rule-following where the parallel with Lewis
conventions can be informative. The discussion leading up to Remark 6.1.3 (p. 151)
summarizes Wittgenstein’s considerations about the normativity of rules. These
try to address a common intuition: that there is a sense in which rules “ought to”
be followed. This can ramify into a number of other ideas, fueled by the ways we
talk about rule-following (Remark 6.1.4, p. 153). Wittgenstein discusses one way in
which normativity takes shape: the idea that, given an expression of a rule, there is
a correct way of following it. In particular, he dispels the thought that the criteria
of correctness for the application of a rule could somehow be contained in it.
Not many positive remarks are given on normativity, but we can try to surmise
a sketch of a more positive account from Wittgenstein’s other remarks. They, I
believe, can give us hints on how to conceive of the normative aspect of rule-following
without falling prey to the usual problems. First, as mentioned before, our feelings
of correct and incorrect applications of rules come from our familiarity with them.
Via training (Remark 6.2.2, p. 156), we internalize certain ways to react to, or
interpret, rules expressed as signs or orders. We end up following them blindly and
thus often find it difficult to even conceive of alternative reactions or interpretations
of familiar rules. Making use of a chart by associating the elements horizontally,
following a signpost in a certain direction, identifying whether something is or is not
a cube, continuing a number series based on the formula, interpreting a pointing
gesture, pronouncing a letter or word, and so forth, all of these activities strike us
as already containing their own criteria of correctness because of how one particular
way of performing them was inculcated upon us. As following a rule is a custom
(Remark 6.2.3, p. 158), these feelings are further reinforced by us observing others
participating in those practices, or by participating in them ourselves. The same
characteristic expressions of agreement, rejection, expectation, or encouragement
used by a tutor to train a pupil in following a rule, are continuously used throughout
our rule-following practices. Not only can we observe the regularities in the rule-
following behavior itself, but also in its correction or reinforcement (what one could
call the meta-behavior). A way to further try to clarify these ideas is to look at how
similar issues arise in the context of Lewis’ notion of convention.
There are two ways in which Lewis sees conventions as a “species of norms” (1969,
pp. 97-100). The first has to do with instrumental rationality. Behaving in accor-
dance to a convention is, given the structure of the coordination problem and the
expected conformance of others, the choice that optimizes an agent’s expected utility.
Given that the latter represents, in Lewis’s interpretation, the agent’s preferences,
and assuming that the agent is instrumentally rational, one could say that he “ought
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to” conform since using the strategy established by the convention is the choice that
best answers directly to his preferences. Consider Alice and Bob again. Having
agreed explicitly on a code to coordinate their next meeting place, and having no
reasons to believe Bob would not conform to the signaling convention, it seems that
Alice ought to follow the agreed-upon strategy since it is supposedly in her own
interest to meet Bob.
The second way in which conventions have an element of normativity, according
to Lewis, has to do with the expectation of social retaliation. Given that conformity
to the convention answers not only to the agent’s own preferences, but also to the
preferences of others involved, it seems reasonable to expect that failure to conform
is likely to be met with some form of punishment. If Alice flouts the convention
and sends Bob the signal she was supposed to send when interested in going to Café
One, but actually goes to Bistro Two, Bob might feel offended to have been stood
up and refuse to meet Alice again. Alice ought to abide by the convention if she
wants to avoid this kind of potential consequence.
The problem with these two ways in which some normativity can be argued
to be present in Lewis conventions is that they arise from sources external to the
framework (Guala, 2013). The agents’ instrumental rationality is simply assumed
by most game theory models. Although, as was mentioned in Section 2.2, some
models that relax that assumption have been proposed, agents are always seen as
striving for utility maximization even when their limited cognitive resources or other
external factors prevent them from fully reaching that goal. Because it is built into
the models by design, it is not something that can be studied by means of them but
needs to be motivated for independently.
Regarding the second way in which Lewis sees normativity in convention, the
mechanism of retaliation, although it is intuitive and recognizable in our everyday
practices, it is presented in a strictly hypothetical sense and not actually incor-
porated into the framework. There is, therefore, no way to study its impact on
enabling or maintaining conventions. However, there is no reason why this mech-
anism couldn’t be captured. In fact, there is work in game theory that explicitly
models it in the context of speculation about the evolution of cooperation (e.g. Ax-
elrod, 1986; Andrews, Thommes, and Cojocaru, 2015). Although this literature is
related to competitive problems captured in terms of the Prisoner’s dilemma, one
could adapt the idea to apply it to Lewis-style coordination problems. I am not
familiar with any work in the literature that does so, but it seems like an interest-
ing topic for future work. Whether or not it gives any insights into normativity in
natural language remains thus to be seen.
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I have been so far discussing the issues of rule-following in general. Wittgenstein’s
main interest in the topic is, however, not a general theory of what following a rule
is. It is rather the implications of those considerations for questions relating to
language and meaning. Rules play an important role in how we conceive of language
learning and use. Especially since the advent and proliferation of formal education
systems, we have a picture of learning a great deal of language by being taught
explicit rules. We learn rules on how to pronounce and identify certain sounds, rules
on how to combine them into words, and those into sentences. We learn further
rules on how to convert all of those into written text, rules of spelling, hyphenation,
capitalization, punctuation, and so on. This creates an everyday picture of language
as governed by rules. The mainstream scientific view of these aspects of language
is also similar in spirit, even though naturally much more technical8. For example,
Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch suggest that “we can profitably think about language as
a system of rules placed within a hierarchy of increasing complexity.” (2002, p. 1577)
Although Wittgenstein’s considerations on rule-following could probably help shine
a different light on this picture (e.g. Waller, 1977), I will not be concerned with rules
relating to phonology, morphology, or syntax here.
Wittgenstein’s main underlying target has rather to do with particular intuitions
regarding meaning. One way to see meaning as governed by rules is to see it in
terms of the correspondence picture. If linguistic expressions have meanings, one
would expect there to be rules on which linguistic expressions correspond to which
meanings, so that one could associate the two in a systematic way. Both language
production and understanding could then be imagined as processes that are guided
by these rules. This picture goes along with a strong perspective on normativity.
There is a right way of using or understanding a linguistic expression, by pairing
the expression with its correct meaning (the meaning determined by the rule), and
a wrong way, by failing to do so. Most problems with this picture were discussed in
Chapter 5, but there are additional ones that are best seen in light of Wittgenstein’s
remarks on rule-following.
One important issue has to do with the determinacy of meaning. Talk about lin-
guistic expressions having meanings goes together with talk about what the meaning
of a word or a sentence is. Many theories of meanings qualify these statements in
various ways (see Speaks, 2018). One could say that the linguistic expression by
itself is not sufficient to determine its meaning, it needs to be paired with a context
of utterance. Perhaps this does not yet determine meaning, but only an intension
which needs to be evaluated in each particular circumstance. Perhaps it is not only
8In order to see this, it suffices to browse through any introductory text on modern linguistics,
e.g. Akmajian et al. (2017).
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an intension, but a Fregean content which determines a Russelian content which
in turn determines an intension (Speaks, 2018, Figure 4). Whatever the number
of additional elements and levels of indirection added, all of these theories share
the idea that, given enough of those, one can determine the meaning of a linguistic
expression.
In this respect, I side with Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein as presenting
a case against the idea that there is ever an objective fact of the matter as to the
meaning of a linguistic expression (Kripke, 1982). As summarized in Remark 6.1.2
(p. 149), rules are always up for interpretation. This includes rules associating an
expression directly with its meaning, or with its character, or associating a character
and a context to a content, or an intension and a circumstance to a referent, or what
have you. Even though when we follow a rule we do so blindly (Remark 6.2.2, p. 156),
that does not mean we could not have potentially acted otherwise.
With this in mind, I would like to return to some attempts at defining meaning in
the context of the signaling games framework beyond those discussed in Section 5.4.
Lewis (1969, pp. 143-152) proposes that we can extend the idea that a signal in a
signaling system can conventionally mean either that a state holds, or that a certain
action should be performed, to think of signals as indicative or imperative. Lewis
characterizes this in terms of how much discretion the strategies allow the respective
agents. If the sender strategy does not give the sender freedom to deliberate about
which signal to send given the state that holds, but the receiver strategy gives
the receiver freedom to deliberate about which action to perform when receiving
a certain message, the signal is indicative. If the sender strategy gives the sender
freedom to deliberate, but the receiver strategy does not give the receiver freedom
to do so, the signal is imperative. If neither strategy is discretionary, or if both are,
the signal is said to be neutral.
Consider again Lewis’ example of the coordination problem between Paul Re-
vere and the sexton of the Old North Church (Lewis, 1969, pp. 122-125). A non-
discretionary receiver strategy could specify, for example, that “If one lantern is
observed hanging in the belfry, warn the countryside that the redcoats are coming
by land”. A discretionary variant could say something along the lines of “If one
lantern is observed hanging in the belfry, do whatever seems best on the assumption
that the redcoats were observed setting out by land” (1969, p. 145). The idea is
that the latter gives Paul Revere the freedom to determine his own actions, whereas
the former does not. The signal of hanging one lantern in the belfry would have an
imperative character in the first case, but not in the second. The main problem with
this suggestion is that, if we see strategies as rules in a material sense, Remark 6.1.2
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(p. 149) must lead us to see all strategies as ultimately discretionary. Paul Revere
can take the first instruction and, as with the second, do as he pleases when observ-
ing one lantern in the belfry. Even though it would feel strange if he would warn the
countryside that the redcoats are coming by sea, the rule can in principle always be
interpreted otherwise than what seems familiar to us.
Could a descriptivist account make a difference? This is, to a certain extent,
what Lewis actually has in mind. The distinction was originally made in terms
of how one can “properly describe” a signal as a signal-that, meaning that a state
holds, or as a signal-to, meaning that a certain action should be performed (1969,
p. 144). The description is thus a third person perspective on the system. Huttegger
(2007b) extends these notions of indicative and imperative meaning to agents with
lower cognitive capacities by incorporating deliberation, as “any mechanism that
processes information inputs and eventually leads to an output” (2007, p. 410),
into an evolutionary signaling game. Zollman (2011) revisits this and proposes yet
another way to flesh out this distinction using a model with multiple receivers. In my
opinion, none of these attempts succeed. By taking a descriptivist stance towards
strategies, they leave the task of finding a description of the meaning of signals up to
the third party observer. What they need, in order to make the distinction between
indicative and imperative meaning, is for there to be situations where a signal can
only be described in terms of either indicating that a state holds or commanding
an action to be performed. The problem is that neither the strategies, nor the
larger context of the game can strictly determine the signals interpretation. If we
see strategies as rules in a descriptivist sense, Wittgenstein’s maxim (Remark 6.1.2,
p. 149) again directly applies, but now to the third party observer who is to interpret
them in the context of the game: where one sees an indicative signal that lets the
receiver deliberate, another can see it as an imperative signal to deliberate.
Zollman is well aware of the problem9 when it comes to the proposals of Lewis
and Huttegger (Zollman, 2011, pp. 161-162, 164). He advances his own model to try
to address the issue, but ultimately needs to acknowledge that perhaps the problem
is not solved after all:
It seems clear that in this case the plausibility of the two translations is
stretched further than it was before, but not that those translations are
somehow impossible. However, those who would point out that we have
not eliminated the possibility of devising both indicative (or assertive)
and imperative (or directive) translations of Sig A might have difficulty
9Zollman (2011) talks about what I have been calling interpretations of the meaning of signals
as translations into English.
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describing what would be necessary to demonstrate that such a real
distinction exists. (2011, p. 168)
The burden of proof is shifted to those who would like to demonstrate a real distinc-
tion between indicative and imperative meaning, but are bothered by the possibility
that different interpretations seem to always be possible. Such a possibility under-
mines the distinction because it purports to be a “real distinction”, i.e. objective
and independent of interpretation. But perhaps the conclusion should rather be
that the apparently unshakable problem that a signal (or a whole strategy, or a
whole signaling game model) can always be interpreted otherwise just shows that
the distinction these authors are seeking cannot be made a priori in an objective
way.
The difficulty in upholding the distinction has to do with the lack of determinacy
of meaning, and this is a direct consequence of the problem of interpretation raised
by Wittgenstein. There is no rule that forces an interpretation upon us, and there
is no linguistic expression that determines its own meaning. One might feel that
a particular description of the use of a signal is more proper than others, as Lewis
(1969, p. 144) puts it, or that one translation is much less plausible than another, as
Zollman (2011, p. 168) puts it, but these judgments are vague (no characterization
of what makes a description proper, or a translation plausible, is given), subjective,
and based on intuitions and feelings of familiarity. The distinction is something that
an individual can make, but it is not in any way an objective property that a signal,
a signaling system, or a language has independently of interpretation.
In the previous sections I mentioned three conceptions of rules, but here I talked
so far only about the material and the descriptivist. The reason for ignoring the third
one is that the justificatory conception of rules does not have a good parallel in the
signaling games framework. First of all, it would only make sense in interpretations
of strategies as representing individual agents rather than populations. Second,
models are typically (if not always) designed with a third person perspective in mind.
There is therefore no room to capture what an agent would give as a justification
for their behavior if asked for it. It would make sense that a rational agent using
strategies as instruments would appeal to them in such a situation, but such a
behavior is not spelled out in any model that I know of in the literature.
In conclusion, I argued that signaling games can help illuminate some of Wittgen-
stein’s positive remarks on rule-following, in particular his notion of blind action and
his appeal to custom and practice. The connection between the two can additionally
inspire more detailed proposals on how to account for the connection between blind
action and interpretation, as well as possibilities for modeling normativity in nat-
6.3. RULES IN SIGNALING GAMES 169
ural language. Wittgenstein’s more skeptic remarks are also important for keeping
us from falling prey to some intuitive urges with regards to interpretations of the
signaling games framework. In particular, they should avert us from conceiving of
meaning as determined by rules.

Conclusions
In this thesis, I tried to explore some connections between Wittgenstein’s later
philosophy and the framework of signaling games. I focused on the four major
themes in the Philosophical Investigations that seemed more relevant to the task:
Wittgenstein’s remarks on method, his picture of language, his criticism of meaning
as a form of correspondence, and his remarks on rules and rule-following. The
objective was to shine light in two directions. First, if signaling games provide a way
to study language that is largely in line with Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, this
insight can direct those who appreciate the latter to a more systematic set of tools
that can help push it forward. Second, those who already appreciate the usefulness
of signaling games for exploring hypothesis about language use can benefit from
Wittgenstein’s critical insights into one’s philosophical presuppositions. This can
further be relevant to the interpretation and use of signaling game models. I hope
that I succeeded in showing that there is indeed a close fit between Witgenstein’s
later philosophy and the framework of signaling games, and that there are lessons
to be drawn in both directions regarding each of the four major themes addressed.
In Chapter 3, I delved into issues of methodology in philosophy. I argued that
Wittgenstein’s negative remarks are directed not against particular methods, but
rather at an idealizing10 attitude that can send philosophers in pursuit of chimeras. I
also defended that an alternative pragmatist attitude can be surmised fromWittgen-
stein’s remarks on explanations of meaning, and his own use of toy language-games.
One can further see many similarities between the latter method and the use of
models in the signaling games literature. However, the risk of taking an idealizing
attitude always looms. A method (especially the history of its use) can promote a
different attitude, but it cannot enforce it. That is why it is important to under-
stand Wittgenstein’s warnings and always keep a pragmatist attitude in mind when
making use and interpreting signaling game models. The signaling games framework
provides useful tools to better understand the complexities of communication, but
it should not be taken as a theory of meaning, or be used in a way that falls prey
to the urges of the idealizing attitude.
Chapter 4 characterizes the picture of language and meaning that I argue is en-
dorsed in the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein describes language in terms
of practice, drawing attention to the involvement of agents, the interconnection with
other activities, the importance of purpose, and its heterogeneity and dynamism.
10In an everyday sense, not to be taken to refer to the schools of thought in philosophy commonly
known as idealism.
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In the context of this picture, I defend that it is best to interpret Wittgenstein’s
remarks on use as methodological advice: if you want to better understand meaning,
investigate how linguistic expressions are used. I argued that the signaling games
framework allows one to embrace this picture of language quite well, by incorporat-
ing agents, actions, and purpose by design. Most approaches within the framework
promote taking heterogeneity and dynamism into account, some models even help
illuminating those aspects of language further. Considering Wittgenstein’s remarks
additionally reminds us of the open-ended nature of research into language and
meaning. Signaling games are still, in many ways, very limited tools in the face of
the complexity of the phenomena, but the flexibility of the framework allows one to
embrace this and see interesting avenues for future work.
Chapter 5 deals with one of Wittgenstein’s major grievances against most pre-
vailing conceptions of meaning in philosophy. The focus is on rejecting the intuition,
rooted in everyday talk, that linguistic expressions have meanings, like entities that
they carry around or stand in correspondence to. This intuition constitutes what
I called a correspondence picture of meaning. I explored the arguments leveraged
against three incarnations of this idea: externalism, logical atomism, and internal-
ism. I then discussed some ways in which this intuition has slipped into the signaling
games literature, in particular in attempts to define signal meaning in those models.
I argued that these proposals are problematic, especially in light of Wittgenstein’s
remarks. When using the signaling games framework one can, and should, focus on
signal use and “leave meaning to look after itself” (Lewis, 1969, p. 122).
Another major topic in the Philosophical Investigations, which I address in Chap-
ter 6, is rule-following. Wittgenstein’s remarks on the topic touch upon various
misconceptions surrounding the role of rules in shaping our behaviors that exhibit
regularities. Criticism is raised against the ideas that rules are sufficient or even
necessary to explain all of those behaviors, that they can be a source of normativity,
and that they have the power to determine actions or outcomes by themselves. I
discussed the implications these remarks have on interpretations of strategies in sig-
naling games, to what extent there is normativity in those models, and whether or
not one could say that meaning is determined. Some upshots of that discussion are
suggestions for future research, for example in linguistic normativity. Others consti-
tute further criticism of conceptions of signal meaning in deterministic, rule-based
terms.
Overall, my main conclusion is that the signaling games framework fits Wittgen-
stein’s later philosophy of language quite well. It is compatible with his metaphilos-
ophy and methodological practice; it embraces a heterogeneous, dynamic, practice-
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based picture of language; and it can avoid the problems related to correspondence-
based and rule-based conceptions of meaning. Some mismatches point to avenues
for future research, like exploring multi-population dynamics and hypergames, or
developing signaling game models of linguistic normativity. Some of Wittgenstein’s
remarks serve as reminders to be cautious about certain interpretations and uses,
like taking the framework as constituting a theory of meaning, or trying to provide
some definition of signal meaning.
Signaling games are of course limited, in the way all tools are. There are techni-
cal issues, theoretical blind spots, and a lot of room for future work. Signaling game
models mostly focus on very basic linguistic interactions. As such, the approach can
be taken as oversimplifying language. I believe this would be a misinterpretation.
Despite the general focus on basic interactions, no one denies our ability to construct
complex grammatical sentences or use language in highly strategic ways. And some
of the research briefly discussed in Chapter 2 shows that the framework can ac-
commodate for modeling some of these kinds of interactions. In keeping with the
pragmatist attitude advocated in Chapter 3, one should not forget that each model
is tailored to a particular language-game. It would be a mistake to overgeneralize
a particular model as being representative of language as a whole. The framework
cannot, and need not, capture everything there is to be said about language. There
is only a problem if one believes otherwise. I personally think that it is important to
first understand the most simple language-games well before modeling more complex
ones, since the latter build on the former. Problematic intuitions about meaning
can easily creep in if not kept in check. Wittgenstein’s remarks can play the role of
reminders against such urges.
A cornerstone of the Philosophical Investigations is the observation that when we
talk about language we are usually talking about a multifarious and highly complex
phenomenon, a product of the interaction of many moving parts. A contempo-
rary picture of language that I think is very much in line with Wittgenstein’s later
philosophy is summarized in the following passage:
The system consists of multiple agents (the speakers in the speech com-
munity) interacting with one another. The system is adaptive; that is,
speakers’ behavior is based on their past interactions, and current and
past interactions together feed forward into future behavior. A speaker’s
behavior is the consequence of competing factors ranging from percep-
tual constraints to social motivations. The structures of language emerge
from interrelated patterns of experience, social interaction, and cognitive
mechanisms. (Beckner et al., 2009)
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This is what the authors call seeing language as a complex adaptive system. To
embrace this picture is to reject the temptation to reduce language to some static
well-delimited object that can be investigated in isolation. In order to study the
emergent patterns generated by such a complex adaptive system, one needs tools
that take all those elements into account and fully embrace both spatial and temporal
aspects of their interrelations. For various reasons argued throughout this thesis,
I believe that the signaling games framework provides such tools and promotes a
study of meaning along those lines.
Additionally, in order to gain more knowledge of such a complex phenomenon
as language, it is important to embrace a multidisciplinary approach. The signaling
games framework draws inspiration and makes use of concepts from areas such as
economics, biology, psychology, mathematics, physics, and others, depending on the
issues at hand. The philosopher that wishes to better understand language and
meaning needs to be able to reach beyond their field and explore notions from other
areas. This goes hand in hand with a pluralistic methodological stance. The liter-
ature summarized in Chapter 2 makes use of classic game-theoretical notions, like
for example the Nash equilibrium, tools from evolutionary biology, like equations of
population dynamics, general mathematical tools, like graphs representing different
network structures, knowledge from psychology and artificial intelligence, like mod-
els of learning mechanisms, notions from physics, like deterministic chaos, measures
from information theory, like entropy and other metrics to help characterize systems
at a higher level of abstraction, and many others. One should also not refrain from
integrating insights from anthropology, applied linguistics, sociology, experimental
psychology, and other related areas. All of the areas of knowledge mentioned and
their tools can hypothetically be relevant for the task of the philosopher, and none
should be off limits. Philosophy is inevitably an armchair enterprise, but it should
not be a nearsighted one.
Part of Wittgenstein’s aim in the Philosophical Investigations was to open the
eyes and minds of philosophers that, like his early self, tend to underestimate the
complexity of the phenomenon of language. This involved undermining some re-
ductive assumptions and intuitions that formed the foundations of the systematic
approaches to meaning in his purview. But one need not shy away from systematic-
ity in order to reflect on language and meaning along the lines of Wittgenstein’s later
philosophy. I hope to have shown that the framework of signaling games serves as a
good example that one is not incompatible with the other. The similarities between
the two pictures of language, and the added power of mathematical formalization
and computer simulation that the signaling games framework brings to the table,
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make the latter an attractive approach for studying language and meaning that is
both systematic and in line with the Philosophical Investigations.

Appendix A
Towards an ecology of
vagueness∗
Abstract
A vexing puzzle about vagueness, rationality, and evolution runs, in crude
abbreviation, as follows: vague language use is demonstrably suboptimal if the
goal is efficient, precise and cooperative information transmission; hence ra-
tional deliberation or evolutionary selection should, under this assumed goal,
eradicate vagueness from language use. Since vagueness is pervasive and en-
trenched in all human languages, something has to give. In this paper, we fo-
cus on this problem in the context of signaling games. We provide an overview
of a number of proposed ways in which vagueness may come into the picture in
formal models of rational and evolutionary signaling. Most argue that vague
signal use is simply the best we can get, given certain factors. Despite the
plausibility of the proposals, we argue that a deeper understanding of the
benefits of vagueness needs a more ecological perspective, namely one that
goes beyond the local optimization of signaling strategies in a homogeneous
population. As an example of one possible way to expand upon our cur-
rent models, we propose two variants of a novel multi-population dynamic of
imprecise imitation where, under certain conditions, populations with vague
language use dominate over populations with precise language use.
∗The contents of this appendix are a reproduction of the publication with the same title by
Correia and Franke (2019), with potential very minor adjustments. Part of Section A.2 served as
the basis for Section 2.1 and contains some repeated content, but given that it is also interspersed
with remarks not included there, I reproduce it here in its entirety.
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A.1 Vagueness and rationality
The classical philosophical problem of vagueness is most starkly embodied by
the sorites paradox. The original formulation is attributed to Eubulides, an ancient
Megarian philosopher (Sorensen, 2009), and uses the example of a heap of sand: if
no removal of one grain of sand can make a heap into a non-heap, one can repeatedly
remove all but one grain of sand from something that is clearly a heap and be forced
to acknowledge that the remaining single grain of sand is still a heap; otherwise,
it seems, one would have to accept that there is a determinate number of grains
that forms a heap, and anything under it is not a heap. Neither choice is, however,
intuitively satisfying. The paradox is interesting because it can be made general
and re-applied to many other words besides ‘heap’. Predicates for which one can
find a suitable instance of the general formulation of the sorites paradox are called
vague. Paradigmatic examples besides ‘heap’ include ‘tall’, ‘red’, ‘bald’, ‘tadpole’,
and ‘child’ (Keefe and P. Smith, 1999). How widespread is the problem? It is easy to
find more examples of predicates based on more finely grained properties—as ‘tall’ is
intuitively based on height—for which constructing a sorites paradox would be easy.
Mereological nihilists argue that instances of the sorites paradox can be designed
for any material object that can be decomposed into small enough parts. If one
subscribes to the scientific picture of matter as composed of molecules and atoms,
this applies to tables and chairs, cats and mats, and any other ordinary thing (Unger,
1979). Bertrand Russell famously argued (1923) that all words, including “the words
of pure logic,” are vague when used by human beings.
If one thinks of language as governed by logical rules, and of rationality as in-
cluding the ability to follow those rules, the sorites paradox seems prima facie to
demonstrate that vagueness and rationality are incompatible. But one can think of
language in different terms. One possibility is to think of signs as tools agents use
to coordinate actions. An example of a way to formally study language along those
lines is the game-theoretic framework of signaling games (Lewis, 1969). Within such
an approach, rationality can be seen as the ability to choose the use of signs that is
optimal to achieve some form of coordination. The existence of vagueness in such
models would not be at odds with rationality as long as vague languages turn out to
be optimal for the purposes at hand. However, as Barton Lipman (2009) argues in
detail, this is typically not the case. The problem can be put very succinctly as fol-
lows. In standard game-theoretic models of communication, vague signal use yields
a lower expected utility than crisp use. Therefore, given that the dynamics (be it
natural selection, cultural evolution, or rational choice) maximize utility, vagueness
should be weeded out by these forces, giving rise to only precise languages. Thus
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it would be irrational to stick to vague language use when one could (theoretically)
switch to a better system. But vagueness is pervasive in natural language, and there
is no reason to believe it is going away. The problem seems to be a theoretically
serious one, but it does not obviously undermine our everyday linguistic practices.
Most of the time we seem to communicate just fine. Therefore, the issue must
lie with the conceptions we have of the forces or mechanisms that underlie those
practices. Lipman concludes that “we cannot explain the prevalence of vague terms
in natural language without a model of bounded rationality which is significantly
different from anything in the existing literature” (2009, p. 1).
Here we survey proposals for addressing vagueness in the context of signaling
games, but before we start we want to establish some vocabulary to better frame
the upcoming discussion. Rationality is an elusive notion that is frequently debated
in areas like philosophy, psychology, and economics. Discussions around it usually
touch on different aspects of the concept without always clearly demarcating them;
this is what we want to do before going further. The aforementioned logical picture
of language and meaning is focused on dichotomies like true and false, meaningful
and meaningless, correct and incorrect. A sentence can be true or false only if
it is meaningful, and it is meaningful if it is constructed according to correct rules.
Rationality is intimately connected with the ability to follow certain procedures, not
only of sentence production, but ultimately of sentence combination and reasoning
(think of what is required for making a logically valid deductive inference). This
is an example of what we will call a procedural account of rationality, one which
focuses more on the means rather than the ends. One can also do the opposite and
focus on the consequences instead. Instrumental rationality, as it is typically called,
characterizes an agent’s choice as rational if it maximizes the possibility of achieving
a desired goal, regardless of the means. The notion is linked to David Hume (1738),
epitomized in the following assertion: “Reason is, and ought to only be the slave of
the passions.” Instrumental rationality is close to a notion of rational choice that is
used in economics and game theory:2 agents are rational if and only if they make
decisions that maximize their expected utility. A more in-depth discussion of the
opposition in the context of theoretical economics can be found, for example, in the
work of Herbert A. Simon (1986).3
When developing models where rationality is relevant, be it constructing a logical
system or setting up a formal game, the assumed epistemic relation between agents
2In fact, it has been argued (Vanderschraaf, 1998) that Hume’s whole account of convention is
very closely in line with modern game theory.
3Simon uses the term substantive instead of instrumental rationality, but the characterization
is basically the same (Simon, 1986, pp. 210-212).
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and their environment can come to bear on considerations of rationality. The ver-
dict over how rational certain choices are can vary depending on how accurate and
complete an agent’s knowledge is of its environment, the goals to be achieved, the
choices or rules available, the relation between those choices and the objectives, and
so forth. In this respect, we will call an agent omniscient if it is in possession of the
same information as the modeler, whereas of an agent with less than that we will
say that it only has limited awareness of the relevant aspects of the model. Models
working within the logical picture typically do not make a distinction between mod-
eler and agent, and thus lack room to express these epistemic gaps. By abstracting
away from language users, these models also typically do not represent potential
interactions between them, let alone allow for repeated interaction and language
change. In other types of models, however, a further aspect of rational choice needs
to be considered, namely the ability of agents to make accurate predictions about
how other agents behave. We can say that an agent is more or less strategic de-
pending on the extent to which she is able to anticipate the actions and beliefs of
other agents, and to predict medium/long term gains from repeated play. Lack of
perfect knowledge of the situation or lack of ability to choose strategically can be
caused by many possible factors. These include, among other things, limitations
in handling information (receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) and limited
computational resources to solve complex problems. We can talk about bounded
rationality to characterize the choices of such agents. While the above definition of
instrumental rationality is usually understood as requiring a single choice to maxi-
mize the expected utility in a single concrete decision situation, one might also be
interested in more general choice mechanisms (Zollman and Smead, 2010; Hagen
et al., 2012; Fawcett, Hamblin, and Giraldeau, 2013; Galeazzi and Franke, 2017).
A choice mechanism is a general way of behaving for an agent involved in a vari-
ety of decision situations. When considering only a single situation, rationality can
only be local. If we take into account the possibility of the agent’s choice or choice
mechanism hinging on multiple situations, we can also talk about global rationality.
This can be important because, hypothetically, there could be choice mechanisms
that are sub-optimal at a local level (for each situation) but are actually perfectly
rational at a global level.
Note that we consider that, in theory, most combinations of these aspects are
possible. Although we have been pinning procedural rationality to the logical picture
of language, this is only with the most traditional logical systems in mind. We are not
denying that advances in dynamic, epistemic, fuzzy, paraconsistent, and other types
of logic could potentially enable one to capture procedural rationality with different
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characteristics. Game-theoretical models of language can, on the other hand, also
combine local instrumental rationality with omniscient highly strategic agents. Our
objective here is not to survey all the possibilities. We want to focus on signaling
games as a framework for the study of language use and meaning. The vocabulary
just introduced will, we hope, help inform the discussion that follows. We proceed by
introducing the framework of signaling games in section A.2. In section A.3 we look
into explanations of vagueness in a particular kind of signaling game. Section A.4
tries to generalize the considerations of these proposals to argue for an approach to
vagueness anchored in a more global notion of rationality. We propose and analyse
the results of a novel multi-population model of imprecise imitation in section A.5,
and summarize our conclusions in section A.6.
A.2 Signaling games
Signaling games were first introduced as models of communication by David
Lewis (1969). In order to support the idea that linguistic conventions can arise
without any prior conventional activity, Lewis considers situations where agents’
choices involve sending and receiving signals or messages.4 One can think of two
players with different roles. The first player, the sender, has knowledge about which
of a number of possible states of affairs obtains and, depending on this information,
chooses a signal to send. The second player, the receiver, has knowledge about which
signal the sender chose and, based on this information, chooses one of several possible
responses. A preference relation exists between responses and states of affairs, and
a payoff is attributed to each player based on the choices of both. Note that Lewis
assumes that no player has any preference regarding the particular signal that is
used for a given state, provided that it enables advantageous coordination with
responses. Formally, in order to describe the setup all we need is to specify a set of
possible states of affairs T , a probability measure P such that P (t) is the probability
or frequency with which t ∈ T occurs, a set of available signals or messages M , a
set of responses or actions A, and a pair of utility functions US,R : T × A→ R, one
for the sender and one for the receiver, each of which yields a payoff value for each
possible pairing of state and action. These so-called signaling problems can be seen
as particular cases of coordination problems if we consider the players’ choices to be
of contingency plans or strategies. A sender strategy is a specification of a choice
of message for each possible state of affairs. It thus describes the sender’s behavior
conditional on the state of affairs that obtains. A receiver strategy analogously
4These terms will be used interchangeably.
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specifies a choice of action for each possible message. Formally, what the sender
chooses is a function σ : T → M and the receiver a function ρ : M → A. The
expected utility EU of a strategy can be calculated by using the utility function
and aggregating payoffs for all pairings of states of affairs and actions, weighted
by the probability of each state. Concretely, the expected utility of σ given ρ is
EUS(σ | ρ) = ∑t∈T P (t) US(t, ρ(σ(t))), and the expected utility of ρ given σ is
EUR(ρ | σ) = ∑t∈T P (t) UR(t, ρ(σ(t))). As an example, consider a game with
T = {t1, t2}, M = {m1,m2}, A = {a1, a2}, P (t1) = P (t2) = 0.5 and the following
utility matrix:
a1 a2
t1 1, 1 0, 0
t2 0, 0 1, 1
Consider sender strategy σ = {t1 7→ m2, t2 7→ m1} and receiver strategy ρ =
{m1 7→ a2,m2 7→ a1}. These would have an expected utility of 1 for both sender
and receiver, since when t1 obtains with probability 0.5 the sender will use m2, and
to this message the receiver will respond with a1, which achieves a payoff of 1, and
when t2 obtains with probability 0.5 the sender will use m1, and to this message the
receiver will respond with a2, which also achieves a payoff of 1. They also represent
one of the two stable conventions in this game, the other being the pair of strategies
σ = {t1 7→ m1, t2 7→ m2} and ρ = {m1 7→ a1,m2 7→ a2}. Conventions of this kind in
a signaling problem are what Lewis calls signaling systems. An example of complete
miscoordination would be σ = {t1 7→ m1, t2 7→ m2} and ρ = {m1 7→ a2,m2 7→ a1}.
Partial coordination is achieved, for example, by σ = {t1 7→ m1, t2 7→ m1} and
ρ = {m1 7→ a1,m2 7→ a2}.
Lewis’ account of the stability of conventions rests on what could be considered
strong demands. Namely, there needs to be a state of affairs that indicates to ev-
eryone involved that a certain regularity will hold, as well as “mutual ascription of
some common inductive standards and background information, strategic rational-
ity, mutual ascription of strategic rationality, and so on” (1969, pp. 56–57). Agents
are thus envisioned as omniscient and highly strategic. These requirements can
seem excessive, and even more so if we consider how simple signaling systems are
when compared to human languages. The models were introduced to help explain
how language could have gotten off the ground as a conventional system without
any sort of prior agreement. However, if one considers the circumstances of the
origins of human language, it seems implausible that the agents that started making
use of primordial signaling systems which (hypothetically) evolved into languages
possessed such advanced rationality. Furthermore, communication through simple
A.2. SIGNALING GAMES 183
message exchange is something that almost all animals do: monkeys use calls, birds
use singing, bees use dances, ants use pheromone trails, and so on. A plausible ac-
count of the origin of language should first explain how signaling systems could get
started, without requiring high standards of rationality from the agents involved.
In order to address this problem, Brian Skyrms (1996) proposes studying signal-
ing problems in evolutionary terms. Rather than imagining, as Lewis does, rational
agents making conscious decisions in possession of knowledge of the game and expec-
tations of the behavior of other agents, one can imagine a simpler scenario inspired
by biological evolution: there is a population of agents with biologically hardwired
behaviors for engaging in interactions characteristic of a signaling problem; utility
does not represent preference, but rather fitness for survival and reproduction; the
make-up of the population evolves based on the relative fitness of the strategies
represented in the population. Such a setup attempts to capture the main features
of natural selection: in a diverse population, agents with more successful strategies
thrive, while agents with less fit strategies die off. Although the inspiration for this
scenario is biological evolution, similar things could be said about how ideas spread
in a population of agents who can adopt or abandon them depending on how suc-
cessful they prove to be (Benz, Jäger, and van Rooij, 2006; Pagel, 2009; Thompson,
Kirby, and K. Smith, 2016), i.e. we can interpret these notions in terms of cultural
evolution (Dawkins, 1976; Boyd and Richerson, 1985). The principles can be cap-
tured in formal models that abstract away from details of single interactions and
behavior of individual agents, for example in the replicator dynamics (Taylor and
Jonker, 1978). The only things relevant to this equation are the relative propor-
tions of strategies in a given population and the utility function. Using it, one can
compute which strategies evolve under which conditions.
Skyrms’ evolutionary game theory approach to signaling games not only gives
more plausible grounds to support Lewis’ discussion of convention, it also accom-
plishes an important conceptual change: it moves most of the theory and mathe-
matical formalism to the descriptive side of the investigation. Utility represents how
the modeler views the signaling problem and understands the relative advantages or
disadvantages of different possible strategy combinations. Dynamics describe how
strategies can evolve when driven by mechanisms of utility maximization. The shift
in perspective allows interpretations that accommodate limited non-strategic agents.
While the general framework manages to abstract quite some details away from the
formalization, it nevertheless leaves room for them, especially when it comes to the
dynamics. We have already mentioned the replicator equation that can be seen
as representing biological or cultural evolution, but one can also use dynamics in-
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spired by learning mechanisms (Roth and Erev, 1995), or even ones assuming a
high degree of knowledge of the game and other players (Gilboa and Matsui, 1991;
Mühlenbernd, 2011; Spike et al., 2017). This range of options goes hand in hand
with a range of pictures of rationality, from nothing more than survival of the fittest
in a biologically-inspired setting, to a certain degree of instrumental but limited
and non-strategic rationality in the case of learning dynamics, to higher levels of
rationality and even recursive strategic reasoning about the co-players’ beliefs and
choices. Each of these can be utilized depending on the problem that one is inter-
ested in characterizing. Thus, although Skyrms shows that high requirements of
rationality are not necessary for signaling conventions to evolve, the framework does
leave room for the study of linguistic interactions between highly strategic agents.
The characterization of signaling problems in terms of evolutionary game theory
allows us to explain why certain equilibria come to be and how. A core notion in
this context is that of an evolutionary stable state (Maynard Smith, 1982): an equi-
librium situation that a population tends to under standard evolutionary pressures,
and to which it returns if slightly disturbed. With these tools, one can better un-
derstand why signaling systems are stable even without any strong assumptions of
rationality. One can also map out which initial conditions drive the system towards
which equilibria and which do not. In a simple case like the example discussed
above, an evolutionary process of the kind described always drives the population
into a state where one signaling system takes over completely. More complex sig-
naling problems may have different evolutionary outcomes, sometimes unexpected
ones. Skyrms (2010) gives an overview of different topics studied using signaling
games, including expansions of the framework itself (for example, considering other
dynamics beyond the replicator equation), exploration of other factors that impact
the evolution of signaling (for example, how agents are interconnected), or varia-
tions on the signaling problem and its basic assumptions (for example, loosening
the alignment of interests in order to provide accounts of deceptive signal use).
Other uses of signaling games include discussions of categorization (Jäger and van
Rooij, 2007), compositionality (Barrett, 2009), incommensurability (Barrett, 2010),
to name a few. More recent overviews are given by Huttegger (2014), Huttegger,
Skyrms, Tarrès, et al. (2014), and Franke and Wagner (2014). In the following sec-
tion, we discuss how a particular type of signaling game has been used to address
the problem of vagueness.
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A.3 Vagueness in sim-max games
The sorites paradox requires us to assume a relation between the vague terms
and a more precise underlying dimension (height for tallness, number of hairs for
baldness, number of grains of sand for “heapness”, and so on). Not only does
this property need to be much more fine-grained than the vague term, but it also
needs to have some structure: there is at least an order between the elements in
it (thinking of height in centimeters, 180 > 179 > . . . > 120), and usually even a
degree of how far apart these elements are from each other. In terms of signaling
games, one can model this using a state space constituted of values of the underlying
dimension, and a message space constituted by the terms in question. Because of
the difference in granularity, we will typically be interested in cases where the state
space is much larger than the message space. We can model the structure of the state
space by defining a distance or similarity function between every value, effectively
making it a metric space. Another important ingredient of the sorites paradox is the
acknowledgment of a certain degree of tolerance with respect to whether a certain
term applies or not. This tolerance decreases with distance in state space: assuming
a 180cm person is tall, one would easily tolerate the use of the term for a person
measuring 179cm, less so for someone who is 170cm, and much less so for 160cm.
This can be modeled using a utility function that is continuous rather than discrete
and that monotonously decreases with distance, i.e. success is not a matter of black
and white, right or wrong, but a matter of degree, of how close the receiver got to
the optimal response to the sender’s perceived state.
The simplest type of game to study in this scenario is one where the state space
and the action space are the same. We can imagine this as a game of guessing states
of affairs: the sender has knowledge of a particular state, sends a message to the
receiver, who in turn has to guess it; their payoff, as discussed above, is proportional
to how close the guess got to the original state. These games, called similarity-
maximization or sim-max games for short, were first introduced by Gerhard Jäger
and Robert van Rooij (Jäger and van Rooij, 2007; Jäger, 2007) and further studied
by Jäger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011). What these authors find about this setup is
that the evolutionary stable states are what they call Voronoi languages. Roughly,
these are situations where the sender uses messages in a way that can be seen as
partitioning the state space into convex regions, and the receiver responds with the
central element of those regions.
In an abstract setup, using 50 states uniformly distributed over the unit interval
and two possible messages, such an optimal language looks like what we see in
Figure A.1a: at a specific point, the probability that the sender uses one message
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Figure A.1: Example strategies for a state space with 50 states. Each line corre-
sponds to a message. For the sender, it plots for each state the proba-
bility that the message is used. For the receiver, it plots for each state
the probability that the response is that state, given the message.
decays sharply from 1 to 0, and increases sharply from 0 to 1 for the other message;
the response of the receiver for each message is a degenerate distribution over the
state space which assigns all probability mass to a single state. These strategies
give mutually optimal behavior for a case where the prior probability is the same for
each state and utility is a linear or quadratic function of the distance between the
actual state and the receiver’s guess. In general, at which point the sender switches
the use of messages and which guesses of the receiver are optimal critically hinges on
the priors over states and the utility function. Still, confirming Lipman’s argument,
there is no vagueness in such optimal languages.
The sender/receiver strategy pairs that we are looking for look more like Fig-
ure A.1b, where the sender’s probability of choosing a certain message gradually
changes, and the receiver strategy assigns a positive probability to more than one
state for each message. What characterizes vagueness in these models is thus a
smooth and monotonous transition between parts of the state space where a mes-
sage is clearly used and where it is clearly not. This means that, for some states in
the middle of the state space, there is uncertainty as to which message will be used
by the sender, whereas for states in the extremes this is as good as certain. For the
receiver part, there is uncertainty as to which state will be picked for each message.
The interpretation of this uncertainty will be different depending on the inter-
pretation of the model. If we see it as an explanatory model of how two agents play
the game, we can see it as randomization. If we interpret the model as descrip-
tive, it simply represents expected behavior in a manner agnostic to the underlying
mechanisms. A third option is to see probabilities as capturing relative numbers
in a population of agents. For example, if the sender strategy assigns a probability
of 0.4 to the event of message m being sent for state t, this would mean that 40%
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of the population uses that message for that state. This latter option leaves open
the possible interpretation that each agent commands a crisp language and vague-
ness is only a population-level effect. However, given the level of abstraction of the
description so far, none of this is necessarily implied by the model. Our preferred
stance is to see the model as descriptive, but we do not wish to focus on that debate
here. The question we want to address is: what additional modifications to sim-max
games are sufficient for optimal languages to be more like Figure A.1b, rather than
like Figure A.1a?
Franke, Jäger, and van Rooij (2011) make two suggestions as to how vagueness
in a signaling game can be boundedly rational, i.e. how vagueness could arise as a
consequence of cost-saving limitations in the cognitive capacities of instrumentally
rational agents. The first proposal is called limited memory fictitious play (LMF)
and models agents playing a sim-max game where their ability to recall past inter-
actions with others is limited to a certain number. For a given interaction, each
agent uses her limited memory of the other agent’s past behavior to estimate the
other’s strategy, and plays an instrumentally rational best response to that strategy.
In order to study the evolution of strategies in repeated interaction, the authors
model several individual agents in actual play. What they observe is the emergence
of vague signaling at the level of the population, i.e. population averages of indi-
vidual strategies exhibit the hallmarks of a vague language. This is because each
agent recalls a different history of previous play and so holds slightly different beliefs
about language use. However, each agent still commands a crisp language, which
is an inadequate feature of the model if the intention is to capture how vagueness
presents itself in human languages.
In order to overcome this limitation, Franke, Jäger, and van Rooij make an-
other proposal using the notion of a quantal response equilibrium (QRE). The idea,
inspired by experimental psychology, is to model the choice of best response as
stochastic rather than deterministic.5 A prominent explanation for such soft-max
or quantal choice behavior is that agents make small mistakes in the calculation of
their expected utilities (Train, 2009). They still choose the option with the highest
expected utility, but each assessment of the expected utilities is noise perturbed.
This, in turn, may actually be boundedly rational since the calculation of expected
utilities relies on assessing stochastic uncertainty, which in turn may be costly to
calculate precisely. Choice based on a few samples from a distribution can be op-
timal if taking more samples or other means of better approximating probabilistic
beliefs is resource costly (Vul et al., 2014; Sanborn and Chater, 2016). The de-
5Probabilistic choice rules are also the source of vagueness in recent accounts by Lassiter and
Goodman (2017) and Qing and Franke (2014).
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gree to which agents tremble in the calculation of expected utilities and therefore
deviate from the instrumentally rational behavior can be characterized by a pa-
rameter. Franke, Jäger, and van Rooij find that for low values of this parameter,
only babbling equilibria are possible, where sender and receiver simply randomize,
respectively, message and interpretation choice uniformly. Above a certain value of
the parameter, other equilibria of the kind described in the beginning of this sec-
tion arise, where agents communicate successfully, though not perfectly, using fuzzy
strategies similar to those depicted in Figure A.1b. However, it is not clear whether
soft-max choices capture the right stochastic trembles in decision making as they
would arise under natural sources of uncertainty about the context (see Franke and
Correia, 2018).
Cailin O’Connor (2014) proposes a way in which vagueness could be expected to
evolve as a side-effect of a particular type of learning process. She studies sim-max
games driven not by rational choice dynamics, but by generalized reinforcement
learning (GRL), a variant of Herrnstein reinforcement learning (HRL) (Roth and
Erev, 1995). In HRL, agents learn to play a signaling game by strengthening partic-
ular choices (of messages for the sender, of responses for the receiver) proportionally
to how successful those choices prove to be in an interaction. O’Connor’s proposal is
to model generalization as the propagation of reinforcement to nearby states, where
“nearby” is defined in terms of distance in state space. For example, if a sender was
successful in using message m for state t, she will not only positively reinforce that
choice of message for t, but also for states similar to t. This is done to a degree that
is proportional to the similarity between t and other states. The dynamics gives rise
to vague signaling of the kind we are looking for.
Although there is a close relationship between reinforcement learning and pop-
ulation-level dynamics (Börgers and Sarin, 1997; Beggs, 2005), O’Connor’s GRL
is, on the face of it, an account of learning between individual players. Also, we
need further justification for linking generalization in reinforcement so closely to
the underlying payoff function of the sim-max game. Why should agents evolve
to generalize in exactly the right way? O’Connor suggests that, despite a language
with vagueness having lower expected utility than a language without it, the learning
mechanism that induces vagueness does have evolutionary advantages: it achieves
higher payoffs in a shorter period of time. From a global point of view, learning
speed can be an advantage. Imagine an initial population of agents with random
strategies, some using GRL and others using classical HRL. Although the latter type
of agent can hypothetically develop a precise and more efficient signaling system,
agents using GRL could coordinate on vague signaling strategies with high (though
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not optimal) expected utility sooner than agents using HRL. In such a scenario,
they could drive the other agents to extinction before the latter had time to achieve
coordination and reap the benefits of a more precise signaling system.
A similar finding is made by Franke and Correia (2018) when studying a vari-
ant of the replicator dynamics in which individual agents do not have the ability
to generalize but simply make perceptual mistakes. In a scenario where agents
learn by imitation, if one assumes that they do not have perfect perception, there
will always be the possibility for senders to confuse states and thus learn associa-
tions with messages that are different than the ones observed, and for receivers to
similarly mix up responses. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that this
confusability is proportional to state similarity, i.e. that the more similar two states
are, the more likely it is that they will be mistaken for each other. Incorporating
these considerations into a derivation of the replicator dynamics based on imitation
processes, Franke and Correia develop a variant of the dynamic that also induces
vague signal use of the kind we expect here. The consequence is very similar to that
of the GRL model discussed above, in that the way the behavior for a given state
is updated takes into account the behavior of similar states, proportionally to their
similarity. Given the known relation between reinforcement learning and the repli-
cator dynamics (Beggs, 2005), it is actually quite plausible that the two are tightly
related (although this would need to be formally demonstrated). The account is,
furthermore, interpretable at a lower level of rationality.
The motivation underlying this model of vague signaling is still one of inevitabil-
ity. A vague strategy is not claimed to have higher expected utility than a crisp one.
However, the authors observe an effect similar to that pointed out by O’Connor:
signaling converges faster and more often in scenarios where there is some degree
of state confusability. Furthermore, they observe one additional potentially bene-
ficial property. Running several rounds of simulation for each parameter set, they
measure for each group of results how close resulting strategies are to each other,
and how they would fare playing against one another. The results show that the
within group distance between strategies becomes smaller with growing confusabil-
ity, and the within group expected utility is actually higher for strategies evolving
under a certain degree of state confusion. Thus, some amount of uncertainty seems
to promote more homogeneous populations of signalers that are better at achieving
cooperation within a group. What is left to show, as it was with O’Connor’s GRL
approach, is whether the potential payoff advantages that were observed in simu-
lations actually suffice to promote vague language use in an encompassing model
of multi-level selection. The following section motivates the need for taking a more
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ecological approach to the evolution of vagueness, before section A.5 gives a concrete
model.
A.4 The ecology of vagueness
Arguments of the kind presented by Lipman (2009), that vague signal use is
suboptimal when compared to crisp use, work under various assumptions. Part
of the picture formed by these assumptions is a highly idealized conception of the
agents involved and of the context in which they develop and use signals. These
idealizations probably originate, via game theory, from the conception of rationality
of traditional theoretical economics. Herbert A. Simon describes this picture as
follows:
Traditional economic theory postulates an “economic man,” who, in the
course of being “economic” is also “rational.” This man is assumed to
have knowledge of the relevant aspects of his environment which, if not
absolutely complete, is at least impressively clear and voluminous. He
is assumed also to have a well-organized and stable system of prefer-
ences, and a skill in computation that enables him to calculate, for the
alternative courses of action that are available to him, which of these
will permit him to reach the highest attainable point on his preference
scale. (Simon, 1955, p. 99)
Both Simon and Lipman call for this picture to be revised, and this is what the
proposals surveyed here all do. In order to account for vagueness in natural language
in the context of these models, they peel away from this idealized picture and bring
some of these assumptions down to earth. In the process, they point to ways in
which we, as language learners and language users, are finite beings finding ways to
cope with a highly complex and dynamic environment:
1. Our existence is temporally finite; language does not have an infinite amount
of time to evolve, nor can it take an infinite time to be learned. The faster a
language can start being useful, the better;
2. Language learning through experience has to rely on a limited number of
observations. Not only is the state space typically much larger than one can
survey in sufficient time, it is even potentially infinite and constantly changing;
3. A corollary of the former is that there will always be heterogeneity in a pop-
ulation of language learners, at the very least in their prior experience, since
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each agent will have relied on a different set of observations. Furthermore, this
information is not directly or fully accessible to others.
All of these observations support the weakening of modeling assumptions. The re-
search surveyed here shows us some examples of assumptions which, when weakened,
make vague signal use a natural outcome of certain evolutionary dynamics. But it
gives us even more. It suggests ways in which the mechanisms that lead to vagueness
can have positive effects that are extremely important in the context of the points
just enumerated. We learned from O’Connor (2014b) and Franke and Correia (2018)
that vague languages are quicker to converge and adapt, which is valuable given the
finite and dynamic character of our experience (point 1). O’Connor (2017) also
showed how generalization, an invaluable feature of any procedure for learning from
a limited number of observations (point 2), leads to vagueness. We also learned from
Franke and Correia (2018) that state confusability, a mechanism that leads to vague
signal use, can have a homogenizing effect on vocabularies, potentially compensating
for the heterogeneity of agents’ experiences (point 3).
What do these observations tell us about rationality? GRL (O’Connor, 2014b)
and the work of Franke and Correia (2018) both assume a picture of agents with a
basic level of instrumental rationality, possibly limited awareness of the game, and
a lack of strategic capabilities, adapting their behavior with only short-term gains
in sight. These approaches introduce constraints on agent behavior or information
processing that prevent the evolution of crisp signal use. But a crisp language
would still have a higher expected utility than the evolved strategies. Agents in
those models seem to be only as rational as the modelers allow them to be. Despite
the plausibility of the mechanisms proposed (limited memory, imprecise calculation
of expected utilities, generalization, state confusability), the results of these models
feel somewhat bittersweet because of the hypothetical possibility of an ideal strategy,
seemingly barred from the agents in an artificial manner. Couldn’t a more rational
agent evolve and drive the system into crisp signal use? Aren’t we, human beings,
that kind of agent?
Perhaps a deeper understanding of vagueness and the reasons for its pervasive-
ness in natural language are to be found only when we broaden the scope of the
models employed. All the models discussed so far explore evolutionary dynamics
for one homogeneous population playing one game. Different types of agents and
different game setups are considered, but each of these different possible scenarios
is tested separately. We see at least two ways in which one could embrace a more
ecological perspective. The first is to think about meaning and vagueness from a
more Wittgensteinian perspective. One can see each signaling game as embodying
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a particular language game. In Wittgenstein’s picture of language, however, we do
not play only one language game over the course of our existence; there is a plural-
ity of them and which one an agent is engaged in at a particular moment is never
clearly identified, neither are the exact benefits one might gain by choosing a certain
behavior over another. These are furthermore not fixed in time; old language games
fall out of fashion or stop being useful, and new ones emerge all the time (and in
particular §23 Wittgenstein, 1953).
We can look for rationality at several levels in this pluralistic picture. First, as
before, there is the actual behavior of a single agent in each actualized language
game. As mentioned above in connection the soft-max choice function used by
Franke, Jäger, and van Rooij (2011), behavior that strictly maximizes expected
utility under uncertainty may be resource heavy, so it might be compatible with
local strategic rationality that agents’ production choices are stochastic. Second, if
we look at behavior across many game types and contexts, there is also the level of
an agent’s internal theory of how words and phrases are likely to be used (or even
normatively: how messages should be used), conditional on a given context. Notice
that a single agent’s rational beliefs about linguistic practices or linguistic meaning
may well have to reflect the actual stochasticity: under natural assumptions about
information loss, the best belief for prediction matches the actual distribution in the
real world (Vehtari and Ojanen, 2012). In sum, both at the level of behavior and at
the level of beliefs about use or meaning, we should expect to find vagueness. Still,
despite the natural vagueness, there does not seem to be anything fundamentally
missing or conceptually incoherent in a naturalistic, rationality- or optimality-driven
explanation of what each agent is doing or what each agent believes about language,
use and meaning.
Another way to go beyond locality is to work with more heterogeneous popula-
tion models. The mechanisms that lead to vague signal use, as O’Connor (2014b)
and Franke and Correia (2018) stress, have the aforementioned important advantages
of faster speed of convergence, higher flexibility, and homogenization. The argument
goes that these side-effects, by temporarily enabling a higher expected utility, could
allow a population using some generalization (or affected by some imprecision) to
take over. However, despite its intuitiveness, the argument is based on comparing
isolated runs of different dynamics. The models do not allow the hypothesis to be
tested, because they do not accommodate different populations evolving together.In
the remainder of the paper we propose a way to do this based on the model of Franke
and Correia (2018). We introduce two variants of a multi-population model of the
imprecise imitation dynamics, where populations characterized by different impreci-
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sion values interact and evolve together. Using this model, we can better see under
which conditions the hypothesized advantages of some imprecision can lead to the
evolution of vagueness.
A.5 Two multi-population models of imprecise
imitation
We build upon the model of Franke and Correia (2018), adding to the impre-
cise imitation dynamics support for multiple populations with different imprecision
values evolving together. The resulting evolutionary dynamic has two layers: first,
signaling strategies change by imprecise imitation following the model of Franke and
Correia (2018); second, there is evolutionary selection at the level of the impreci-
sion values themselves. More concretely, imagine agents who are born with varying
perceptual abilities, subsequently learn a signaling strategy by imitation of other
agents (either within or across populations), and depending on the success of the
strategies they develop, are more or less likely to survive and reproduce. In such
a setup, evolutionary processes will not only change the distribution of strategies
within a population, where a population is identified by a shared level of imprecision
in imitation, they will also promote those levels of imprecision which result in the
development of more successful signal use.
This is closely related to the ideas behind theories of kin selection (W. D. Hamil-
ton, 1964) and multi-level (or group) selection (Wilson, 1975). These theories build
upon the hypothesis that selection acts not only to directly favor genes that re-
sult in behaviors that benefit individuals, but also to indirectly favor genes that
lead to behaviors that benefit either genotypically (kin) or socially (group) related
individuals (see Okasha, 2006, for more details). In our model there is a similar
structure: there is a process of selection of behavior within each population, and
levels of imprecision are selected across populations based on the strategies they give
rise to. We believe there is an important difference with group and kin selection
models in that the two selection processes in our model act on different entities: the
inner shaping signaling behavior, and the outer selecting levels of imprecision. In
any case, we intend our model to be descriptive rather than causal or explanatory.
That means that we do not want to commit to seeing populations either as kin or
as social groups, and use them as merely descriptive abstractions that allow us to
capture the hypothetical impact of indirect selection processes.6
6We make this note because of the heated debate between the two theories. See Kohn (2008),
and Kramer and Meunier (2016) for more details.
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In the following, we lay down the formal details of our model. Let’s start by
defining A to be the set of imprecision values considered. For each value α ∈ A,
the proportion of its population is given by P (α), such that ∑α∈A P (α) = 1. Each
population has its own sender and receiver strategies, represented as σα and ρα.
The probability that a given agent with imprecision α (or of type α) observes to
when the actual state is ta is given by Pαo (to|ta). If the same agent intends to
realize ti, the probability that she actually realizes tr instead is given by Pαr (tr|ti).
Following Franke and Correia (2018, p. 26), we can then define the following values.
Probability that ta is actual if to is observed by an agent of type α:
Pαo¯ (ta|to) ∝ Pa(ta)Pαo (to|ta)
Probability that a random sender of type α produces m when the actual state is
ta:
Pασ (m|ta) =
∑
to
Pαo (to|ta)σα(m|to)
Probability that the actual state is ta if a random sender of type α produced m:
Pασ¯ (ta|m) ∝ Pa(ta)Pασ (m|ta)
Probability that tr is realized by a random receiver of type α in response to
message m:
Pαρ (tr|m) =
∑
ti
Pαr (tr|ti)ρα(ti|m)
These formulations are merely parameterized versions of the single-population
model. They encapsulate calculations that one can use to compute expected utilities
and strategy update steps for each type. The latter, however, depend on the types
of interaction that we imagine occurring between populations. In the following
sections, we consider two different possibilities.
Tight population interaction
In a multi-population model with tight interaction between populations, each
agent plays with, observes, and potentially imitates any other agent, regardless
of their type. This has an impact on the expected utilities of sender and receiver
strategies of each type, and on the update steps for those strategies. Let’s start with
the expected utilities. For a sender of type α, the expected utility of its strategy σα
against all other receiver strategies ρ?, is given by:
EUασ(m, to, ρ?) =
∑
ta
Pαo¯ (ta|to)
∑
α′∈A
P (α′)
∑
tr
Pα
′
ρ (tr|m)U(ta, tr)
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and, for a receiver of type α, the expected utility of its strategy ρα against all other
sender strategies σ?, is given by:
EUαρ (ti,m, σ?) =
∑
α′∈A
P (α′)
∑
ta
Pα
′
σ¯ (ta|m)
∑
tr
Pαr (tr|ti)U(ta, tr)
Expected utilities thus take into account the existence of strategies of other types,
and weigh the relevance of each type α′ according to its relative proportion P (α′).
Another important value to calculate has to do with the types that agents ob-
serve and imitate. In a model with tight interaction, we imagine this occurring
across populations. Therefore, we can define the probability that a sender of type
α observes a randomly sampled agent play message m for observed state to as:
Pαo (m|to) =
∑
ta
Pαo¯ (ta|to)
∑
α′∈A
P (α′)Pα′σ (m|ta)
and the probability that a receiver of type α observes a randomly sampled agent
choose interpretation to given message m as:
Pαo (to|m) =
∑
tr
Pαo (to|tr)
∑
α′∈A
P (α′)Pα′ρ (tr|m)
Again, these calculations incorporate the probabilities that the imitating agent might
observe the behavior of an agent of another type α′, weighed by its relative propor-
tion. Finally, the update step for a sender strategy of type α at time instant i + 1
is given by:
σˇαi+1(m|t) ∝ Pαo (m|t)EUασi(m, t, ρ?i )
and similarly for a receiver strategy of type α by:
ρˇαi+1(t|m) ∝ Pαo (t|m)EUαρi(t,m, σ?i )
We here use σˇ and ρˇ since there is still an additional adjustment to these values to
be calculated before we get the final strategies σ and ρ.
These formulations cover the evolution of the particular strategies of each type.
We can think of this as the level of cultural evolution: agents are born with a certain
level of imprecision and adopt strategies based on the behavior of others. Alongside
this process, we can imagine another level of selection, where agents die and new
agents are born. More successful agents have a higher likelihood of surviving and
reproducing, giving rise to more agents with their level of imprecision. Levels of
imprecision are thus subject to an evolutionary dynamic that is indirectly influenced
by the cultural dynamic. Importantly, only the level of imprecision is passed on to
new generations under this dynamic, not the actual strategies developed by the
agents at the cultural level.
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We model this process by changing the proportion of each type P (α) according
to the replicator dynamic. A population of type α consists of agents employing
both a sender and a receiver strategy, thus the overall fitness of the population must
include the expected utilities of both. We could imagine this process happening at
a different speed to the cultural process, in which case we could have different time
scales. For the sake of simplicity, we choose to have them both happen at each
time step, but calculate the changes occurring at this level of selection after the
calculation for the other level. We define the proportion of type α at time step i+ 1
as:
Pi+1(α) ∝ Pi(α)(EUασi+1(m, t, ρ?i ) + EUαρi+1(t,m, σ?i ))
In order to additionally account for the fact that strategies are not passed on to
new generations, we mix the evolved strategies of a certain type σα and ρα with
new random strategies σ˜α and ρ˜α (generated at each time step). The idea is that,
at each time step, a certain percentage of each population will consist of “newborn”
agents, i.e. agents that haven’t yet had time to evolve their strategies. We define a
parameter γ that quantifies this percentage, or as we can also call it the birth rate,
which we consider to be the same for every population. This mixing finally defines
the strategies for time step i+ 1 and can be described in the following formulas:
σαi+1(m|t) = (1− γ)σˇαi+1(m|t) + γσ˜αi+1(m|t)
ραi+1(t|m) = (1− γ)ρˇαi+1(t|m) + γρ˜αi+1(t|m)
Simulation results We performed 25 simulation runs of this model for each of
three population scenarios: only one population with α = 0 (for reference), two
populations with α ∈ {0, 0.05}, and three populations with α ∈ {0, 0.05, 0.1}. For
each scenario, starting proportions P (α) were equal for each value of α. Given
the observations by Franke and Correia (2018) that state space size and tolerance
parameter β do not result in important qualitative difference, we fixed these values at
nS = 30 and β = 0.1. We also used a fixed uniform distribution for the priors and a
message space with 2 messages. Each type started with its own randomly generated
strategy. Regarding the duration of the simulations, due to the mixing in of new
individuals into the population (birth rate was fixed at γ = 0.05), the convergence
criteria is no longer applicable because each strategy is randomly perturbed at each
time step. Therefore, all simulation runs were stopped after 200 iterations.
The first thing to observe from the simulation results is that the population with
no imprecision (α = 0) dominated the other populations in every run.
In Figure A.2 we plot the evolution of the proportion of each population in the
two-population and three-population scenarios for all trials. As the plot shows, the
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(a) Two-population scenario.
(b) Three-population scenario.
Figure A.2: Evolution of population proportions through time for each simulation
trial of the tight interaction model. Numbers on top of each plot identify
each trial.
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population with no imprecision steadily increased its proportion against the others
in every trial. In the three-population scenario, the proportion of type α = 0.05 sees
a slight increase in the beginning of the simulation, but inexorably starts a downward
trend. These observations go against the expectation of Franke and Correia (2018)
that faster convergence to a convex strategy by populations with a certain level
of imprecision could give them a temporary advantage to take over and eliminate
other types. The reason for this is interesting in itself. What happens is that,
because of the tight interaction between populations, the strategies of each type
evolve in close tandem with each other. One of the consequences of this is that the
population with no imprecision reaches convexity faster than it would on its own
because of the interaction with the populations with imprecision. We can see this
effect by looking into the percentage of trials with convex sender strategies at a given
iteration, for each scenario, and comparing the three scenarios: populations with no
imprecision evolving alone, two populations (α ∈ {0, 0.05}), and three populations
(α ∈ {0, 0.05, 0.1}).
This is plotted in Figure A.3a. What we see is more trials reaching convexity
earlier for the multi-population scenarios when compared with the single-population
scenario. This effect precludes the hypothesized temporary advantage of imprecision
manifesting itself, but it can be seen as a positive influence of the population(s) with
imprecision on the population with no imprecision.
The flip side of this tight connection between populations is that strategies
evolved by populations with no imprecision are also more vague (in the sense defined
in section A.3). This is visible by looking at mean entropy values, namely sender
strategy entropy, plotted in Figure A.3b, and receiver strategy entropy, plotted in
Figure A.3c. The values for the population with no imprecision are clearly higher
in the scenarios where it evolves together with populations with imprecision than
in the scenario where it evolves on its own. Given the trends in population pro-
portions, one expects this to eventually be eliminated when the population with no
imprecision finally takes over the others, but it is interesting to observe that while
populations with vague strategies persist, the population with no imprecision takes
much longer to evolve a fully crisp strategy.
Loose population interaction
We can also imagine a scenario where populations interact more loosely. Namely,
the dynamic we want to model here is one where agents of a certain type α imi-
tate and learn only from other agents of the same type, but nevertheless use their
signaling strategies with agents from all types. In order to capture this, we need
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(a) Percentage of convex sender strategies for α = 0.
(b) Mean entropy of sender strategies for α = 0.
(c) Mean entropy of receiver strategies for α = 0.
Figure A.3: Development of some metrics through time for the α = 0 population
in each of three scenarios: evolving alone (‘0’), with an α = 0.05
population (‘0/0.05’), and with an additional α = 0.1 population
(‘0/0.05/0.1’).
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to make changes to some calculations. Any formula that is not redefined in this
section should be assumed to remain the same. First, if agents learn only within
their population, the imitation dynamic needs to consider only the expected utility
against agents of that population. We thus define the following expected utilities
for a sender of type α:
EUασ(m, to, ρα) =
∑
ta
Pαo¯ (ta|to)
∑
tr
Pαρ (tr|m)U(ta, tr)
and for a receiver of type α:
EUαρ (ti,m, σα) =
∑
ta
Pασ¯ (ta|m)
∑
tr
Pαr (tr|ti)U(ta, tr)
The main difference from the previous model is that these expected utilities are not
calculated against all populations (σ? and ρ?) but only against the agent’s own type
(σα and ρα). This also implies that population proportions do not play a role at
this level of selection.
Regarding the imitation process, we can redefine the probability that a sender
of type α observes a randomly sampled agent play message m for observed state to
as:
Pαo (m|to) =
∑
ta
Pαo¯ (ta|to)Pασ (m|ta)
and the probability that a receiver of type α observes a randomly sampled agent
choose interpretation to given message m as:
Pαo (to|m) =
∑
tr
Pαo (to|tr)Pαρ (tr|m)
Again, the main difference is that agents make observations within their own pop-
ulation, so to model a randomly sampled agent one needs only to take into account
agents of the same type. Population proportions again do not play a role in these
calculations. Based on these formulas, we can define the update step for a sender
strategy of type α at time instant i+ 1 as:
σˇαi+1(m|t) ∝ Pαo (m|t)EUασi(m, t, ραi )
and similarly for a receiver strategy of type α as:
ρˇαi+1(t|m) ∝ Pαo (t|m)EUαρi(t,m, σαi )
Note that, because imitation and learning occur only within populations, these
formulations are essentially the same as for the single-population model of Franke
and Correia (2018), only parameterized by type α.
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The selection process between different populations still follows the same mo-
tivation as before: agents of a certain type that evolve successful strategies (with
respect to other types) will be more likely to survive and reproduce, benefiting the
proportion of their population. The formulation of the dynamic for the proportion
of each type P (α) thus stays the same. In order to avoid confusion, we want to
stress that this means that these calculations rely on the definitions of expected
utility across populations (i.e. EUασ(m, to, ρ?) and EUαρ (ti,m, σ?)) and not the newly
introduced EUασ(m, to, ρα) and EUαρ (ti,m, σα).
Simulation results We ran the same number of simulation trials under the same
conditions as for the model with tight population interaction.
In Figure A.4 we plot the evolution of population proportions for all trials of
the multi-population scenarios. The first thing to observe is that proportions evolve
faster than in the model with tight interaction. Whereas in the latter no given
population ever reached much more than 70% proportion, in this model we see
that many trials resulted in one population fully dominating the others. In the
two-population scenario, some population reached at least 99% in 24 out of 25
trials. In the three-population scenario, this happened in 18 out of 25 trials. More
interestingly for our investigation, some trials actually resulted in the population
with α = 0 being dominated. For the two-population scenario, α = 0.05 fully
reached 100% in 8 trials (79, 86, 88, 89, 91, 93, 96, 98), a point from which it
is technically impossible for the other population to recover. In most cases the
dominating population gains its ground from the start, but in 5 cases we see a
temporary advantage of α = 0.05 that is then lost to the other population. In one
interesting trial (85), α = 0.05 reached 99.87% only to then steadily start losing
ground to α = 0. For the three-population scenario, α = 0 was reduced to 0% in 4
trials (152, 157, 159, and 175). In all of those cases, α = 0.05 clearly has the upper
hand over α = 0.1, despite a temporary advantage of the latter in some trials.
Because of the loose interaction between populations, different types can now
evolve separately. One consequence of this is that populations with a certain level
of imprecision again reach convexity faster than those without imprecision.
In Figure A.5 we plot, for each trial, the first iteration when each type reached
convexity. What we see is that, even though α = 0 usually reaches convexity later,
this is not always the case. This has certainly to do with the initial conditions of
each trial, since the randomly generated strategies can simply by chance be more
favourable to reaching convexity. More importantly, we also see that reaching con-
vexity sooner is not a sufficient condition for achieving population dominance. There
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(a) Two-population scenario.
(b) Three-population scenario.
Figure A.4: Evolution of population proportions through time for each simulation
trial of the loose interaction model. Numbers on top of each plot identify
each trial.
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(a) Two populations scenario. (b) Three populations scenario.
Figure A.5: First iteration with convex sender strategies for each simulation trial of
the loose interaction model.
were many trials where another type reached convexity much sooner than α = 0 but
its population was completely dominated nevertheless (e.g. 76, 84, 92, and 99 in the
two-population scenario; 156, 165, 168, and 172 in the three-population scenario). It
also does not seem to be fully necessary, given a few examples where α = 0 reached
convexity early on and another type ended up dominating (89 in the two-population
scenario and 152 in the three-population scenario).
Another consequence of the populations evolving separately in this model is that
they do not necessarily evolve towards the same equilibrium. In a sim-max game
such as the one set up here, there are only two stable equilibria. These are the two
Voronoi languages of the kind shown in Figure A.1: one where the first message is
used for the first half of the state space, and the other where the second message
is used for this region. In the multi-population model with loose interaction, each
population evolves independently towards one of these two equilibria. An important
factor determining which language strategies converge to is the random initial popu-
lation configuration. The populations are, however, not fully independent, since the
process of selection of the level of precision relies on the expected utility of one popu-
lation playing against itself and the others. And this is important because strategies
in one equilibrium get the lowest payoff possible against strategies in the other
equilibrium. Now, if two populations evolve towards different equilibria, whatever
advantage one population has playing against itself could trigger a runaway effect
by causing an increase in its proportion, which in turn will increase the population’s
relative expected utility, potentially increasing their proportion further in the next
round, and so forth. In this case, one would expect that faster convergence towards
convexity would be especially important for a population’s success.
In the two-population scenario, of the 8 trials where α = 0 was reduced to 0%, all
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(a) Sender expected utility. (b) Receiver expected utility.
Figure A.6: Expected utilities for trial 88 of the loose interaction model. Verti-
cal lines demarcate, for each type, the iteration where convexity was
achieved.
but two (88, 98) ended with the two populations each close to different equilibria.
In the three-population scenario, the population with α = 0 evolved towards the
same equilibrium as the other two in 1 of the trials where it was eliminated. In
the other 3 trials, in 2 it evolved to a different equilibrium than the other two, and
in 1 it evolved towards the same equilibrium as α = 0.05 (but different to the one
α = 0.1 evolved towards). Again, we do not find a clear case for this being a decisive
factor in the success of populations with some imprecision. The same goes for the
impact of an initial advantage in expected utility creating the runaway effect we just
mentioned. Despite none of these three factors (including reaching convexity sooner)
sentencing the demise of α = 0 with certainty, they do seem to conspire together to
bring it about. In most trials where the type was eliminated, in both the two- and
three-population scenarios, α = 0 ended up evolving towards a different equilibrium
than the other types, and either had an initial disadvantage in expected utility, or
reached convexity much later. These factors can thus be seen as indicators at best,
and the story of how a population with imprecision ends up dominating one without
it seems to be more complicated than expected.
This is not surprising, since we are facing a complex dynamical system with
various interacting components (sender and receiver strategies and multiple popu-
lations).
Just as an example of this, in Figure A.6 we plot the expected utilities of sender
and receiver strategies for both populations of trial 88. The curves up to where
α = 0.05 achieved convexity seem to suggest that the sender strategy of that type
was evolving towards the same equilibrium as the receiver strategy of the other. The
moment where the population reaches convexity marks the point where the sender
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strategy of α = 0.05 aligns with its type’s receiver strategy and this coincides with
the moment when the population seems to gain real traction over the other type (see
again the plot for trial 88 in Figure A.5). In this particular case, reaching convexity
seems to have made an important difference.
A.6 Conclusions
Vagueness presents a challenge to both procedural and instrumental pictures of
rationality alike. In the context of game-theoretical models of language, this takes
the form of a question about evolution: how can vagueness persist if it characterizes
demonstrably less efficient communication? Most existing proposals in the litera-
ture attempt to explain this by considering agents with some degree of bounded
rationality. Despite the many ways in which our rationality is inevitably limited,
the argument for the pervasiveness of vagueness in natural language would be much
stronger if one could also find associated advantages. In this paper, we argued that
finding those might require us to go beyond a local notion of rationality, as two of the
proposals reviewed here (O’Connor, 2014b; Franke and Correia, 2018) suggest. We
advocate moving towards an ecological approach, studying vagueness in more het-
erogeneous ecosystems. Language is part of a very complex system (Beckner et al.,
2009) that involves many components interacting in often unpredictable ways. An
ecology of vagueness would involve studying models where different populations can
evolve and interact with each other, where different language games can be played
between individuals, where the environment is uncertain and changing, or anything
else that more closely approximates the real context of language evolution.
In light of this picture, we have proposed two variants of a concrete multi-
population signaling model to test the hypothesis (Franke and Correia, 2018) that
certain features of imprecise imitation, like promoting faster convergence and regu-
larity, could prove beneficial in contrast with full precision. Analysing these models
did not provide us with a clear-cut answer, and revealed that the story is much more
nuanced than initially expected. In a variant where populations with and without
imprecision interact tightly, although precision always has the upper hand, vague-
ness seems to take a long time to be weeded out. When we let populations interact
more loosely, we see a more complex pattern of outcomes. These include scenarios
where imprecise imitation dominates over full precision, showing that strategies with
vagueness can actually, under certain circumstances, be more successful. Bringing
several populations together in a more complex ecosystem thus allowed us to not
only spell out and test the original intuition, but also learn about unforeseen effects.
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These models thus serve as an example of how moving to a more global perspective
on rationality can allow us to achieve a more detailed awareness of the complex in-
teractions that might be involved in sustaining vagueness in natural language. They
can be seen, we believe, as a first step towards an ecology of vagueness.
Bibliography
Akmajian, Adrian, Ann Kathleen Farmer, Lee Bickmore, Richard A. Demers, and
Robert M. Harnish, eds. (2017). Linguistics: An Introduction to Language and
Communication. Seventh edition. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Alexander, J. McKenzie (2014). “Learning to Signal in a Dynamic World”. In: The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65.4, pp. 797–820.
Alexander, J. McKenzie, Brian Skyrms, and Sandy L. Zabell (2012). “Inventing new
signals”. In: Dynamic Games and Applications 2.1, pp. 129–145.
Allen, Colin and Jacob Neal (2019). “Teleological Notions in Biology”. In: The Stan-
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. Spring 2019. Meta-
physics Research Lab, Stanford University.
Andrews, Michael, Edward Thommes, and Monica G. Cojocaru (2015). “Replicator
Dynamics of Axelrod’s Norms Games”. In: Interdisciplinary Topics in Applied
Mathematics, Modeling and Computational Science. Ed. by Monica G. Cojo-
caru, Ilias S. Kotsireas, Roman N. Makarov, Roderick V. N. Melnik, and Hasan
Shodiev. Vol. 117. Springer Proceedings in Mathematics & Statistics. Cham:
Springer, pp. 29–34.
Argiento, Raffaele, Robin Pemantle, Brian Skyrms, and Stanislav Volkov (2009).
“Learning to Signal: Analysis of a Micro-level Reinforcement Model”. In: Stochas-
tic Processes and their Applications 119.2, pp. 373–390.
Augustine (1993). “The Confessions”. In: Saint Augustine. Ed. by Mortimer J. Adler,
Clifton Fadiman, and Philip W. Goetz. Trans. by R.S. Pine-Coffin. Fourth print-
ing. Great Books of the Western World 16. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., pp. 1–
159.
Austin, J. L. (1962). How to Do Things with Words. William James Lectures. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press.
Axelrod, Robert (1986). “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms”. In: American Po-
litical Science Review 80.04, pp. 1095–1111.
Baker, Gordon (2004).Wittgenstein’s Method: Neglected Aspects. JohnWiley & Sons,
Inc.
207
208 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Baker, Gordon and P. M. S. Hacker (1980). Wittgenstein: Understanding and Mean-
ing. An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations 1. Oxford:
Blackwell.
— (1985). Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity. An Analytical Commen-
tary on the Philosophical Investigations 2. Oxford: Blackwell.
Barrett, Jeffrey A. (2006). “Numerical Simulations of the Lewis Signaling Game:
Learning Strategies, Pooling Equilibria, and the Evolution of Grammar”. In:
Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences.
— (2007). “Dynamic Partitioning and the Conventionality of Kinds”. In: Philosophy
of Science 74.4, pp. 527–546.
— (2009). “The Evolution of Coding in Signaling Games”. In: Theory and Decision
67.2, pp. 223–237.
— (2010). “Faithful Description and the Incommensurability of Evolved Languages”.
In: Philosophical Studies 147.1, pp. 123–137.
— (2012). “On the Coevolution of Basic Arithmetic Language and Knowledge”. In:
Erkenntnis 78.5, pp. 1025–1036.
— (2013a). “On the Coevolution of Theory and Language and the Nature of Suc-
cessful Inquiry”. In: Erkenntnis 79.4, pp. 821–834.
— (2013b). “The Evolution of Simple Rule-Following”. In: Biological Theory 8.2,
pp. 142–150.
Barrett, Jeffrey A. and Kevin J. S. Zollman (2009). “The Role of Forgetting in the
Evolution and Learning of Language”. In: Journal of Experimental & Theoretical
Artificial Intelligence 21.4, pp. 293–309.
Beaney, Michael (2016). “Analysis”. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. Summer 2016. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University.
Beckner, Clay, Richard Blythe, Joan Bybee, Morten H. Christiansen, William Croft,
Nick C. Ellis, John Holland, Jinyun Ke, Diane Larsen-Freeman, and Tom Schoen-
emann (2009). “Language Is a Complex Adaptive System: Position Paper”. In:
Language Learning 59, pp. 1–26.
Beggs, Alan W. (2005). “On the Convergence of Reinforcement Learning”. In: Jour-
nal of Economic Theory 122.1, pp. 1–36.
Ben-Menahem, Yemima (1998). “Explanation and Description: Wittgenstein on
Convention”. In: Synthese 115.1, pp. 99–130.
Bennett, Peter G. (1977). “Toward a Theory of Hypergames”. In:Omega 5.6, pp. 749–
751.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 209
Benz, Anton, Gerhard Jäger, and Robert van Rooij, eds. (2006). Game Theory and
Pragmatics. Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition. London:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Björnerstedt, Jonas and Jörgen Weibull (1995). “Nash Equilibrium and Evolution
by Imitation”. In: The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior. Ed. by Ken-
neth Arrow, Christian Schmidt, Mark Perlman, and Enrico Colombatto. London:
Macmillan, pp. 155–171.
Blackburn, Simon (2006). Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Penguin Books.
Börgers, Tilman and Rajiv Sarin (1997). “Learning Through Reinforcement and
Replicator Dynamics”. In: Journal of Economic Theory 77.1, pp. 1–14.
Boyd, Robert and Peter J. Richerson (1985). Culture and the Evolutionary Process.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Brochhagen, Thomas (2017). “Signalling under Uncertainty: Interpretative Align-
ment without a Common Prior”. In: The British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science.
Brown, George W. (1951). “Iterative Solutions of Games by Fictitious Play”. In:
Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation. Ed. by T.C. Koopmans. New
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Brown, James Robert (1991). The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in
the Natural Sciences. Philosophical Issues in Science. London; New York: Rout-
ledge.
Brown, James Robert and Yiftach Fehige (2017). “Thought Experiments”. In: The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. Summer 2017.
Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
Catteeuw, David and Bernard Manderick (2014). “The Limits and Robustness of Re-
inforcement Learning in Lewis Signalling Games”. In: Connection Science 26.2,
pp. 161–177.
Connelly, Brian L., S. Trevis Certo, R. Duane Ireland, and Christopher R. Reutzel
(2011). “Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment”. In: Journal of Manage-
ment 37.1, pp. 39–67.
Cooper, Rachel (2005). “Thought Experiments”. In: Metaphilosophy 36.3, pp. 328–
347.
Correia, José Pedro (2013). “The Bivalent Trap: Vagueness, Theories of Meaning,
and Identity”. MA thesis. Universiteit van Amsterdam.
— (2019). “Analysis and Explanation in the Philosophical Investigations”. In: Log-
ical Analysis and History of Philosophy. To appear.
210 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Correia, José Pedro and Michael Franke (2019). “Towards an Ecology of Vagueness”.
In: Vagueness and Rationality in Language Use and Cognition. Ed. by Richard
Dietz. Language, Cognition, and Mind. Cham: Springer, pp. 87–113.
Correia, José Pedro and Radek Ocelák (2019). “Towards More Realistic Modeling
of Linguistic Color Categorization”. In: Open Philosophy 2.1, pp. 160–189.
Cover, Thomas M. and Joy A. Thomas (2006). Elements of Information Theory.
Second edition. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell.
Crawford, Vincent P. and Joel Sobel (1982). “Strategic Information Transmission”.
In: Econometrica 50.6, pp. 1431–1451.
Davis, Isaac (2017). “Understanding the Role of Perception in the Evolution of
Human Language”. In: Proceedings of the 39th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society. Austin: Cognitive Science Society, Inc., pp. 1902–1907.
Dawkins, Richard (1976). The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press.
Di Paolo, Ezequiel A., Jason Noble, and Seth Bullock (2000). “Simulation Models
as Opaque Thought Experiments”. In: Proceedings of the Seventh International
Conference on Artificial Life. Ed. by Mark A. Bedau, John S. McCaskill, Norman
H. Packard, and Steen Rasmussen. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 497–506.
Dummett, Michael (1975). “What is a Theory of Meaning?” In: Mind and Language.
Ed. by Samuel Guttenplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 97–138.
— (1996). “Frege’s Myth of the Third Realm”. In: Frege and Other Philosophers.
Oxford University Press, pp. 249–262.
El Skaf, Rawad and Cyrille Imbert (2013). “Unfolding in the Empirical Sciences:
Experiments, Thought Experiments and Computer Simulations”. In: Synthese
190.16, pp. 3451–3474.
Fawcett, Tim W., Steven Hamblin, and Luc-Alain Giraldeau (2013). “Exposing the
Behavioral Gambit: the Evolution of Learning and Decision Rules”. In: Behav-
ioral Ecology 24.1, pp. 2–11.
Fogelin, Robert J. (1976). Wittgenstein. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Franke, Michael (2014a). “Creative Compositionality From Reinforcement Learning
in Signaling Games”. In: The Evolution of Language: Proceedings of the 10th
International Conference. Ed. by Erica A. Cartmill, Seán Roberts, Heidi Lyn,
and Hannah Cornish. World Scientific, pp. 82–89.
— (2014b). “Pragmatic Reasoning About Unawareness”. In: Erkenntnis 79.4, pp. 729–
767.
— (2017). “Game Theory in Pragmatics: Evolution, Rationality, and Reasoning”.
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Linguistics.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 211
Franke, Michael and José Pedro Correia (2018). “Vagueness and Imprecise Imitation
in Signalling Games”. In: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69.4,
pp. 1037–1067.
Franke, Michael, Gerhard Jäger, and Robert van Rooij (2011). “Vagueness, Signaling
and Bounded Rationality”. In: New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence. Berlin,
Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 45–59.
Franke, Michael and Elliott Wagner (2014). “Game Theory and the Evolution of
Meaning”. In: Language and Linguistics Compass 8.9, pp. 359–372.
Frigg, Roman and Stephan Hartmann (2018). “Models in Science”. In: The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. Summer 2018. Metaphysics
Research Lab, Stanford University.
Galeazzi, Paolo and Michael Franke (2017). “Smart Representations: Rationality and
Evolution in a Richer Environment”. In: Philosophy of Science 84.3, pp. 544–573.
Gilboa, Itzhak and Akihiko Matsui (1991). “Social Stability and Equilibrium”. In:
Econometrica 59.3, pp. 859–867.
Glock, Hans-Johann (2007). “Perspectives on Wittgenstein: An Intermittently Opin-
ionated Survey”. In: Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of
Gordon Baker. Ed. by Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian, and Oskari Kuusela.
Reprint edition. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 37–65.
Godfrey-Smith, Peter and Manolo Martínez (2013). “Communication and Common
Interest”. In: PLOS Computational Biology 9.11, pp. 1–6.
Grafen, Alan (1990). “Biological Signals as Handicaps”. In: Journal of Theoretical
Biology 144.4, pp. 517–546.
Grice, H. P. (1957). “Meaning”. In: The Philosophical Review 66.3, pp. 377–388.
Grim, Patrick, Trina Kokalis, Ali Alai-Tafti, Nicholas Kilb, and Paul St Denis (2004).
“Making Meaning Happen”. In: Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial
Intelligence 16.4, pp. 209–243.
Gruender, David (1962). “Wittgenstein on Explanation and Description”. In: The
Journal of Philosophy 59.19, pp. 523–530.
Guala, Francesco (2013). “The Normativity of Lewis Conventions”. In: Synthese
190.15, pp. 3107–3122.
Haack, Robin (1982). “Wittgenstein’s Pragmatism”. In: American Philosophical
Quarterly 19.2, pp. 163–171.
Haack, Susan (1997). “Vulgar Rortyism: Review of Pragmatism: A Reader by Louis
Menand”. In: The New Criterion.
Hacker, P. M. S. (1990). Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind. An Analytical Commen-
tary on the Philosophical Investigations 3. Oxford: Blackwell.
212 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hacker, P. M. S. (1996). Wittgenstein: Mind and Will. An Analytical Commentary
on the Philosophical Investigations 4. Oxford: Blackwell.
— (2007). “Gordon Baker’s Late Interpretation of Wittgenstein”. In: Wittgenstein
and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of Gordon Baker. Ed. by Guy Kahane,
Edward Kanterian, and Oskari Kuusela. Reprint edition. Chichester: Wiley-
Blackwell, pp. 88–122.
— (2012). “Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism”. In: Philosophical
Investigations 35.1, pp. 1–17.
Hagen, Edward H., Nick Chater, Charles R. Gallistel, Alasdair Houston, Alex Kacel-
nik, Tobias Kalenscher, Daniel Nettle, Danny Oppenheimer, and DavidW. Stephens
(2012). “Decision Making: What Can Evolution Do for Us?” In: Evolution and
the Mechanisms of Decision Making. Ed. by Peter Hammerstein and Jeffrey R.
Stevens. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hale, Bob and Crispin Wright, eds. (1997). A Companion to the Philosophy of Lan-
guage. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Hamilton, Nicholas E. and Michael Ferry (2018). “ggtern: Ternary Diagrams Using
ggplot2”. In: Journal of Statistical Software, Code Snippets 87.3, pp. 1–17.
Hamilton, William D. (1964). “The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour. II”. In:
Journal of Theoretical Biology 7.1, pp. 17–52.
Hattiangadi, Anandi (2007). Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Norma-
tivity of Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hauser, Marc D., Noam Chomsky, and William Tecumseh Fitch (2002). “The Fac-
ulty of Language: What is It, Who Has It, and How Did It Evolve?” In: Science
298.5598, pp. 1569–1579.
Hofbauer, Josef and Simon M. Huttegger (2008). “Feasibility of Communication in
Binary Signaling Games”. In: Journal of Theoretical Biology 254.4, pp. 843–849.
Horwich, Paul (2004). “A Use Theory of Meaning”. In: Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research 68.2, pp. 351–372.
— (2008). “Wittgenstein’s Definition of ‘Meaning’ as ‘Use’”. In: Annals of the Japan
Association for Philosophy of Science 16.1, pp. 133–141.
Hume, David (1738). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Huttegger, Simon M. (2007a). “Evolution and the Explanation of Meaning”. In:
Philosophy of Science 74.1, pp. 1–27.
— (2007b). “Evolutionary Explanations of Indicatives and Imperatives”. In: Erken-
ntnis 66.3, pp. 409–436.
— (2014). “How Much Rationality Do We Need to Explain Conventions?” In: Phi-
losophy Compass 9.1, pp. 11–21.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 213
Huttegger, Simon M., Brian Skyrms, Rory Smead, and Kevin J. S. Zollman (2009).
“Evolutionary Dynamics of Lewis Signaling Games: Signaling Systems Vs. Partial
Pooling”. In: Synthese 172.1, pp. 177–191.
Huttegger, Simon M., Brian Skyrms, Pierre Tarrès, and Elliott Wagner (2014).
“Some Dynamics of Signaling Games”. In: Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the United States of America 111.Suppl 3, pp. 10873–10880.
Huttegger, Simon M. and Kevin J. S. Zollman (2010). “Dynamic Stability and Basins
of Attraction in the Sir Philip Sidney Game”. In: Proceedings of the Royal Society
of London B: Biological Sciences 277.1689, pp. 1915–1922.
— (2013). “Methodology in Biological Game Theory”. In: The British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 64.3, pp. 637–658.
— (2016). “The Robustness of Hybrid Equilibria in Costly Signaling Games”. In:
Dynamic Games and Applications 6.3, pp. 347–358.
Jäger, Gerhard (2007). “The Evolution of Convex Categories”. In: Linguistics and
Philosophy 30.5, pp. 551–564.
Jäger, Gerhard, Lars P. Metzger, and Frank Riedel (2011). “Voronoi Languages:
Equilibria in Cheap-talk Games With High-dimensional Types and Few Signals”.
In: Games and Economic Behavior 73.2, pp. 517–537.
Jäger, Gerhard and Robert van Rooij (2007). “Language Structure: Psychological
and Social Constraints”. In: Synthese 159.1, pp. 99–130.
Jiang, Junjie, Yu-Zhong Chen, Zi-Gang Huang, and Ying-Cheng Lai (2018). “Evo-
lutionary Hypergame Dynamics”. In: Physical Review E 98.4, p. 042305.
Jurafsky, Dan and James H. Martin (2009). Speech and Language Processing: An
Introduction to Natural Language Processing, Computational Linguistics, and
Speech Recognition. Second edition. Prentice Hall Series in Artificial Intelligence.
Upper Saddle River, N.J: Prentice Hall.
Kahane, Guy, Edward Kanterian, and Oskari Kuusela, eds. (2007).Wittgenstein and
His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of Gordon Baker. Reprint edition. Chich-
ester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Kanazawa, Takafumi, Toshimitsu Ushio, and Tatsushi Yamasaki (2007). “Replicator
Dynamics of Evolutionary Hypergames”. In: IEEE Transactions on Systems,
Man, and Cybernetics - Part A: Systems and Humans 37.1, pp. 132–138.
Keefe, Rosanna and Peter Smith, eds. (1999). Vagueness: A Reader. Paperback
edition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Klement, Kevin (2016). “Russell’s Logical Atomism”. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. Spring 2016. Metaphysics Research Lab,
Stanford University.
214 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kohn, Marek (2008). “Darwin 200: The Needs of the Many”. In: Nature News
456.7220, pp. 296–299.
Kramer, Jos and Joël Meunier (2016). “Kin and Multilevel Selection in Social Evo-
lution: A Never-ending Controversy?” In: F1000Research 5.
Kraugerud, Hanne A. and Bjørn T. Ramberg (2010). “The New Loud: Richard
Rorty, Quietist?” In: Common Knowledge 16.1, pp. 48–65.
Kripke, Saul A. (1972). “Naming and Necessity”. In: Semantics of Natural Language.
Ed. by Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman. Synthese Library. Dordrecht:
Springer Netherlands, pp. 253–355.
— (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Lassiter, Daniel and Noah D. Goodman (2017). “Adjectival Vagueness in a Bayesian
Model of Interpretation”. In: Synthese 194.10, pp. 3801–3836.
Lawry, Jonathan and Oliver James (2017). “Vagueness and Aggregation in Multiple
Sender Channels”. In: Erkenntnis 82.5, pp. 1123–1160.
Lewis, David (1969). Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Lipman, Barton L. (2009). “Why is Language Vague?” Unpublished.
Loreto, Vittorio, Andrea Baronchelli, and Andrea Puglisi (2010). “Mathematical
Modeling of Language Games”. In: Evolution of Communication and Language
in Embodied Agents. Ed. by Stefano Nolfi and Marco Mirolli. Berlin, Heidelberg:
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 263–281.
Malachowski, Alan (2002). Richard Rorty. Philosophy Now. Chesham: Acumen.
Martínez, Manolo (2019). “Deception as Cooperation”. In: Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological
and Biomedical Sciences, p. 101184.
Martínez, Manolo and Peter Godfrey-Smith (2016). “Common Interest and Signaling
Games: A Dynamic Analysis”. In: Philosophy of Science 83.3, pp. 371–392.
Maynard Smith, John (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
— (1991). “Honest Signalling: The Philip Sidney Game”. In: Animal Behaviour
42.6, pp. 1034–1035.
— (1994). “Must Reliable Signals Always Be Costly?” In: Animal Behaviour 47.5,
pp. 1115–1120.
McDowell, John (2009). “Wittgensteinian “Quietism””. In: Common Knowledge
15.3, pp. 365–372.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 215
McGinn, Marie (2011). “Grammar in the Philosophical Investigations”. In: The Ox-
ford Handbook of Wittgenstein. Ed. by Oskari Kuusela and Marie McGinn. Ox-
ford University Press, pp. 646–666.
Miller, Alexander and Crispin Wright, eds. (2002). Rule-Following and Meaning.
Chesham: Acumen.
Morris, Katherine (2007). “Wittgenstein’s Method: Ridding People of Philosophical
Prejudices”. In: Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of Gordon
Baker. Ed. by Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian, and Oskari Kuusela. Reprint
edition. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 66–87.
Mühlenbernd, Roland (2011). “Learning With Neighbours”. In: Synthese 183.1,
pp. 87–109.
— (2017). “The Change of Signaling Conventions in Social Networks”. In: AI &
SOCIETY, pp. 1–14.
Mühlenbernd, Roland and Michael Franke (2012). “Signaling Conventions: Who
Learns What Where and When in a Social Network?” In: The Evolution of
Language. World Scientific, pp. 242–249.
Nersessian, Nancy J. (1992). “In the Theoretician’s Laboratory: Thought Experi-
menting as Mental Modeling”. In: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of
the Philosophy of Science Association 1992.2, pp. 291–301.
Nersessian, Nancy J. and Miles MacLeod (2017). “Models and Simulations”. In:
Springer Handbook of Model-Based Science. Springer Handbooks. Cham: Springer,
pp. 119–132.
Nowak, Martin A. and David C. Krakauer (1999). “The Evolution of Language”. In:
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 96.14, pp. 8028–8033.
Nowak, Martin A. and Karl Sigmund (2004). “Evolutionary Dynamics of Biological
Games”. In: Science 303.5659, pp. 793–799.
O’Connor, Cailin (2014a). “Evolving Perceptual Categories”. In: Philosophy of Sci-
ence 81.5, pp. 840–851.
— (2014b). “The Evolution of Vagueness”. In: Erkenntnis 79.4, pp. 707–727.
— (2015). “Ambiguity is Kinda Good Sometimes”. In: Philosophy of Science 82.1,
pp. 110–121.
— (2017). “Evolving to Generalize: Trading Precision for Speed”. In: The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68.2, pp. 389–410.
— (2019). “Games and Kinds”. In: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
70.3, pp. 719–745.
Okasha, Samir (2006). Evolution and the Levels of Selection. Oxford University
Press.
216 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Pacheco, Jorge M., Vítor V. Vasconcelos, Francisco C. Santos, and Brian Skyrms
(2015). “Co-evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action with Signaling for a
Quorum”. In: PLOS Computational Biology 11.2. Ed. by Carl T. Bergstrom,
e1004101.
Pagel, Mark (2009). “Human Language as a Culturally Transmitted Replicator”. In:
Nature Reviews Genetics 10.6, pp. 405–415.
Parisi, Domenico (2004). “Language as Pragmatics: Studying Meaning With Sim-
ulated Language Games”. In: Seduction, Community, Speech: A Festschrift for
Herman Parret. Ed. by Frank Brisard, Michael Meeuwis, and Bart Vandenabeele,
pp. 139–149.
Pichler, Alois (2007). “The Interpretation of the Philosophical Investigations: Style,
Therapy, Nachlass”. In: Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory
of Gordon Baker. Ed. by Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian, and Oskari Kuusela.
Reprint edition. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 123–144.
Plant, Bob (2004). “The End(s) of Philosophy: Rhetoric, Therapy and Wittgen-
stein’s Pyrrhonism”. In: Philosophical Investigations 27.3, pp. 222–257.
Portner, Paul (2005). What is Meaning? Fundamentals of Formal Semantics. Fun-
damentals of Linguistics. Malden: Blackwell Publishers.
Proops, Ian (2017). “Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism”. In: The Stanford Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. Winter 2017. Metaphysics Research
Lab, Stanford University.
Putnam, Hilary (1970). “Is Semantics Possible?” In: Metaphilosophy 1.3, pp. 187–
201.
— (1975). “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”. In: Mind, Language and Reality. Vol. 2.
Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
— (1994). Pragmatism: An Open Question. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Qing, Ciyang and Michael Franke (2014). “Gradable Adjectives, Vagueness, and
Optimal Language Use: A Speaker-oriented Model”. In: Proceedings of the 24th
Semantics and Linguistic Theory Conference (SALT 24). Ed. by Todd Snider,
Sarah D’Antonio, and Mia Weigand. LSA and CLC Publications, pp. 23–41.
Quine, Willard Van Orman (1936). “Truth by Convention”. In: Journal of Symbolic
Logic, pp. 77–106.
Ratner, Nancy and Jerome Bruner (1978). “Games, Social Exchange and the Ac-
quisition of Language”. In: Journal of Child Language 5.3, pp. 391–401.
Rescher, Nicholas (2005). What If? Thought Experimentation in Philosophy. New
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 217
Rorty, Richard, ed. (1967). The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical
Method. Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press.
— (1976). “Keeping Philosophy Pure”. In: The Yale Review LXV.3, pp. 336–356.
— (1979). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
— (1982a). Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays, 1972-80. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press.
— (1982b). “Keeping Philosophy Pure: An Essay on Wittgenstein”. In: Conse-
quences of Pragmatism: Essays, 1972-80. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, pp. 19–36.
— (1989). Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
— (1991). “Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the Reification of Language”. In: Essays
on Heidegger and Others. Vol. 2. Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University
Press.
— (2007). “Wittgenstein and the Linguistic Turn”. In: Philosophy as Cultural Pol-
itics. Philosophical Papers 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 160–
175.
Roth, Alvin E. and Ido Erev (1995). “Learning in Extensive-form Games: Experi-
mental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term”. In: Games
and Economic Behavior 8.1, pp. 164–212.
Russell, Bertrand (1905). “On Denoting”. In: Mind 14.56, pp. 479–493.
— (1919). “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”. In: The Monist 29.3, pp. 345–380.
— (1923). “Vagueness”. In: Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 1.2,
pp. 84–92.
Ryle, Gilbert (1962). “Abstractions”. In:Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue
Canadienne de Philosophie 1.1, pp. 5–16.
Sanborn, Adam N. and Nick Chater (2016). “Bayesian Brains without Probabilities”.
In: Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20.12, pp. 883–893.
Santana, Carlos (2014). “Ambiguity in Cooperative Signaling”. In: Philosophy of
Science 81.3, pp. 398–422.
Sasaki, Yasuo and Kyoichi Kijima (2012). “Hypergames and Bayesian Games: A
Theoretical Comparison of the Models of Games With Incomplete Information”.
In: Journal of Systems Science and Complexity 25.4, pp. 720–735.
— (2016). “Hierarchical Hypergames and Bayesian Games: A Generalization of the
Theoretical Comparison of Hypergames and Bayesian Games Considering Hi-
erarchy of Perceptions”. In: Journal of Systems Science and Complexity 29.1,
pp. 187–201.
218 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Schlag, Karl H. (1998). “Why Imitate, and If So, How? A Boundedly Rational Ap-
proach to Multi-armed Bandits”. In: Journal of Economic Theory 78.1, pp. 130–
156.
Sillari, Giacomo (2013). “Rule-following as Coordination: A Game-theoretic Ap-
proach”. In: Synthese 190.5, pp. 871–890.
Simon, Herbert A. (1955). “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice”. In: The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 69.1, pp. 99–118.
— (1986). “Rationality in Psychology and Economics”. In: The Journal of Business
59.4, S209–S224.
Skyrms, Brian (1996). Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
— (2009). “Evolution of Signalling Systems With Multiple Senders and Receivers”.
In: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sci-
ences 364.1518, pp. 771–779.
— (2010). Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Smaldino, Paul E. (2017). “Models Are Stupid, and We Need More of Them”. In:
Computational Social Psychology. Ed. by Robin R. Vallacher, Stephen J. Read,
and Andrzej Nowak. New York: Routledge, pp. 311–331.
Sorensen, Roy (2009). “sorites arguments”. In: A Companion to Metaphysics. Ed.
by Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa, and Gary S. Rosenkrantz. Second edition. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., pp. 565–566.
Speaks, Jeff (2018). “Theories of Meaning”. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-
ophy. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. Winter 2018. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University.
Spence, Michael (1978). “Job Market Signaling”. In: Uncertainty in Economics. Ed.
by Peter Diamond and Michael Rothschild. Academic Press, pp. 281–306.
— (2002). “Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets”.
In: American Economic Review 92.3, pp. 434–459.
Spike, Matthew, Kevin Stadler, Simon Kirby, and Kenny Smith (2017). “Minimal
Requirements for the Emergence of Learned Signaling”. In: Cognitive Science
41.3, pp. 623–658.
Steels, Luc (1995). “A Self-Organizing Spatial Vocabulary”. In: Artificial Life 2.3,
pp. 319–332.
Stern, David G. (2004).Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: An Introduction.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 219
— (2007). “The Uses of Wittgenstein’s Beetle: Philosophical Investigations §293
and Its Interpreters”. In: Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory
of Gordon Baker. Ed. by Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian, and Oskari Kuusela.
Reprint edition. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 248–268.
Stokhof, Martin (2013). “Formal Semantics and Wittgenstein: An Alternative?” In:
The Monist 96.2, pp. 205–231.
Taylor, Peter D. and Leo B. Jonker (1978). “Evolutionary Stable Strategies and
Game Dynamics”. In: Mathematical Biosciences 40.1, pp. 145–156.
Thompson, Bill, Simon Kirby, and Kenny Smith (2016). “Culture Shapes the Evolu-
tion of Cognition”. In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113.16,
pp. 4530–4535.
Tomasello, Michael (2008). Origins of Human Communication. The Jean Nicod Lec-
tures 2008. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Train, Kenneth E. (2009). Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Travis, Charles (2006). Thought’s Footing: A Theme in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations. New York: Oxford University Press.
Unger, Peter (1979). “There Are No Ordinary Things”. In: Synthese 41.2, pp. 117–
154.
Vanderschraaf, Peter (1998). “The Informal Game Theory in Hume’s Account of
Convention”. In: Economics and Philosophy 14.02, pp. 215–247.
Vehtari, Aki and Janne Ojanen (2012). “A Survey of Bayesian Predictive Methods for
Model Assessment, Selection and Comparison”. In: Statistics Surveys 6, pp. 142–
228.
Vul, Edward, Noah Goodman, Thomas L. Griffiths, and Joshua B. Tenenbaum
(2014). “One and Done? Optimal Decisions From Very Few Samples”. In: Cog-
nitive Science 38.4, pp. 599–637.
Wagner, Elliott (2009). “Communication and Structured Correlation”. In: Erkennt-
nis 71.3, pp. 377–393.
— (2012). “Deterministic Chaos and the Evolution of Meaning”. In: The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63.3, pp. 547–575.
— (2013). “The Dynamics of Costly Signaling”. In: Games 4.2, pp. 163–181.
Waller, Bruce (1977). “Chomsky, Wittgenstein, and the Behaviorist Perspective on
Language”. In: Behaviorism 5.1, pp. 43–59.
Watts, Duncan J. and Steven H. Strogatz (1998). “Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-
world’ Networks”. In: Nature 393.6684, pp. 440–442.
220 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Wickham, Hadley (2016). ggplot2: Elegant Graphics for Data Analysis. Springer-
Verlag New York.
Wilensky, Uri and William Rand (2015). An Introduction to Agent-Based Model-
ing: Modeling Natural, Social, and Engineered Complex Systems with NetLogo.
Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Wilson, David Sloan (1975). “A Theory of Group Selection”. In: Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 72.1, pp. 143–146.
Winter, Yoad (2016). Elements of Formal Semantics: An Introduction to the Mathe-
matical Theory of Meaning in Natural Language. Edinburgh Advanced Textbooks
in Linguistics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Wisdom, John (1953). Philosophy and Psycho-analysis. Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. by C. K. Og-
den. London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Trübner.
— (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
— (1958). The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the ‘Philosophical
Investigations’. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
— (2002). The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the ‘Philosophical
Investigations’. Second edition, reprinted. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
— (2009). Philosophical Investigations. Ed. by P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte.
Trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte. Revised
4th edition. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Wright, Crispin (2007). “Rule-Following without Reasons: Wittgenstein’s Quietism
and the Constitutive Question”. In: Ratio 20.4, pp. 481–502.
Zahavi, Amotz (1975). “Mate Selection—A Selection for a Handicap”. In: Journal
of Theoretical Biology 53.1, pp. 205–214.
— (1977). “The Cost of Honesty: Further Remarks on the Handicap Principle”. In:
Journal of Theoretical Biology 67.3, pp. 603–605.
Zollman, Kevin J. S. (2005). “Talking to Neighbors: The Evolution of Regional
Meaning”. In: Philosophy of Science 72.1, pp. 69–85.
— (2011). “Separating Directives and Assertions Using Simple Signaling Games”.
In: The Journal of Philosophy 108.3, pp. 158–169.
Zollman, Kevin J. S., Carl T. Bergstrom, and Simon M. Huttegger (2013). “Between
Cheap and Costly Signals: The Evolution of Partially Honest Communication”.
In: Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 280.1750, p. 20121878.
Zollman, Kevin J. S. and Rory Smead (2010). “Plasticity and Language: An Example
of the Baldwin Effect?” In: Philosophical Studies 147.1, pp. 7–21.
